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FEDERALISM, POSITIVE LAW, AND THE EMERGENCE OF
THE AMERICAN ADMINISTRATIVE STATE: PROHIBITION
IN THE TAFT COURT ERAt
ROBERT POST*
ABSTRACT
This Article offers a detailed analysis of major Taft Court
decisions involving prohibition, including Olmstead v. United
States, Carroll v. United States, United States v. Lanza, Lambert
v. Yellowley, and Tumey v. Ohio. Prohibition, and the Eighteenth
Amendment by which it was constitutionally entrenched, was the
result of a social movement that fused progressive beliefs in efficiency
with conservative beliefs in individual responsibility and self-control.
During the 1920s the Supreme Court was a strictly "bone-dry"
institution that regularly sustained the administrative and law
enforcement techniques deployed by the federal government in its
t This Article makes extensive use of primary source material, including the papers of
members of the Taft Court. All unpublished sources cited herein are on file with the author.
* I am grateful for the incisive comments of Bruce Ackerman, Akhil Amar, Nancy Cott,
Steven Duke, George Fisher, William Fletcher, Charles Fried, Barry Friedman, Robert
Gordon, Roderick Hills, Morton Horwitz, John Langbein, Daniel Meltzer, Bill Nelson,
Edward Purcell, Ceceile Kay Richter, Reva Siegel, Kate Stith, and Bill Stuntz, as well as for
the unfailing research of Deborah Dinner and Robert Wiygul. The recent retirement of Gene
Coakley is an irreparable loss for all of us who have relied upon his inexhaustible assistance.
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losing effort to prevent the manufacture and sale of liquor
throughout the continental United States. This is surprising, because
the Taft Court was in other respects dominated by conservative
Justices, who were temperamentally opposed to the expansion of the
national administrative state, particularly in contexts in which the
national government sought to displace local police power.
Prohibition represented the greatest expansion of federal regulatory
authority since Reconstruction. It caused a major crisis in the theory
and practice of American federalism, as the national government,
which lacked the courts or police necessary for implementing the
Eighteenth Amendment, sought to conscript state judicial and law
enforcement resources.
Close inspection reveals that the Taft Court's support for
prohibition came from an unlikely alliance between two liberal
Justices-Holmes and Brandeis--and three conservative Justices-
Taft, Van Devanter, and Sanford. Three conservative Justices-
McReynolds, Sutherland, and Butler-remained adamantly opposed
to prohibition.
Holmes's and Brandeis's support ofprohibition likely reflects pre-
New Deal liberalism's conviction that courts ought to defer to
democratic lawmaking. This conviction was sorely tested by the
flagrant and persistent defiance of prohibition, as well as by the
repressive criminal and administrative techniques used to secure
prohibition's enforcement. Not only did progressives grow suspicious
of federal regulatory efforts to enforce sumptuary legislation, but they
began to question the legitimacy ofpositive law that lacked resonance
with the customs and mores of the population. These trends in
American liberalism are visible in Brandeis's famous dissent in
Olmstead. They would vanish with the advent of the New Deal and
not reappear until the 1960s, in cases like Griswold v. Connecticut,
at a time when the American administrative state had become as
effectively entrenched as it had been during prohibition in the 1920s.
The opposition to prohibition of McReynolds, Sutherland, and
Butler represents the traditional pre-New Deal judicial conservative
position that positive law, particularly positive national law, was to
be judicially disciplined whenever it departed from customary social
values. The vigorous support ofprohibition by otherwise conservative
Justices like Taft, Van Devanter, and Sanford, by contrast,
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represents a new development in American judicial conservatism.
These Justices fused a conservative belief in social control with-an
embrace of legal positivism. This fusion disappeared from judicial
conservatism with the repeal of the Eighteenth Amendment, and it
did not reappear until the 1970s and the philosophy of Justice
Rehnquist, when judicial conservatism finally came to terms with the
entrenchment of the American administrative state.
The brief constitutionalization of prohibition, in other words,
forced Justices on both the right and the left to stop debating whether
there should be an American administrative state, and required them
instead to reconstruct their judicial philosophy on the assumption
that the administrative state was an unalterable reality. It provoked
a brief efflorescence of judicial perspectives that would not come into
full flower until late in the twentieth century. Prohibition also forced
a rethinking of the appropriate limits of national power, as well as
fundamental developments in the meaning of Fourth Amendment
limitations on law enforcement.
20061
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INTRODUCTION
To recover the significance of prohibition in the United States is
to engage in what Michel Foucault would call archaeology.' The
normal history of the American administrative state simply omits
the era of prohibition. The hiatus is especially striking because the
Eighteenth Amendment's prohibition on the sale and manufacture
of liquor prompted the greatest expansion of federal administrative
responsibility since the days of Reconstruction. Yet the ordinary
narrative of American institutional development leaps directly from
prewar progressivism to FDR's New Deal, skipping lightly over the
1920s. Apparently the collapse of prohibition was so traumatic that
the whole episode has simply dropped from our historical conscious-
ness.
This is a pity, for prohibition has much to teach us about im-
portant themes of American constitutional history. The Eighteenth
Amendment, ratified on January 16, 1919, prohibited "the manu-
facture, sale, or transportation of intoxicating liquors,"2 and the
bone-dry Volstead Act,' enacted by Congress to implement the
Amendment, defined liquor as intoxicating whenever it con-
tained more than 0.5 percent alcohol.' Although the Eighteenth
Amendment had been approved by forty-six of the forty-eight
1. See MICHEL FOUCAULT, THE ARCHAEOLOGY OF KNOWLEDGE 7, 131, 135, 138.40 (A.M.
Sheridan Smith trans., Pantheon Books 1972) (1969).
2. The Amendment provides:
Section 1. After one year from the ratification of this article the manufacture,
sale, or transportation of intoxicating liquors within, the importation thereof
into, or the exportation thereof from the United States and all territory subject
to the jurisdiction thereof for beverage purposes is hereby prohibited.
Sec. 2. The Congress and the several States shall have concurrent power to
enforce this article by appropriate legislation.
Sec. 3. This Article shall be inoperative unless it shall have been ratified as an
amendment to the Constitution by the legislatures of the several States, as
provided in the Constitution, within seven years from the date of the submission
hereof to the States by the Congress.
U.S. CONST. amend. XVIII, repealed by U.S. CONST. amend. XXI.
3. The official name for the Volstead Act was the National Prohibition Act, ch. 85, 41
Stat. 305 (1919), repealed by Liquor Law Repeal and Enforcement Act, ch. 740, 49 Stat. 872
(1935).
4. Id.; see The Nat'l Prohibition Cases, 253 U.S. 350, 387-88 (1920).
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states,5 and although the majority of the states had some form of
local prohibition prior to ratification,6 national prohibition was
5. Although federal documents report Rhode Island as the only state not to ratify the
Eighteenth Amendment, see CONG. RESEARCH SERV., THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED
STATES OF AMERICA: ANALYSIS AND INTERPRETATION, S. Doc. No. 108-17, at 35 n.10 (2d Sess.
2004) (Johnny H. Killian et al. eds., 2002 & Supp. 2004), available at http:/www.
gpoaccess.gov/constitution/pdf2002/007.pdf, in fact Connecticut also failed to ratify. See CONN.
JOURNAL OFTHE SENATE CONFERENCE REPORT, S.J. Res. 56, Spec. Sess., at 1191 (1918); AKHIL
REED AMAR, AMERICA'S CONSTITUTION: A BIOGRAPHY 616 n.28 (2005).
6. State prohibition laws preexisted national prohibition. The prevalence of such laws
had increased dramatically in the years before the United States entered World War I. At the
turn of the century there were only five states with "state-wide laws prohibiting the
manufacture and sale of intoxicating beverages," but by April 1917 that number had increased
to twenty-six. JAMES H. TIMBERLAKE, PROHIBITION AND THE PROGRESSIVE MOVEMENT 1900-
1920, at 149-66 (1966). Of these, only thirteen-all in the southern or western regions of the
country--"'had sought to anticipate on a state-wide basis the drastic bone-dry legislation of
the Eighteenth Amendment." CHARLES MERZ, THE DRY DECADE 22 (1931). The remaining
"dry" states allowed the importation and/or manufacture of alcohol for personal use, although
some restricted the type of alcohol permitted and many limited the amount that could be
imported during any given period. See id. at 20-22. Virtually all of the "wet" states had local
option laws that allowed localities to vote themselves dry or refuse liquor licenses. See
generally WAYNE B. WHEELER, FEDERAL AND STATE LAWS RELATING TO INTOXICATING LIQUOR
(2d ed. 1918). For a compilation of state prohibition laws in effect in 1918, based on Wheeler's
work, see Tables 2 and 3 in the Appendix. It is noteworthy that the effect of the 1917 Reed
Amendment, Law of Mar. 3, 1917, ch. 162, § 5, 39 Stat. 1058, 1069 (1917), was to transform
states that forbade the sale and manufacture of liquor, but that permitted the importation of
liquor for personal use, into bone-dry states. It was observed in 1930:
It is not generally known that bone-dryness is an absolutely new thing in this
country. It did not exist at all before 1914, and substantially not at all before
1917, when the Reed Amendment (a Federal Statute), as a war-time measure,
made it unlawful to ship intoxicants into "dry" states. Before the Reed
amendment went into effect on July 1, 1917, it was lawful in almost every dry
state for residents to have liquor shipped to them from wet states. Many of these
dry states also permitted residents to make their own alcoholic beverages. It
was, accordingly, the fact that before 1914 all, and before 1917 substantially all,
of the dry states were merely partially dry,-the idea being to abolish the saloon,
not to force total abstinence on everyone. These semi-dry laws commanded a
large public support and respect and accordingly did not cause the resentment
which the bone-dry Volstead Act has since aroused. They appear, accordingly,
to have worked much better in practice than the more recent bone-dry law.
THE MODERATION LEAGUE, A NATIONAL SURVEY OF CONDITIONS UNDER PROHIBITION 1930, at
5-6 (1930).
It is difficult to gauge the effectiveness of state prohibition in the years immediately
preceding the Eighteenth Amendment. For a good discussion, see Harry M. Cassidy, Liquor
Control in the United States, 1928 EDITORIAL RES. REP. 683, 693-705. In 1917, the Literary
Digest offered a useful and detailed survey of conditions under state prohibition. Nation-wide
Prohibition as a War Measure: The Story of Prohibition in States Dry for At Least a Year Told
by Their Newspapers, LITERARY DIG., May 26, 1917, at 1573. One Maine newspaper observed
that state prohibition was sometimes undermined by "weak and nullifying officials" but
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divisive from the start. Two constitutional foci of the controversies
that swirled around prohibition are of particular interest.
The first is federalism v The United States had never before
attempted to control the details of everyday life, and the nation
lacked the institutional structures necessary independently to
nonetheless concluded that in rural areas "the law has 'fulfilled its high purpose in a degree
that is admirable beyond measure."' Id. at 1576. Newspapers in Kansas, which had a long
history of prohibition efforts, thought highly of state prohibition laws. The editor of the
Topeka State Journal esteemed them "a great success ... and would recommend [them] to
other States." Id. at 1603. Many newspapers noted that although prohibition had achieved
desirable effects, it had also spawned an underground trade in alcohol that was difficult to
stamp out. The Tulsa World in Oklahoma declared that, while prohibition had succeeded in
eliminating the licensed saloon, "instead we have the 'blind tiger' [i.e., the speakeasy] and the
bootlegger .... The irony of the new condition is that the new evils are not amenable to
regulation, are outlaws from start to finish, yet because of popular demand they remain and
flourish 'in spite of police activity and religious crusades."' Id. at 1613. The Courier News of
Fargo, North Dakota, interpreted this shift as a sign of progress. Believing that
"antiprohibition sentiment is losing ground rather than gaining, with the result that
enforcement makes constant progress," the paper noted that the consumption of alcohol had
moved "from marble-front and beveled-glass interior locations on the best business corners"
to 'low dives, and nauseating places" where "the social element of drinking" had been
eliminated. Id. at 1607. Several newspapers expressed the view that the success of
enforcement depended upon popular opinion. A Georgia paper asserted that "[t]he drink habit
is not going by enforcement until more people believe it is wrong to drink.... So long as a fairly
large number of individual citizens want it, liquor will continue to come to Georgia." Id. at
1610. State prohibitionists expressed optimism on this score. Id. at 1619. In sum, as the
Fayetteville Observer of North Carolina noted, "prohibition has prohibited as much as most
other laws, for all laws are violated." Id. at 1620. What this success portended for national
prohibition, however, was unclear, for, as the Cocino Sun of Arizona presciently warned,
"[g]radually, the United States is going 'dry,' by education and by a general inclination of the
people, but a nation-wide prohibition law would seem at this time so drastic that a revolution
of feeling might result in undoing the good work already done by the States." Id. at 1633.
7. Columbia University political scientist John Burgess remarked that in discussions
"preceding the adoption" of the Eighteenth Amendment,
[m]en did not seem so much impressed by the fact that the individual was to be
totally deprived of his right to determine for himself what he would drink as by
the fact that the jurisdiction of the States was to be reduced.... A number of the
States of the Union had already prohibited the manufacture and sale of
intoxicating drinks and we had become somewhat accustomed to Government
exercising control of the subject. It did not seem so much, therefore, a
deprivation of individual liberty as a centralization of governmental power
already exercised.
JOHN W. BURGESS, RECENT CHANGES IN AMERIcAN CONSTITUTIONAL THEORY 87-88 (1923). At
the time of the adoption of the Eighteenth Amendment "[t]he power of the states ... to prohibit
the manufacture and sale of intoxicating liquor" was considered "so well settled that it is no
longer an open question." ARCHIBALD DOUGLAS DABNEY, LIQUOR PROHIBITION 61 (1920).
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implement the Eighteenth Amendment.8 The federal government
was virtually forced to attempt to conscript state law enforcement
resources, which provoked sustained controversy about the proper
boundary between state and national sovereignty. Both supporters
and opponents of prohibition struggled to understand how the
Eighteenth Amendment's radical enlargement of federal authority
could be reconciled with received ideals of federalism. Many
Americans came to reject the idea that the national government
ought to be involved in detailed police regulations seeking to control
the minutiae of everyday life.
The second is positive law. Positive legislation, as distinct from
common law customary standards, is essential for the development
of an administrative state. Prohibition was a conspicuous form of
such legislation; it sought to reform the entrenched values and
behavior of important segments of the American population. Not
surprisingly, prohibition provoked a fierce and roiling debate about
the legitimacy of positive law which, although democratically
enacted, nevertheless seeks to override engrained social mores. This
debate exposed surprisingly widespread reservations about the
validity of positive legislation. The debate also revealed an intimate
connection between distrust of positive law and distrust of federal
authority.
During the 1920s the Supreme Court, under the leadership of
Chief Justice William Howard Taft, was at the storm center of
prohibition enforcement. The Court split violently over the inter-
pretation and administration of prohibition. Taft remarked to his
son Charles that "[i]t would seem as if more feeling could be
engendered over the Prohibition Act than almost any other subject
8.
The Eighteenth Amendment represents the first effort in our history to extent
[sic] directly by Constitutional provision the police control of the federal
government to the personal habits and conduct of the individual. It was an
experiment, the extent and difficulty of which was probably not appreciated. The
government was without organization for or experience in the enforcement of a
law of this character.
NAT'L COMM'N ON LAW OBSERVANCE AND ENFORCEMENT, ENFORCEMENT OF THE PROHIBITION
LAWS OF THE UNITED STATES, H.R. Doc. No. 71-722, at 20 (1931).
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that we have in the Court."9 'There is something about the issue
that seems to engender bitterness,"' ° Taft observed two years later:
We have had two five to four decisions, Brandeis writing the
majority opinion in each case. Our dear friends Pierce Butler
and George Sutherland are most sensitive on the subject of the
Volstead law, but Holmes, Van Devanter, Brandeis, Sanford and
I are still steady in the boat. Stone wobbles a good deal on the
subject, and I don't quite see where he stands, and I am not
quite sure that he does."
Taft suggests, and independent analysis confirms, that the
disagreements inspired by prohibition cut across the usual divide
that separated judicial conservatives from liberals. 2 That divide
9. "[U]nless," Taft continued, "it be the technical questions of jurisdiction, the excited
feelings over which among the members of the Court amaze me." Letter from William Howard
Taft (WHT) to Charles P. Taft, 2nd (Dec. 28, 1924), microformed on WILLIAM H. TAFF PAPERS,
Reel 270 (Library of Cong. 1969) [hereinafter TAFT PAPERS]. During the 1921 to 1928 Terms,
inclusive, the Taft Court decided 1554 opinions, of which 84.5 percent were unanimous, by
which I mean that they had no dissenting or concurring opinions. During that same period
the Taft Court, by my count, decided sixty-six cases that were connected to prohibition. Of
these cases, only 74.2 percent were unanimous.
10. Letter from WHT to Horace D. Taft (Dec. 12, 1927), microformed on TAFT PAPERS,
supra note 9, Reel 287. Taft was very frank about the opposition provoked by federal statutory
enforcement of Prohibition: "There are certain members of our Court who I dislike to say are
becoming a bit raw in their opposition to the Volstead Act." Id.
11. Id. The only major prohibition case that the Court decided in December of 1927 was
Gambino v. United States, 275 U.S. 310 (1927), a unanimous but politically delicate opinion
authored by Brandeis. Id. at 312. The only five-to.four decision about prohibition that the Taft
Court decided prior to 1927 was Lambert v. Yellowley, 272 U.S. 581 (1926), a decision
authored by Brandeis. Id. at 587. Justices McReynolds, Sutherland, Butler, and Stone
dissented. Id. at 597, 605. In referring to a second five-to-four decision, Taft might have had
in mind United States v. One Ford Coupe Automobile, 272 U.S. 321 (1926), which was also
authored by Brandeis. Id. at 323. McReynolds, Sutherland, and Butler dissented in that case,
and Stone filed a special and limited concurrence. Id. at 335.
12. The Taft Court was a vigorous supporter of prohibition. See infra note 142 and
accompanying text. Figures A and B in the Appendix contrast the voting patterns of Justices
Sutherland, Butler, and McReynolds to those of Taft, Holmes, Van Devanter, and Sanford.
These figures indicate that Sutherland, Butler, and McReynolds were, during the 1920s, less
likely to join or author an opinion for the Court in cases involving prohibition than they were
in cases generally, whereas the reverse was true for Taft, Holmes, Van Devanter, and
Sanford. On the roots of Stone's ambivalent attitude toward prohibition, see infra note 269.
From the time he was appointed to the Court until the end of the 1928 Term, Justice
Sutherland either joined or authored the opinion for the Court in 96.7 percent of the cases in
which he participated. During that same period, however, he either joined or authored the
opinion for the Court in only 90.7 percent of cases involving prohibition. Infra App. Fig. A. For
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was ordinarily drawn over the question of how deferentially courts
ought to review manifestations of the administrative state, and
most especially of the national administrative state. But the
Eighteenth Amendment confronted the Court with a massive fait
accompli committing the national government to a wide-ranging
project of social control. Faced with a seemingly unalterable
constitutional mandate for prohibition, the conservative wing of the
Court split into two factions.
Justices McReynolds, Sutherland, and Butler remained faithful
to a traditional conservative view that was suspicious of positive
governmental regulation. They detested prohibition both because
they opposed the expansion of the national administrative state and
because they believed that positive law ought to be subordinated to
received social values. Conservatives like Taft, Van Devanter, and
Sanford, by contrast, strongly supported prohibition because they
interpreted opposition to the Eighteenth Amendment as resistance
to the legal order itself. Accepting prohibition as irreversible
positive law requiring rigorous enforcement, these Justices pio-
examples of Sutherland's discomfort with the Court's support of prohibition, see Donnelley v.
United States, 276 U.S. 505, 518 (1928) (Sutherland, J., dissenting); Lambert, 272 U.S. at 597
(Sutherland, J., dissenting); One Ford Coupe Automobile, 272 U.S. at 335 (Butler, J.,
dissenting); Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 163 (1925) (McReynolds & Sutherland, JJ.,
dissenting); and Cunard Steamship Co. v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 100, 133 (1923) (Sutherland, J.,
dissenting).
From the time he was appointed to the Court until the end of the 1928 Term, Justice Butler
either joined or authored the opinion for the Court in 97.8 percent of the cases in which he
participated. During that same period, however, he either joined or authored the opinion for
the Court in only 89.3 percent of cases involving prohibition. Infra App. Fig. A. For examples
of Butler's opposition to prohibition, see Lambert, 272 U.S. at 597, 605 (Sutherland, J.,
dissenting); Port Gardner Investment Co. v. United States, 272 U.S. 564, 567 (1926) (Butler,
J., concurring); One Ford Coupe Automobile, 272 U.S. at 335 (Butler, J., dissenting); and
Samuels v. McCurdy, 267 U.S. 188, 200 (1925) (Butler, J., dissenting).
In a 1922 conversation with Frankfurter, Brandeis remarked that "Day & Clarke &
Mc[Reynolds] are quite wild about prohibition." Melvin I. Urofsky, The Brandeis-Frankfurter
Conversations, 1985 SUP. CT. REV. 299, 306. From the time of Taft's appointment as Chief
Justice until the end of the 1928 Term, McReynolds either joined or authored the opinion for
the Court in 94.0 percent of the cases in which he participated. During that same period,
however, he either joined or authored the opinion for the Court in only 87.9 percent of cases
involving prohibition. Infra App. Fig. A. For examples of McReynolds's opposition to
prohibition, see Lambert, 272 U.S. at 597, 605 (Sutherland, J., dissenting); One Ford Coupe
Automobile, 272 U.S. at 335, 351 (Butler, J., dissenting); Carroll, 267 U.S. at 163; Cunard
Steamship Co., 262 U.S. at 132 (McReynolds, J., dissenting); Vigliotti v. Pennsylvania, 258
U.S. 403, 409 (1922) (McReynolds, J., dissenting); and Corneli v. Moore, 257 U.S. 491, 499
(1922) (McReynolds, J., dissenting).
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neered an innovative fusion of conservatism and positivism that
would vanish after the repeal of prohibition and that would not
again reemerge on the Court until William Rehnquist a half century
later.'"
Liberals on the Court, like Holmes and Brandeis, also vigorously
upheld prohibition, a stance that reflected both their embrace of
national authority and their customary progressive deference to the
democratic enactments of positive law. An odd and singular alliance
of conservatives and liberals thus converted the Taft Court into an
institution so staunchly dry that it would eventually be transformed
into a potent symbol of the oppressive bureaucratic apparatus
necessary to sustain prohibition. By the end of the decade the
disparity between this apparatus and fundamental social norms had
become so sharp that Brandeis was prompted to explore issues of
legal legitimacy arising from the contradiction between positive law
and basic social values. In his famous dissent in Olmstead v. United
States,4 Brandeis sketched constitutional protections for privacy
that would foreshadow the subsequent emergence of a liberal
communitarianism dedicated to using essential social norms to
check the potential abuses of government administration. The
repeal of prohibition and liberal support for the New Deal would
defer the emergence of this kind of liberal communitarianism until
the 1960s and cases like Griswold v. Connecticut.5
Prohibition, in short, sparked new forms of jurisprudential
thinking for both conservatives and liberals. These developments
would be short lived because they would vanish with the Twenty-
First Amendment and would not reappear until many years later,
when the existence vel non of the national American administrative
state had come to seem inevitable and irrevocable. To excavate the
lost constitutional debates surrounding prohibition is thus to
uncover the drama of Americans struggling for the first time to
understand the relationship between positive federal law and
13. On Rehnquist's positivism, see SUE DAVIS, JUSTICE REHNQUISTAND THE CONSTITUTION
152 (1989); Robert Post, Foreword. Fashioning the Legal Constitution: Culture, Courts, and
Law, 117 HARV. L. REV. 4, 30 (2003); William H. Rehnquist, The Notion of a Living
Constitution, 54 TEX. L. REV. 693, 704 (1976).
14. 277 U.S. 438, 471 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
15. 381 U.S. 479, 486, 494 (1965) (Goldberg, J., concurring).
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popular values under conditions in which such law no longer seemed
optional, but instead an inescapable national destiny.
I
If one were forced to identify the single issue that most dominated
political attention and debate during the 1920s, prohibition would
certainly be a strong candidate. 6 It was "the largest political issue
... since the Civil War."" In his 1922 State of the Union Address,
President Harding was moved to complain "that many voters are
disposed to make all political decisions with reference to this single
question. It is distracting the public mind and prejudicing the
judgment of the electorate."'" In contrast to the enforcement of state
and local prohibition laws that predated prohibition, 9 federal efforts
to enforce the Eighteenth Amendment were so conspicuously
ineffectual that widespread violation of prohibition became, in
Harding's words, a "nation-wide scandal" that was "the most
demoralizing factor in our public life."'
"Conspicuous and flagrant violations"'" of prohibition provoked a
vigorous discussion about the extent to which federal law could be
used "to effect a radical change in the personal habits of a large
16. Prohibition "has been marked by controversy, nation-wide in scope and almost
unparalleled in intensity." Fabian Franklin, Prohibition Ten Years After, 83 FORUM 209, 209
(1930).
17. HowARD LEE MCBAIN, PROHIBITION LEGAL AND ILLEGAL 14 (1928).
18. Warren G. Harding, Second Annual Message (Dec. 8, 1922), in 3 THE STATE OF THE
UNION MESSAGES OF THE PRESIDENTS, 1790-1966, at 2636 (Fred L. Israel ed., 1967).
19. See supra note 6; see also NAT'L COMM. ON LAW OBSERVANCE AND ENFORCEMENT, supra
note 8, at 39 ("At the time of the adoption of the Eighteenth Amendment, thirty-three states
had adopted prohibition by law or constitution .... In many of ... [these] states the laws were
quite generally enforced before national prohibition."); W.H. Stayton, Our Experiment in
National Prohibition: What Progress Has It Made?, 109 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI.
26, 26 (1923) ("[U]ntil the outbreak of the World War, the only prohibition known in this
country was state or district prohibition-something resting on home rule and local self.
government.... State prohibition laws ... were well known and in some states were favored by
a majority of the voters.... [Tihey were fairly well obeyed and respected,-about as other laws
were; they required for their execution no separate and expensive enforcement divisions, but
were administered by the regular judicial and police forces; they brought no great scandals,
and were reasonably free from corrupting effects. None of these things can, as yet, fairly be
said for the Volstead Act.").
20. Harding, supra note 18, at 2636.
21. John Grier Hibben, Our National Moral Issue: What the 18th Amendment Has Done
to Us, 87 F. & CENTURY 215, 215 (1932).
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part of the population, under the compulsion of the combined
executive and judicial branches of the government of the United
States."22 Prohibition provoked this debate because the Eighteenth
Amendment was a truly astonishing and disorienting social
innovation. Contemporaries of all political stripes recognized the
Eighteenth Amendment as "the most radical political and social
experiment of our day,"2 and prohibition as "one of the most
extensive and sweeping efforts to change the social habits of an
entire nation recorded in history. 24
The radical reach of prohibition was made possible by the "frenzy"
of World War 1.25 The ratification of the Eighteenth Amendment was
22. Martin Conboy, Has the Volstead Act Nullified the Eighteenth Amendment, 16 GEO.
L.J. 348, 350 (1928).
23. Editorial, Progressivism and Prohibition, 46 NEW REPUBLIC 261, 262 (1926).
24. NAT'L COMM'N ON LAW OBSERVANCE AND ENFORCEMENT, supra note 8, at 10.
Prohibition "marks what is perhaps the most radical change that has ever taken place in the
history of a nation." Frank Crane, The Little Church on Main Street, 72 CURRENT OPINION
736, 736 (1922).
25. Progressivism and Prohibition, supra note 23, at 262; see also RICHARD F. HAMM,
SHAPING THE EIGHTEENTH AMENDMENT: TEMPERANCE REFORM, LEGAL CULTURE, AND THE
POLITY, 1880-1920, at 240 (1995) ("The frenzied emotions of war mobilization carried over into
the drive for national constitutional prohibition."). Woodrow Wilson addressed both Houses
of Congress on April 2, 1917, urging that war be declared on Germany. 55 CONG. REC. 102-04
(1917). The Eighteenth Amendment was introduced into Congress two days later, on April 4,
1917, 55 CONG. REC. 197-98 (1917), and proposed by Congress to the States on December 19,
1917. S.J. Res. 17, 65th Cong., 40 Stat. 1050 (1917). Congress did not formally declare war
until April 6. S.J. Res. 1, 65th Cong., 40 Stat. 1 (1917). "[lIt was universally recognized that
one of the most essential steps in winning the war was to suspend the liquor traffic." NATL
COMM'N ON LAW OBSERVANCE AND ENFORCEMENT, supra note 8, at 5. Accordingly, on May 18,
1917, Congress prohibited the sale to soldiers of all intoxicating liquor, including beer, ale, or
wine. Law of May 18, 1917, ch. 15, § 12, 40 Stat. 76, 82-83 (1917).
By the Act of August 10, 1917, c. 53, § 15, 40 Stat. 276, 282, a war measure
known as the Lever Act, Congress prohibited the use after September 9, 1917,
of food materials or feeds in the production of distilled spirits for beverage
purposes and authorized the President to limit or prohibit their use in the
production of malt or vinous liquors for beverage purposes, so far as he might,
from time to time, deem it essential to assure an adequate supply of food, or
deem it helpful in promoting the national security or defense. Under the power
so conferred the President, by proclamation of December 8, 1917, 40 Stat. 1728,
prohibited the production after January 1, 1918, of any "malt liquor except ale
and porter" containing more than 2.75 per centum of alcohol by weight. By
proclamation of September 16, 1918, 40 Stat. 1848, the prohibition was extended
to "malt liquors, including near beer, for beverage purposes, whether or not such
malt liquors contain alcohol"
Jacob Ruppert v. Caffey, 251 U.S. 264, 278-79 (1920). On November 21, 1918, after the
Armistice of November 11, Congress passed the War-Time Prohibition Act, which provided
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"attributed in large measure to the influence of the war,' 26 and
prohibition was seen as "an outgrowth of the reforming and
religious enthusiasm engendered during the war. '27 Throughout the
1920s prohibition stood as the avatar of the anomalous desire of
Americans during World War I to endow the federal government
with comprehensive police powers.28 Although in the immediate
that until the termination of demobilization, which did not occur until after the Eighteenth
Amendment became operative, "no grains, cereals, fruit, or other food product shall be used
in the manufacture or production of beer, wine, or other intoxicating malt or vinous liquor for
beverage purposes.... [N]o beer, wine, or other intoxicating malt or vinous liquor shall be sold
for beverage purposes except for export." Law of Nov. 21, 1918, ch. 212, 40 Stat. 1045, 1046
(1918); see Hamilton v. Ky. Distilleries & Warehouse Co., 251 U.S. 146, 153 (1919). The entire
ratification process for the Eighteenth Amendment thus occurred under various forms of
emergency national wartime prohibition. For a good discussion of wartime prohibition, see
CHRISTOPHER N. MAY, IN THE NAME OF WAR: JUDICIAL REVIEW AND THE WAR POWERS SINCE
1918, at 60-93 (1989). For a summary of federal prohibition in the period before 1920, see
Table 1 in the Appendix.
26. War Breaking Down the Barriers to Prohibition and Woman Suffrage, 64 CURRENT
OPINION 82,83 (1918); accord TIMBERLAKE, supra note 6, at 178 ("In speeding the [Eighteenth]
Amendment through Congress and the state legislatures, the war undoubtedly played an
important part."); The Problem of Prohibition in War Time, 119 OUTLOOK 515, 515 (1918)
(' The sentiment in favor of National prohibition is due primarily to the growing belief that
the evils of the liquor traffic can be overcome only by National action. But it has received a
great impulse from the growing conviction that it is necessary as a war measure.").
27. William Howard Taft, Foreword to LORD SHAW OF DUNFERMLINE, THE LAW OF THE
KINSMEN 10 (1923); see NAT'L COMM'N ON LAW OBSERVANCE AND ENFORCEMENT, supra note
8, at 45; WALTER THOMPSON, FEDERAL CENTRALIZATION: A STUDY AND CRITICISM OF THE
EXPANDING SCOPE OF CONGRESSIONAL LEGISLATION 183 (1923) ("Prohibition became
associated with winning the war."); A. Lawrence Lowell, Reconstruction and Prohibition, 143
ATLANTIC MONTHLY 145 (Feb. 1929); Editorial, The Prohibition Amendment and Its Outlook,
108 CoM. & FIN. CHRON. 1212, 1212 (1919) ("It is probable that when we have had ten years
of perspective ... it will be freely acknowledged that the reformers pressed their advantage
(the advantage of an admission that the war measure was best) at a time when the thought
of the people was engrossed with war, peace, and reconstruction."). But see NOLAN R. BEST,
YES, "IT'S THE LAW" AND IT'S A GOOD LAW 63 (1926) (arguing that "national prohibition was
not a fruit of the Great War," but conceding that "[i]t would indeed not have been brought to
pass quite so soon if there had been no national emergency which compelled economy of food
resources and man power").
28. World War I "witnessed an enormous and wholly unprecedented intervention of the
federal government in the nation's economic affairs." ROBERT HIGGS, CRISIS AND LEVIATHAN:
CRITICAL EPISODES IN THE GROWTH OF AMERICAN GOVERNMENT 123 (1987).
By the time of the armistice the government had taken over the ocean shipping,
railroad, telephone, and telegraph industries; commandeered hundreds of
manufacturing plants; entered into massive economic enterprises on its own
account in such varied departments as shipbuilding, wheat trading, and building
construction; undertaken to lend huge sums to businesses directly or indirectly
and to regulate the private issuance of securities; established official priorities
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aftermath of the war the nation scrambled frantically to return to
"normalcy"29 by dismantling the extensive emergency authorities
that had been allocated to the national government,' ° prohibition
endured because it had been constitutionally entrenched. In the
Republican and conservative environment of the 1920s, prohibition
was a striking reminder of the excesses of the war; it was "some-
thing out of the normal. 31
for the use of transportation facilities, food, fuel, and many raw materials; fixed
the prices of dozens of important commodities; intervened in hundreds of labor
disputes; and conscripted millions of men for service in the armed forces.
Id.
29. President Warren G. Harding, Inaugural Address (Mar. 4, 1921), in 61 CONG. REC. 4,
5 (1921).
30. See generally BURL NOGGLE, INTO THE TWENTIES: THE UNITED STATES FROM ARMISTICE
To NORMALCY (1974). A major exception to immediate wartime demobilization was the steeply
progressive income tax enacted during the war, which survived into the Harding
administration. Harding promptly undertook to reduce the tax. See ROBERT K MURRAY, THE
POLITICS OF NORMALCY: GOVERNMENTAL THEORY AND PRACTICE IN THE HARDING-COOLIDGE
ERA 12, 46-48 (1973).
31. Conboy, supra note 22, at 353; see THOMPSON, supra note 27, at 361-62 ("Perhaps what
makes the enforcement of federal liquor laws especially difficult is that prohibition is a
standard adopted under an agitated and abnormal condition of the public mind created by war
psychology and prematurely imposed."); see also FREDERIC LYMAN COBB, PROHIBITION! THE
CROWNING FOLLY OF THE GREAT WAR'S AFTERMATH 1 (1922):
During the war anything that had the slightest bearing on helping to "win the
war" was proposed and put in operation.
Some of these energies were sane and necessary-many others were nothing
but rampant hysteria, and should have ceased as soon as the war ended. But the
momentum was so great most of them were swept over into peacetime.
What, during the fever of war, seemed perfectly natural and sensible is
entirely out of place now that the war is over.
In this class Prohibition leads them all.
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The "abnormar"2 circumstances of prohibition's ratification set
it athwart the ordinary lines that divided liberals from conserva-
tives. The roots of prohibition lay in evangelical protestant
moralism, so much so that Richard Hofstadter could dismiss it
as "a pseudo-reform" produced by a "rural-evangelical virus"
capable of transmuting "the reforming energies of the country ...
into mere peevishness."33 But prohibition, at least as it matured
in the second decade of the twentieth century, was also "one of the
reforms of the Progressive Movement."' Prohibition expressed
"middle-class" 5 aspirations to use "government action to protect or
32. Letter from WHT to Allen B. Lincoln (Sept. 2, 1918), microformed on TAFT PAPERS,
supra note 9, Reel 197 ("We are acting now under the heroic impulse of a war, which stirs our
feelings and makes us think that we can have a millennium of virtue and self-sacrifice for the
future. This is a fundamental error. I profoundly deprecate having our constitutional
structure seriously amended by a feverish enthusiasm, which will abate to neglect and laxity
in many states as the years go on. If, through the abnormal psychology of war, the thirty-six
states are induced to approve a national prohibition amendment now, we can never change
it, though a great majority of the people may come later to see its utter failure."). At the time
of the proposal of the Eighteenth Amendment, William H. Anderson, state superintendent for
New York for the Anti-Saloon League of America, the primary lobbying group for prohibition,
remarked:
If an emergency, by opening a short cut which avoids the necessity for settling
a lot of technical questions, enables the doing of certain desirable things with
less delay and less friction than would be possible under normal conditions, that
is one of the compensations of such a catastrophe as war.
William H. Anderson, Prohibition or War? The Views of the Anti.Saloon League, 117 OUTLOOK
46, 46 (1917).
33. RICHARD HOFSTADTER, THE AGE OF REFORM: FROM BRYAN TO F.D.R. 287-88, 290
(1955). "[Iln the twenties," Hofstadter notes, prohibition "was the skeleton at the feast, a grim
reminder of the moral frenzy that so many wished to forget, a ludicrous caricature of the
reforming impulse, of the Yankee-Protestant notion that it is both possible and desirable to
moralize private life through public action." Id. at 287. Hofstadter stressed the extent to
which prohibition in the 1920s had become associated with anti-immigrant prejudice, most
especially that associated with the Ku Klux Klan. Id. at 291-93.
34. TIMBERLAKE, supra note 6, at 100; see DEWEY W. GRANTHAM, SOUTHERN
PROGRESSmSM: THE RECONCILIATION OF PROGRESSANDTRADITION 160,173 (1983) (explaining
that prohibition "enlisted the strong support of most southern progressives" and was "the
manifestation of a desire for social uplift of the poor and of a zeal to promote social justice");
J.C. Burnham, New Perspectives on the Prohibition "Experiment"of the 1920's, 2 J. SOC. HIST.
51, 52-53 (1968); Robert A. Hohner, The Prohibitionists: Who Were They?, 68 S. ATLANTIC Q.
491, 500-01 (1969) ("Both prohibitionists and progressives reflected a moral idealism; both
had great faith in progress, efficiency, and science; both attempted to curb the arrogance and
power of big business, to eliminate political corruption, and to reduce crime, poverty, and
disease; both sought to uplift the masses by direct legislation.").
35. TIMBERLAKE, supra note 6, at 152.
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advance the public interest."3 It was advocated to promote health, 7
workplace effectiveness," "war efficiency, " " crime reduction,4 ° the
36. THOMAS R. PEGRAM, BATTLING DEMON RUM: THE STRUGGLE FOR A DRY AMERICA, 1800-
1933, at 130 (1998).
37.
So, I am bound to believe, on the evidence, that if you take alcohol habitually,
in any quantity whatever, it is to some extent a menace to you. I am bound to
believe, in the light of what science has revealed: (1) that you are tangibly
threatening the physical structures of your stomach, your liver, your kidneys,
your heart, your blood-vessels, your nerves, your brain; (2) that you are
unequivocally decreasing your capacity for work in any field, be it physical,
intellectual, or artistic; (3) that you are in some measure lowering the grade of
your mind, dulling your higher esthetic sense, and taking the finer edge off your
morals; (4) that you are distinctly lessening your chances of maintaining health
and attaining longevity; and (5) that you may be entailing upon your
descendants yet unborn a bond of incalculable misery.
Such, I am bound to believe, is the probable cost of your "moderate"
indulgence in alcoholic beverages. Part of that cost you must pay in person; the
balance will be the heritage of future generations.
Henry Smith Williams, Alcohol and the Individual, 31 MCCLURE'S MAG. 704, 712 (1908); see
Eugene Lyman Fisk, The Relationship of Alcohol to Society and to Citizenship, 109 ANNALS
AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 1, 5 (1923).
38. Edward Alsworth Ross, Prohibition as the Sociologist Sees It, 142 HARPER'S MAG. 186,
188 (1921) ("The factory system supplanted the handicrafts, and a new class, the employers,
came to realize how drink plays havoc with production. As workers became machine tenders
the damage from the liquor habit in impairment of efficiency and in injury to delicate and
costly machinery became ever more unmistakable. More and more employers came to look
upon prohibition as a labor-efficiency policy and it was largely these men who financed the
movement which brought the liquor interests to grief, despite their millions for propaganda.");
see Roy A. Haynes, Says Business Man Upholds Prohibition; Haynes Convinced that Industry
Is Won Over by Reason of More Efficiency, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 23, 1923, at 17.
39. The Independent, the official organ of The Efficiency Society, agitated for wartime
prohibition because "human efficiency must be saved to win the war." Editorial, To Win the
War, 90 INDEPENDENT 486, 487 (1917). "We must not forget that when efficiency is concerned
any drink, beer as well as whiskey, is bad." Id. (On the relationship between The Independent
and The Efficiency Society, see id. at 488.); see also Hamilton v. Ky. Distilleries & Warehouse
Co., 251 U.S. 146, 157 (1919) ("[P]rohibition of the liquor traffic is conceded to be an
appropriate means of increasing our war efficiency.').
40. George Elliott Howard, Alcohol and Crime: A Study in Social Causation, 24 AM. J.
Soc. 61, 79-80 (1918) ("Without doubt the saloon is the chief laboratory of the vice and crime
attributable to the use of intoxicating drinks. The closing of the saloon is the indispensable
condition of any successful effort to eliminate the evils caused by alcohol. Wherever the saloon
has been closed, whether by local option or by state-wide prohibition, drunkenness and
therefore vice and crime have been lessened. Everywhere 'dry' towns compare favorably with
license towns in this regard. Why stop with local or state action? Why not demand nation-
wide prohibition? Are not the American people ready to empower and to require the federal
government to outlaw a traffic so destructive of the moral and vital resources of the nation?");
see also Richard J. Hopkins, Prohibition and Crime, 222 N. AM. REV. 40,41 (1925) ("The liquor
traffic has been the dominant cause of crime, misery and pauperism. Intoxicants, directly or
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Americanization of new immigrants, and the control of southern
blacks.41
The anomalous political status of prohibition was rooted in its
unique capacity to serve as a "bridge between the old and the new,
between those who wanted to reform individuals and those who
wanted to reform society."42 As one astute observer remarked,
"[w]hile the propaganda of prohibition still is pre-eminently a moral
one, ... the conclusion is inescapable ... that the extra-religious
support which vitalizes it today has been gained through its
attempted assimilation of the gospel of mental and physical
efficiency which now stands so firmly embodied in our national
character."43 Conservatives supported prohibition because of its
pietistic moralism," its hostility to large unruly urban
populations,45 its nativism," and its commitment to authoritarian
social control.47 Progressives supported prohibition because of its
indirectly, have sent more people to the jails, penitentiaries and insane asylums than any
other cause.").
41. GRANTHAM, supra note 34, at 176; TIMBERLAKE, supra note 6, at 115-24.
42. GRANTHAM, supra note 34, at 173.
43. L. Ames Brown, Is Prohibition American?, 203 N. AM. REV., 413, 414 (1916).
44. See, e.g., GRANTHAM, supra note 34, at 173-74; Brown, supra note 43, at 416-18; Crane,
supra note 24, at 741; Jeremiah Hevenward, Upholding the Constitution, 153 HARPER'S MAG.
476, 476 (1926); Hohner, supra note 34, at 494-95; "Prohibition Anderson"Answers Pertinent
Questions on the Battle Against Alcohol, FORUM, July 1919, at 68-69.
45. See JOSEPH R. GUSFIELD, SYMBOLIC CRUSADE: STATUS POLITICS AND THE AMERICAN
TEMPERANCE MOVEMENT 97-98 (1963); Hohner, supra note 34, at 495.
46. PEGRAM, supra note 36, at 169-73; see also Haynes, supra note 38 ("The foreign
element in our population ... especially in the large cities, perhaps will be a problem always.
Through all our history we have shown the world that foreign standards of life, types of
citizenship, ideals and customs are not sufficient for us. Continued violation of, and contempt
for, our prohibition laws have brought many loyal Americans to this definite conviction: If any
of our ... un-American sons of Europe revolt against the very forces from which has sprung our
greatness, then let them leave our shores. America is working out her destiny in her own
American way. There is no place for the foreigner, or the native born, who ... sets himself
against or apart from American tradition, American institutions.").
47. See, e.g., The Economics of War Prohibition, 38 SURVEY 143, 143 (1917) ('The public
is far better advised today than ever before concerning the effects of the habitual use of
intoxicants in producing criminal, insane and untrustworthy men and women and degenerate
children. Prisons, asylums and public reformatories furnish continuous and abundant
evidence along these lines. The increasing undiscipline of Americans has been observed and
noted by investigators and students for many years. This is evidenced in lack of respect for
parents, for the aged, for officers of the law and for the law itself. It has also been a uniform
observation that these conditions become aggravated whenever and wherever intoxicating
liquors are habitually used." (quoting Maj.-Gen. William Harding Carter)); see also
GRANTHAM, supra note 34, at 176-77.
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association with moral uplift,4 its affirmation of efficiency,49 and its
use of social engineering to achieve social mastery.5"
For both conservatives and progressives, however, prohibition
came at a price. For conservatives the price was commitment to a
social reform that unabashedly sought to use state compulsion to
improve society. Prohibition was in many ways the apotheosis of the
administrative state, for it deployed a vast governmental apparatus
to control intimate details of personal consumption. Even if this
control were acceptable when exercised at the local level by
individual states, the Eighteenth Amendment located responsibility
in the national government, which was required to issue uniform
regulations preempting all local variation.51 Conservatives could
48. GRANTHAM, supra note 34, at 173.
49. See TIMBERLAKE, supra note 6, at 67 (noting that the 1899 Committee of Fifty, which
undertook an investigation of alcohol's role in poverty and crime, believed that the increased
speed, precision, and danger of industrial machinery, as well as the greater intensity and
length of the workday, necessitated workers' sobriety); id. at 80-81 (explaining that the
aspiring middle class and labor unions also identified a relationship between sobriety and
efficiency).
50. See PEGRAM, supra note 36, at 169 ("From its origins in the nineteenth century,
temperance reform had developed as a forward-looking, optimistic social movement. Its
proponents had been modernizers, those who looked forward to social, economic, and moral
improvement."). Prohibition, it was said, "was bound to come as the inevitable consequence
of technical and scientific progress." Henry W. Farnam, Law, Liberty, and Progress, 15 YALE
REV. 433, 441 (1926).
51. In a remarkable series of editorials, for example, the New York Times, objecting to the
"imposition of the prohibition amendment by the Anti-Saloon League and all the pragmatical
busybodies who have bulldozed Congress and are now seeking to bulldoze the State
Legislatures," charged southern conservative Democrats with hypocrisy:
When so many Democrats are more Hamiltonian than HAMILTON, when they
miss no chance to add to the overgrown powers of the central Government, who
could blame the Republicans if they should seek to regulate Federal elections in
the Southern States? If "white supremacy" and local self-government are
threatened at any time in the South, whose fault will it be? The fault of
Democrats who have forgotten or renounced the historic and cardinal doctrines
of the Democratic Party.
Editorial, State Rights Democrats, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 15, 1918, at 14. Three months earlier the
Times, apropos of Southern Democrats, had made the same point:
The old ragers against "centralization" have become its devotees. To speak of
"State rights" is almost like speaking of an ancient world, of the Kentucky and
Virginia resolutions. Yet the preservation to the several States of their
undelegated and unprohibited ... powers ... should be striven for by every man
who wants the American form of government to retain something of its original
principles, who believes in local initiative and self-government, who is not
willing to sacrifice the power of the State to the all-swallowing Federal monster.
State Rights and Prohibition, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 9, 1918, at 12. In 1922 Fabian Franklin
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support prohibition only by advocating "an experiment in federal
centralization, which, if successful, would radically alter the
customary and the appropriate distribution of responsibility for
social welfare between Washington and the state capitals."52
For progressives the price was more subtle. Progressives had long
aspired to endow the federal government with the democratic
legitimacy necessary to sustain the kind of extensive social regula-
tion required by prohibition. But progressives in the 1920s were
highly ambivalent about prohibition," because the Eighteenth
Amendment was a legal cataclysm of such unimaginable proportions
that it undermined basic progressive assumptions about the
desirability of the national administrative state. As the New
Republic reported, "[n] ational prohibition" had been ratified "on the
supposition that the American people would on the whole support
confirmed the accuracy of the Times's prediction. He caustically observed that after 1919
Southern Senators and Representatives and Legislaturemen who, forgetting
about their cherished doctrine of State rights, had fallen over themselves in
their eagerness to fasten the Eighteenth Amendment upon the country,
suddenly discovered that they were deeply devoted to that doctrine when the
Nineteenth Amendment came up for consideration. But nobody would listen to
them.
FABIAN FRANKLIN, WHAT PROHIBITION HAS DONE TO AMERICA 30-31 (1922).
52. The Progressive Attitude Towards Prohibition?, 56 NEW REPUBLIC 166, 167 (1928).
The eighteenth amendment has profoundly altered our federal system of
government. In comparison, the commerce clause is a frail instrument of
potential centralization. If Congress ever casts off hypocrisy and sets up the
necessary machinery for adequate federal enforcement, we shall enjoy a national
bureaucracy worthy of our boasted "bigness" in other respects. No wonder
Congress pauses before the plain logic of the amendment.
MCBAIN, supra note 17, at 168.
53. The New Republic reported that the question of prohibition
divides the progressives one from another just as sharply and irreconcilably as
it does the Democrats and the Republicans. The western progressives outside of
Wisconsin are for the most part dry, but there are many exceptions to this rule
particularly among labor-union groups. The eastern progressives who live for the
most part in large cities are more likely to be wet, but there is probably a larger
proportion of dry progressives in the east than of wet progressives in the west.
The social workers, for instance, who tend to be progressive are usually
convinced supporters of prohibition, and while this group is not numerous, it is
composed of unusually disinterested and intelligent voters. There is no
consensus of opinion in any part of the country among progressives as to what
attitude as progressives they should adopt toward prohibition.
Progressivism and Prohibition, supra note 23, at 261.
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its enforcement," '54 but "this calculation ... prove[d] to be entirely
false."55 The Eighteenth Amendment instead
provoked a stubborn and widespread violation of the law, and as
the years have come and gone this resistance has increased
rather than diminished.... [I]t has provoked dogged resistance on
the part of several states .... The resistance has attained at the
present time almost the dignity and importance of an organized
insurrection against the authority of the federal government ....
It is certain now that the rules of conduct prescribed for all
American citizens by the Eighteenth Amendment and the
Volstead act will be disobeyed by a minority of the American
people so large and so segregated that they cannot be forced to
obey without some huge expenditure of money and police power
by the federal government.
56
It was almost immediately evident that prohibition could succeed
only if it were sustained by the kind of focused national coercive
power that risked making the federal government "feared, disliked
and suspected by many millions of American citizens."57 To the
extent that enforcing prohibition "brought [the national govern-
ment] into suspicion, disrepute and even contempt," 8 it contradicted
"[t]he first condition of a progressive revival," which was "the
restoration of the federal government in the esteem, the loyalty and
the obedience of the American people."59 Prohibition thus provoked
progressives to rethink the normative foundations of American
federalism. It forced liberals to consider whether certain forms of
"social behavior" should "in any well balanced federal system ... be
treated at least partly as a matter of local rather than of national
responsibility."60
Prohibition also required progressives to question the proper
boundaries of the administrative state. The "volume, the stubborn-
ness and the unscrupulousness of the existing resistance to the
54. Id. at 262. The "doctrine of cooperative exercise of state and national power over
liquor" was at the heart of the dry movement. HAMM, supra note 25, at 255.
55. Progressivism and Prohibition, supra note 23, at 262.
56. Id. at 262-63.
57. Id. at 263.
58. The Progressive Attitude Towards Prohibition?, supra note 52, at 167.
59. Id.
60. Id. at 166.
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law"'" by millions of citizens who were "in other respects law-
abiding," and who included "all the business, artistic, professional,
labor and political leaders of the larger cities,' 62 raised for progres-
sives the "totally new question" of whether law could "exterminate
a habit of popular conduct to which people are so stubbornly
attached."63 To the extent that progressivism aspired to express "the
collective conscience of the community in its effort to make for more
and better human life, ' 64 prohibition required progressives to think
anew about the relationship between traditional values and positive
law.
The New Republic, for example, concluded that government "must
expect to have its authority flouted" when "it forbids its citizens to
perform innocent and inoffensive acts of private conduct."65 This
dependence of legal legitimacy on the brute facts of popular custom
carried with it the startling idea that progressives may previously
have "over-emphasized the importance of government as the
instrument of human amelioration,"6 6 because the "moral authority
of the government does not rest on its legal right to issue com-
mands.6 7 Prohibition exposed the many ways in which legal
legitimacy was dependent upon custom, even as progressives sought
to use positive law to reform traditional mores.
It was of course possible for conservatives and liberals to debate
prohibition in the old and familiar ways. Conservatives could
condemn prohibition because it was "a gross outrage upon personal
liberty' 6 that represented a giant stride toward socialism, and
because it entailed "the suppression of individuality, the exaltation
of the collective will and the collective interest, the submergence of
the individual will and the individual interest.
69
The cause of Prohibition has owed its rapid success in no small
measure to the support of great capitalists and industrialists
61. Progressivism and Prohibition, supra note 23, at 263.
62. The Progressive Attitude Towards Prohibition?, supra note 52, at 167.
63. Progressivism and Prohibition, supra note 23, at 263.
64. The Progressive Attitude Towards Prohibition?, supra note 52, at 166.
65. Id. at 167.
66. Id. at 166.
67. Id. at 167.
68. FRANKLIN, supra note 51, at 98.
69. Id. at 117-18.
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bent upon the absorbing object of productive efficiency; but they
have paid a price they little realize. For in the attainment of this
minor object, they have made a tremendous breach in the
greatest defense of the existing order of society against, the
advancing enemy. To undermine the foundations of Liberty is to
open the way to Socialism.7"
And progressives could counter by reaffirming the necessity for
active state intervention in order to achieve required social reform.
In 1927 the president of the National Conference of Social Work
invoked "the great progressive movement of 1910 to 1914''71 as a
platform from which to lambaste "[t]he anti-prohibitionists" who,
"with their cry of personal liberty, ... have about wrecked the true
conception of government control of evils ."72
To be consistent those same destructionists go so far as to
condemn any and all control of conduct .... What may the
government regulate, control, or prohibit if not such human
destroyers as ... intoxicating liquors? ... No previous time in our
history has seen such a concerted movement to break the
confidence of the people in their government as an instrument
for human betterment.73
Framed in this way, prohibition merely prompted an old and
familiar dialogue about the desirability of the emerging administra-
tive state. These issues had been debated throughout the progres-
sive era and would continue to be discussed throughout the
70. Id. at 120. The Commercial & Financial Chronicle opposed prohibition as part of its
general hostility to what it called "reform":
The moral of it all is, and it is a very big moral, that we cannot preserve either
our liberties, our institutions, or our peculiar form of government, if we are to
let self-appointed guardians of the public weal seek the cover of general law for
the purpose of obtaining their self-satisfying ends. This prohibition measure and
mandate is but one of these ends. It is, whether good or bad, a theory of the
proper social life. In precisely the same manner theorists are seeking to control
individual life in commerce .... And, it is worth repeating, while we are saving
the world we are sleeping on our own rights ....
The Prohibition Amendment and Its Outlook, supra note 27, at 1212-13.
71. John A. Lapp, President, Nat'l Conference of Soc. Work, Justice First, Presidential
Address at the National Conference of Social Work (May 11, 1927), in PROCEEDINGS OF THE
NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF SOCIAL WORK 3, 5, 7 (1927).
72. Id. at 7.
73. Id.
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twentieth century. The unique characteristic of prohibition,
however, was that it could provoke a discussion that transcended
this debate, because it forced sophisticated Americans to face the
jurisprudential and constitutional challenges that would emerge
once the existence of the national administrative state was already
in place and constitutionally entrenched. Prohibition required both
conservatives and liberals to reconsider the fraught relationship
between positive law and traditional values, and, in particular, to
address the difficult question of how the continuous deployment of
state coercion could undermine the legitimacy of the legal order
itself. It forced both conservatives and liberals to address this
question in the context of specifically national responsibility and
authority.
II
Prohibition put enormous strain on the ideals of federalism to
which the country was committed in the years before World War I.
Most constitutional grants of federal power simply authorize the
national government to regulate in a particular domain, such as
interstate commerce. But the Eighteenth Amendment was different
because, like the Thirteenth Amendment, it imposed a particular
rule of conduct that forbade "the manufacture, sale, or transporta-
tion of intoxicating liquors ... for beverage purposes."74 The Volstead
Act, passed on October 28, 1919, over Woodrow Wilson's veto, used
a strict 0.5 percent alcohol content standard to define "intoxicating
liquors."7" With the passage of the Act, the federal government
74. U.S. CONST. amend. XVIII, § 1.
75. Volstead Act, ch. 85,41 Stat. 305 (1919) (repealed 1935); see Jacob Ruppert v. Caffey,
251 U.S. 264, 280 (1920). The Volstead Act "was designed as 'a 1920 model of efficiency and
speed." HAMM, supra note 25, at 251. The Act defined intoxicating beverages by reference to
the standard previously used in the application of the War-Time Prohibition Act. See supra
note 25 and accompanying text.
On February 6, 1919, the Commissioner of Internal Revenue ruled ... that a
beverage containing as much as one-half of one per centum of alcohol by volume
would be regarded as intoxicating within the intent of the Act of November 21,
1918 .... [Slince 1902 ... fermented liquor containing as much as one-half of one
per centum of alcohol had been treated as taxable under Rev. Stats. §§ 3339 and
3242; and this classification was expressly adopted in the War Revenue Act of
October 3, 1917, c. 63, § 307, 40 Stat. 311.
Jacob Ruppert, 251 U.S. at 279-80.
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suddenly found itself responsible for suppressing all trade and
manufacture of liquor in the United States, a task for which it was
utterly unprepared.6
Over the opposition of the Secretary of the Treasury and the
Commissioner of Internal Revenue, Congress specified in the
Volstead Act that prohibition be enforced by the Bureau of Internal
Revenue." But compliance with the draconian provisions of the
Volstead Act could be ensured only by "an army of enforcement
agents far larger than it would be practicable to assemble or obtain
an appropriation for. '7'  The Commissioner therefore promptly
announced that the Bureau could fulfill its responsibility only by
securing "the closest cooperation between the Federal officers and
all other law-enforcing officers-State, county, and municipal. 79
The striking fact about prohibition was that this cooperation was
not forthcoming, even though virtually every state eventually
76. The origins of the now-familiar debate about the "federalization of local crime" lie in
prohibition. For a contemporary example of that debate, see John S. Baker, Jr., State Police
Powers and the Federalization of Local Crime, 72 TEMP. L. REV. 673 (1999).
77. Volstead Act, ch. 85, tit. 1, § 2,41 Stat. 305 (1919) (repealed 1935). Evidently, said the
Commissioner of Internal Revenue in his report for 1919, Congress was impressed by "the
similarity of some phases of the work of internal-revenue agents in the field who are assigned
to secure evidence and aid in the prosecution of persons who have evaded the taxes imposed
by law on the manufacture and sale of alcoholic beverages with the police function of
prohibition enforcement officers." 1919 COMM'R INTERNAL REVENUE ANN. REP. 62. The Anti-
Saloon League vigorously advocated allocating prohibition enforcement to the Treasury
Department in part because the League anticipated that an overworked IRS commissioner
would rely on League advice in decisions involving personnel and enforcement policy. PEGRAM,
supra note 36, at 153-54; ANDREW SINCLAIR, PROHIBITION: THE ERA OF ExcEss 273-76 (1962).
78. No Way To Execute Harding Dry Order; Enforcement Officials Declare Army of Agents
Is Necessary To Stop Bootlegging, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 28, 1922, at 6.
79. COMM*R INTERNAL REVENUE ANN. REP., supra note 77, at 62. Plainly daunted by the
task imposed upon him, the Commissioner declared:
The Bureau naturally expects unreserved cooperation also from those moral
agencies which are so vitally interested in the proper administration of this law.
Such agencies include churches, civic organizations, educational societies,
charitable and philanthropic societies, and other welfare bodies. The Bureau
further expects cooperation and support from all law-abiding citizens of the
United States who may have been opposed to the adoption of the constitutional
amendment and the law, which in pursuance of that amendment makes
unlawful certain acts and privileges which were formerly not unlawful. Thus, it
is the right of the Government officers charged with the enforcement of this law
to expect the assistance and moral support of every citizen in upholding the law,
regardless of personal conviction.
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passed its own version of a prohibition statute.' By 1923 President
Harding was complaining that although "the Federal government
is not equipped with the instrumentalities to make enforcement
locally effective" because "it does not maintain either a police or a
judicial establishment adequate or designed for such a task," the
States were nevertheless
disposed to abdicate their own police authority in this matter,
and to turn over the burden of prohibition enforcement to the
Federal authorities. It is a singular fact that some States which
successfully enforced their own prohibition statutes before the
eighteenth amendment was adopted have latterly gone back-
wards in this regard."1
80. "If one fact was abundantly clear by 1930 it was the failure of the federal government,
after ten years of earnest exhortation, to persuade the states to make a realistic effort to
enforce prohibition in the United States." MERZ, supra note 6, at 279.
Parsimonious state legislatures, even the ultra-dry Oklahoma General
Assembly, refused to allocate sufficient funds for implementation of prohibition
on the grounds that the national government should pay for enforcement.
Officials in thirsty states did as little as they could and let federal officials bear
the brunt of their constituents' hostility to the enforcement of prohibitory laws.
In 1926 the state legislatures allocated eight times more to implement fish and
game laws than to enforce prohibition.
HAMM, supra note 25, at 266; see also Burnham, supra note 34, at 58 ('[1In 1927 only eighteen
of the forty-eight states were appropriating money for the enforcement" of prohibition.). In
1927 total state expenditure for the enforcement of prohibition was about $690,000. PEGRAM,
supra note 36, at 159.
81. Dry Law To Be Enforced, With or Without States'Help, Says President;Policy Will Not
Be Modified Except by Adding Strength, WASH. PosT, June 26, 1923, at 9 (quoting President
Harding). Harding observed that "[c]ommunities in which the policy was frankly accepted as
productive of highly beneficial results, and in which there was no widespread protest so long
as it was merely a State concern, report that since the Federal government became in part
responsible there has been a growing laxity on the part of State authorities about enforcing
the law." Id. Harding warned that
[i]f the burden of enforcement shall continue to be increasingly thrown upon the
Federal government, it will be necessary, at large expense, to create a Federal
police authority, which in time will inevitably come to be regarded as an
intrusion upon and interference with the right of local authority to manage local
concerns. The possibilities of disaster in such a situation hardly need to be
suggested.
Id. Leading prohibitionists acknowledged the "embarrassment to enforcement" caused by
the indifference of State and local officials in many sections who shifted to the
Federal Government the entire responsibility for ferreting out violators of the
law and seeing that it was enforced. It had never been expected that State and
local authorities would abdicate their duties and responsibilities and place on
the national authorities the enormous task of policing our entire territory.
WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW
Four years later, Lincoln Andrews, the Assistant Secretary of the
Treasury in charge of prohibition enforcement, grumbled that
[s]tate, county and municipal law officers tended to overlook
their own civic responsibilities under their community laws, and
to pass the responsibility for prohibition law enforcement to the
Federal law and its agents. The citizens of the country generally
... looked to the national law in Federal hands for the enforce-
ment of prohibition.82
Andrews observed that citizens "resented this exercise of police
power on the part of the Federal agents within their own communi-
ties ... in previously dry states, as well as in those that had never
previously accepted state prohibition."8
Without the active and willing assistance of state police, the only
option for federal prohibition enforcement would be, as Taft had
pointed out in 1915, a "horde of Federal officials" who would
constitute "a direct blow at local self-government and at the
integrity of our Federal system, which depended on preserving the
control by the States of parochial and local matters."'  "[S]uch a
superimposed Federal police power," said Andrews, "is to my mind
absolutely unthinkable in America, and bad enough in Russia.
Such a solution is predicated upon so false a conception of our
government as to offend the very fundamentals of our institutions,
and I believe it could never be accepted by a thoughtful public."85
Edwin C. Dinwiddie, Is National Prohibition a Success?, 4 CONG. DIG. 26, 26 (1924).
82. Lincoln C. Andrews, Prohibition Enforcement as a Phase of Federal Versus State
Jurisdiction in American Life, 129 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. SOC. SCI. 77, 82 (1927); see also
Hibben, supra note 21, at 217 ("The states cannot be compelled to exercise concurrent power
and corresponding legislation; this, according to the decision of the United States Supreme
Court. Many states have refused to do so. Their attitude for the most part, and this is true
also even of the states which had prohibition laws before the National Prohibition Act, is in
a way a natural one: that the enforcement of prohibition is now a federal concern in which the
state has no further responsibility and that many states do not care to assume the financial
obligation thus necessitated.").
83. Andrews, supra note 82, at 82-83. For a good history of failed federal efforts to
stimulate state enforcement of prohibition, see MERTZ, supra note 6, at 257-81.
84. Letter from WHT to Mrs. Elizabeth Hewes Tilton (Jan. 3, 1913), in For Local Option,
Mr. Taft Explains; Ex-President Amplifies Recent Address in Which He Opposed National
Prohibition, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 24, 1915, at 10.
85. Andrews, supra note 82, at 84. "No one knows," observed Andrews,
how many policemen would be necessary, and how many Federal police courts
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Whether for this or for some other reason, Congress throughout
the 1920s refused to fund federal prohibition enforcement at
anything close to the levels that would have been required to ensure
full compliance with the law.86 National prohibition enforcement
was understaffed,87 with agents who were underpaid88 and unprofes-
sional.89 The federal judicial system was completely unprepared to
would be required, but the numbers certainly would be tremendous, and the
political and social effects of their daily contact with the intimate affairs of the
citizens of the communities might easily be most disastrous to democratic
institutions.
Id.
86. MERZ, supra note 6, at 75-157, 265. "Congress has never seen fit to set up the
machinery for' the "complete enforcement" of prohibition. MCBAIN, supra note 17, at 32.
That would entail a vast increase in the number of prohibition agents, of
prosecuting attorneys, and of courts. The cost would be staggering....
The monetary cost, however, would be as nothing compared to the cost to our
system of government.... If Congress should create the machinery for its up-to-
the-hilt enforcement, it must of necessity spread a veritable army of federal
policemen over the land. It must set up a giant bureaucracy emanating from
Washington....
Why does Congress hesitate? No doubt its motives are mixed. To plead
poverty is to hide behind a shadow....
... A gigantic national police force is antipathetical to our federal scheme of
things. Such a force is nevertheless the plain logic of national prohibition .... To
enact a stringent enforcement law, such as the Volstead Act, and to provide
enforcement machinery that is notoriously far short of adequacy is a gesture of
sheer hypocrisy.
Id. at 32-34. "[Meager allocations guaranteed only token federal enforcement, carried on by
a skeleton force unequal to the task." HAMM, supra note 25, at 267. Between 1921 and 1926,
annual congressional appropriations for the Prohibition Bureau were between six and ten
million dollars. PEGRAM, supra note 36, at 159.
87. MERZ, supra note 6, at 119-21.
88. Id. at 79.
89. Until 1927, prohibition agents were not in the regular civil service, and as a
consequence positions in national prohibition enforcement were an important source of
political patronage. Id. at 94-97, 106-07, 189-90. The ranks of federal enforcement officials
were filled by "party hacks and patronage hunters. The National Civil Service League, along
with many Americans, thought that most federal prohibition officers were at best incompetent
and untrained and at worst venal and dishonest." HAMM, supra note 25, at 267. Assistant
Attorney General Mabel Willebrandt, who was in charge of prohibition enforcement at the
Justice Department, complained:
At present we haven't had the right kind of investigators. Many of them are
well-meaning, sentimental and dry, but they can't catch crooks. The sole object
of others has been to appropriate all the graft in sight, and they won't catch
crooks. These two classes have obtained their positions largely because
prohibition enforcement officers have been appointed at the instance of
Senators, Congressmen and political leaders. The average Senator or
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deal with the huge influx of cases generated by prohibition.9 H.L.
Mencken famously quipped that "[p]erhaps the chief victims of
Prohibition, in the long run, will turn out to be the Federal judges,"
whose "typical job today, as a majority of the plain people see it,
especially in the big cities, is simply to punish men who have
refused or been unable to pay the bribes demanded by Prohibition
enforcement officers."'" The massive numbers of prohibition
prosecutions92 forced federal courts "to perform the function of petty
police courts.""3
Congressman recommends a man because he has been useful politically or
because he is an Anti-Saloon Leaguer, a confirmed dry or a widely known
Sunday school teacher; but that kind of man doesn't often make a good detective.
A.H. Ulm, A Woman Directs the Dry Battle; Mrs. Willebrandt, In Charge of the Legal End of
Prohibition, Believes the Law Must Be Enforced Without Fear or Political Favor, To Protect
the Nation's Honor, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 25, 1925, § 4 (Magazine), at 1 (quoting Mabel Walker
Willebrandt); see MABEL WALKER WILLEBRANDT, THE INSIDE OF PROHIBITION 111-41 (1929).
"When in 1927 Congress finally got around to requiring professional examinations for field
agents, the results were disastrous. The Commissioner of Prohibition admitted that almost
three-quarters of his men had failed the test." WALTER F. MURPHY, WIRETAPPING ON TRIAL:
A CASE STUDY IN THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 11-12 (1965). "During the first six years of
prohibition, one of every twelve [prohibition] agents was fired" for some form of corruption.
PEGRAM, supra note 36, at 159.
90. 'The condition of the American judiciary in the twenties was such that there was no
hope of enforcing the Volstead Act." SINCLAIR, supra note 77, at 211; see id. at 209-14.
91. H.L. Mencken, Editorial, 1 AM. MERCURY 161, 161 (1924).
92. Prosecutions for violations of the Volstead Act increased from 29,114 in 1921 to 74,723
in 1929. MERZ, supra note 6, at 332-33.
93. Prohibition and Federal Judges, N.Y. TIMES, May 29, 1925, at 16; see also NAVL
COMM'N ON LAW OBSERVANCE AND ENFORCEMENT, supra note 8, at 56:
Lawyers everywhere deplore, as one of the most serious effects of prohibition,
the change in the general attitude toward the federal courts. Formerly these
tribunals were of exceptional dignity, and the efficiency and dispatch of their
criminal business commanded wholesome fear and respect.... The effect of the
huge volume of liquor prosecutions, which has come to these courts under
prohibition, has injured their dignity, impaired their efficiency, and endangered
the wholesome respect for them which once obtained. Instead of being
impressive tribunals of superior jurisdiction, they have had to do the work of
police courts and that work has been chiefly in the public eye. These deplorable
conditions have been aggravated by the constant presence in and about these
courts of professional criminal lawyers and bail-bond agents, whose unethical
and mercenary practices have detracted from these valued institutions.
Id. A more colorful assessment was offered in 1924 in a private letter by federal district judge
Martin J. Wade:
When I came on the Bench ten years ago in March next, the position was one
of dignity and honor, to-day, if one stepped into a Federal Court during more
than fifty per cent of each Session, he would think he was in a police court,
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It is no wonder that Coolidge sought to solve the problem of pro-
hibition enforcement by arguing that the Eighteenth Amendment
"puts a concurrent duty on the States. We need their active and
energetic cooperation, the vigilant action of their police, and the
jurisdiction of their courts to assist in enforcement." 4 Coolidge
appealed to the enigmatic second section of the Eighteenth
Amendment, which provided that "It]he Congress and the several
States shall have concurrent power to enforce this article by
appropriate legislation."95 Section 2 of the Eighteenth Amendment
raised a deep question about the constitutional structure of
American federalism, for it forced contemporaries to theorize the
relationship between independent state sovereignty and the
affirmative constitutional requirement of prohibition.
swarming with Italians and Poles, and Greeks, Chinamen, "niggers", and
samples of nearly all the races, with weeping wives and bawling children,
bootleggers, dope fiends, dope peddlers, White Slavers, etc. etc. The work, the
worry, the responsibility, are more than double what they were in 1915.
Letter from Martin J. Wade to Senator Thomas Walsh (Dec. 30, 1924) (Walsh Papers). Wade
was writing in support of an increase in pay for federal judges. Many thanks to Ed Purcell for
this reference.
94. Calvin Coolidge, Third Annual Message (Dec. 8, 1925), in 3 THE STATE OF THE UNION
MESSAGES OF THE PRESIDENTS, supra note 18, at 2685. In 1926, Coolidge once again urged
that
[o]fficers of the Department of Justice throughout the country should be vigilant
in enforcing the law, but local authorities, which had always been mainly
responsible for the enforcement of law in relation to intoxicating liquor, ought
not to seek evasion by attempting to shift the burden wholly upon the Federal
agencies. Under the Constitution the States are jointly charged with the Nation
in providing for the enforcement of the prohibition amendment.
Calvin Coolidge, Fourth Annual Message (Dec. 7, 1926), in 3 THE STATE OF THE UNION
MESSAGES OF THE PRESIDENTS, supra note 18, at 2706; see Calvin Coolidge, Sixth Annual
Message (Dec. 4, 1928), in 3 THE STATE OF THE UNION MESSAGES OF THE PRESIDENTS, supra
note 18, at 2743 ("Under the terms of the Constitution, however, the obligation is equally on
the States to exercise the power which they have through the executive, legislative, judicial,
and police branches of their governments in behalf of enforcement."). In his inaugural address,
Herbert Hoover continued this same appeal, stressing that "the undoubted abuses which have
grown up under the Eighteenth Amendment" were in part "due to the failure of some States
to accept their share of responsibility for the concurrent enforcement and to the failure of
many State and local officials to accept the obligation under their oath of office zealously to
enforce the laws." Herbert Hoover, Inaugural Address (Mar. 4, 1929), in THE INAUGURAL
ADDRESSES OF THE PRESIDENTS 438-39 (Renzo D. Bowers ed., 1929).
95. U.S. CONST. amend. XVIII, § 2. On the puzzling nature of "concurrent power," see Noel
T. Dowling, Concurrent Power Under the Eighteenth Amendment, 6 MINN. L. REv. 447 (1922).
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Speaking before a conference of state Governors that he had
convened "to consider co-operation between the State and Federal
Governments in the enforcement of the Eighteenth Amendment,"
Coolidge argued that the Amendment imposed on states "a joint
responsibility to enact and execute enforcement laws."' Throughout
the decade federal officials and supporters of prohibition maintained
96. Governors Accept Coolidge Program To Back Up Dry Law, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 21, 1923,
at 1. Coolidge's conclusions were seconded by Attorney General Daugherty, who asserted that
"[t]he States owe to the Federal Government a reciprocal loyalty to support and enforce the
Constitution of the United States and the laws enacted by Congress pursuant thereto." Id.
Noting "the congestion of the dockets of the Federal courts ... from prohibition cases pending,"
Daugherty proposed that "larger conspiracies" be prosecuted in federal courts, whereas
"smaller offenses ... be handled by local, State or Police Courts." Id. For a lively description
of the conference, see Governors Pledge Full Cooperation To Aid Prohibition, WASH. POST, Oct.
20, 1923, at 1. Three years later, on May 8, 1926, Coolidge issued Executive Order No. 4439
providing that to "more efficiently function in the enforcement of the National Prohibition act,
any state, county or municipal officer may be appointed, at a nominal rate of compensation,
as prohibition officer of the Treasury Department to enforce the provisions of the National
Prohibition act, and acts supplemental thereto." Coolidge's Dry Order Amends Grant's Decree
Issued in 1873 and in Force Since Then, N.Y. TIMES, May 22, 1926, at 2. The order provoked
"a flood of bitter criticism in the Senate," and was "denounced as illegal and unconstitutional
and as an encroachment on State rights." Coolidge Dry Order Attacked in Senate as
Unconstitutional; President Permits County, Municipal and State Officers To Enforce Federal
Law, N.Y. TIMES, May 22, 1926, at 1; see Andrews To Try Out Coolidge Dry Order First in
California; Will Employ Deputy Sheriffs at Nominal Pay To Aid in Enforcement, N.Y. TIMES,
May 23, 1926, at 1; Congress Renews Assault on Order; Senator Robinson Calls Coolidge
Action Invalid and Urges Referendum, N.Y. TIMES, May 25, 1926, at 1; House Body Denies
Action To Nullify Coolidge Dry Order; Britten Resolution To Prevent Use of State Police Is
Rejected, WASH. POST, June 11, 1926, at 4; House Wets To Push Bill To Let States Fix Alcohol
Ratio, N.Y. TIMES, May 27, 1926, at 1; Storm Grows on Coolidge Dry Order; Give State Rights
Views, N.Y. TIMES, May 25, 1926, at 1. For a discussion of the order, see James Hart, Some
Legal Questions Growing Out of the President's Executive Order for Prohibition Enforcement,
13 VA. L. REv. 86 (1927). In the end "[n]o state officials were appointed as agents of the federal
government.... No change was made in the enforcement of the law. Mr. Coolidge's order was
filed away ... and the whole question was forgotten." MERZ, supra note 6, at 193. For a
fascinating survey of the various forms of state and federal cooperation that developed during
prohibition, see J.P. Chamberlain, Current Legislation: Enforcement of the Volstead Act
Through State Agencies, 10 A.B.A. J. 391, 394 (1924):
[The Eighteenth Amendment] has brought into strong relief the inadequacy of
the organization of the federal government, especially its judicial branch, to deal
with so widespread a question as prohibition; it has shown that state and
national government machines must operate harmoniously to put into effect a
police policy declared to be national, but affecting individuals so widely, and it
has brought into the open the inconvenience of a double system of police
regulations of the same article in the same country. The attempts made by the
states and the nation to meet the situation constitute a chapter in our
constitutional development well worth watching.
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the position that the Eighteenth Amendment created affirmative
state obligations to enforce the law. 7 In 1929, for example, James
M. Doran, Commissioner of Prohibition, proclaimed that there
was "no doubt" that States were required "to exercise in their
appropriate sphere of action the full police powers of the State, in
order to properly discharge their obligations under the Eighteenth
Amendment."9'8 Idaho Senator William E. Borah, a noted dry, wrote
an entire article for the New York Times arguing that even though
"[w]e cannot mandamus a State to pass a State law, to execute or
enforce a law," a state was nevertheless under a 'legal obligation...
to support the law under which it lives."99
Against this interpretation of the Eighteenth Amendment,
Maryland Governor Albert C. Ritchie advanced the position that
"the Eighteenth Amendment ... does not mean that the States are
legally or morally obliged to exercise" their concurrent power of
enforcement. 1o
97. See Haynes Answers Pinchot's Attack; Says State Officers Must Do Their Share To
Enforce Prohibition Laws, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 5, 1923, at 3.
98. Ritchie and Doran Clash at Institute, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 16, 1929, at 8 (quoting James
M. Doran); see also Dry Law Needs Help of State Says Dr. Doran, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR,
Dec. 13, 1929, at 1 ("I am of the opinion,' he said, 'that the obligation to enact enforcement
laws under the concurrent clause of the Eighteenth Amendment is equally obligatory upon
the states, as well as upon the Federal Government."'). Arthur J. Davis, Massachusetts state
superintendent of the Anti-Saloon League, made a similar argument: 'The Eighteenth
Amendment ... imposes on the states the same obligation to enforce prohibition by appropriate
legislation that it imposes upon Congress." Ritchie's Attack on Prohibition Challenged by State
Dry Leader; Davis Declares Amendment Demands States'Help in Enforcing Law, CHRISTIAN
SG. MONITOR, Dec. 11, 1929, at 2.
99. William E. Borah, The State's Duty Under Prohibition; Senator Borah Holds that,
Although a State Cannot Be Mandamused To Pass or Enforce a Statute, It Has a Legal and
Moral Obligation To Support the Mandates of the United States Constitution, N.Y. TIMES, July
28, 1929, § 9, at 1. The article developed ideas Borah had earlier presented in William E.
Borah, Civic Righteousness: Lawlessness the Insidious Disease of Republics, 114 CENTURY
MAG. 641, 644-46 (1927) [hereinafter Borah, Civic Righteousness], and in Senator William E.
Borah, Shall the Constitution of the United States be Nullified?, Address at the Citizenship
Conference (Oct. 13-15, 1923), in LAW VS. LAWLESSNESS 163-80 (Fred B. Smith ed., 1924). For
similar positions, see WILLIAM GIBBS MCADOO, THE CHALLENGE: LIQUOR AND LAWLESSNESS
VERSUS CONSTITUTIONAL GOVERNMENT 65-79 (1928); MAdoo Sees a Wet Plot by Corrupt City
Machines To Gain Federal Control, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 29, 1927, at 1 ("[IThe same affirmative
duty rests upon the State Governments as upon Congress to provide for effective enforcement
[of the Eighteenth Amendment]." (quoting William McAdoo)).
100. Politics Institute Debates Dry Law; Governor Ritchie Denies Maryland Is Compelled
To Enforce Federal Statute, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 15, 1929, at 48 (quoting Albert C. Ritchie).
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No State is called upon to provide enforcement machinery for
the Federal income tax law or the narcotic law or the Mann act
or any other Federal enactment that I know of .... Why, then,
should any State be obligated to set up State machinery to
enforce just one out of all the thousands of Federal laws-the
Federal prohibition law-merely because the Eighteenth
Amendment says that it has the power to do so?1°1
The idea that states were obligated independently to enforce the
Eighteenth Amendment would seem to imply that states were
constitutionally required to enact statutes prohibiting the sale and
transportation of liquor. But in 1923 New York repealed its
antiliquor statute, the Mullan-Gage law. °2 In discussing his
decision not to veto the repeal,0 3 Governor Smith essentially
101. Id.; see also F.F. Lauriston Bullard, Boston Is Stirred by Ritchie Speech, N.Y. TIMES,
Dec. 15, 1929, at El; Austen G. Fox, Not a State Duty; Reasons Why No State Would Trample
Under Foot Its Own Bill of Rights, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 30, 1931, at 22.
102. Act effective June 1, 1923, ch. 871, 1923 N.Y. Laws 1690. Although New York had
ratified the Eighteenth Amendment, it had also passed in 1920 the "so-called Walker Act," Ex
parte Finegan, 270 F. 665, 665 (N.D.N.Y. 1921), which "purported to make it lawful ... for
persons who" paid a state liquor tax "to traffic in liquor containing" less than "2.75 per centum
of alcohol by weight." People v. Cook, 188 N.Y.S. 291, 293 (N.Y. App. Div. 1921); see also Act
of May 24, 1920, ch. 911, §§ 2, 8, 1920 N.Y. Laws 2276, 2277, 2282. Because the Volstead Act
prohibited transporting and selling beverages having in excess of 0.5 percent alcohol, the
Walker Act was declared pro tanto unconstitutional. Cook, 188 N.Y.S. at 296. In 1921,
therefore, the New York Legislature enacted the Mullan-Gage Act, which "put into the penal
statutes substantially all of the provisions of the Volstead act, but accompanied them by even
more rigorous provisions as to search and seizure." Alfred E. Smith, The Governor's
Statement, N.Y. TIMES, June 2, 1923, at 1 (reprinting Smith's signing statement for the bill
repealing the Act). The Mullan-Gage Act proved impossible to enforce. MERZ, supra note 6,
at 203-05.
103. Smith was under enormous pressure to veto the repeal. Responding to a letter from
a private citizen arguing that "[e]very State official who voted" for the repeal of the Mullan-
Gage law "is subject to the law of treason, having taken the oath to sustain the Constitution
of the United States," President Harding announced that
[w]ith much of what you say I am fully in accord.... The executives of the nation
and equally the executives of the States are sworn to enforce the Constitution.
It is difficult to believe that public approval will ever be given to any other than
a policy of fully and literally discharging this duty.... The States are equipped
with police organizations and judicial establishments adequate to deal with such
problems. The Federal Government is not thus equipped.
Harding Sees Clash if Gov. Smith Signs Dry Law Repealer, N.Y. TIMES, May 17, 1923, at 1;
see SINCLAIR, supra note 77, at 296-97. Smith's decision to sign the repeal marked the
beginning of the alignment of the national Democratic Party with antiprohibitionism, an
alignment that would have momentous consequences for prohibition with the eventual
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adopted Ritchie's position. He asserted that he was "entirely
unwilling to admit the contention that there was put upon the State,
either by the Eighteenth Amendment [or] the Volstead act ... any
obligation to pass any law adopting into the State law the provisions
of the Volstead act."1 °4 The Eighteenth Amendment was "not a
command but an option. It does not create a duty";0 5 any other
conclusion, Smith contended, would be inconsistent with "the
supremacy of the Federal Government in its own sphere and the
sovereignty of the several States in theirs," which is "one of the
great elements in the strength of our democracy. ' O6
election of FDR. See JAMES M. BECK, THE REVOLT AGAINST PROHIBITION 12 (1930) ("The
Republican Party cannot longer afford to sell its soul to the fanatical Drys and if it does, and
thus becomes the party of Prohibition, it may have a like fate.").
104. Smith, supra note 102, at 1. Smith directly answered the suggestion in Harding's
critique
that, because the States have a larger police force than the Federal Government
has, and because the Federal Government has at this time what the President
describes as an inadequate machinery for the enforcement of the Volstead act,
therefore the States are obligated severally to enact statutes duplicating the
Volstead act. I am unable to understand from what source he believes this
obligation to be derived and he does not disclose it. The President might, with
equal force, suggest that at any time Congress in its wisdom saw fit to withhold
adequate appropriation for the enforcement of any Federal law that there
immediately devolved a duty upon each State to enact that Federal law into a
State statute and make every offense against Federal law not enforced a duty
upon the States to punish it as a State offense and at State expense.
Id.
105. Id.
106. Id. With something less than analytic consistency, Smith also stated that New York
"peace officers" would nevertheless retain
the sacred responsibility of sustaining the Volstead act with as much force and
as much vigor as they would enforce any State law or local ordinance and I shall
expect the discharge of that duty in the fullest measure by every peace officer in
the State....
Let it be understood at once and for all that this repeal does not in the
slightest degree lessen the obligation of peace officers of the State to enforce in
its strictest letter the Volstead act, and warning to that effect is herein
contained as coming from the Chief Executive of the State of New York.
Id. Either Smith meant to argue that state legislatures had no obligation to enforce federal
law, whereas state executive officials did have such an obligation, or he meant to argue that
the "obligation" of state police officers to enforce the Volstead Act depended entirely on the
discretionary policy of the Governor.
WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 48:1
The Taft Court considered the implications of New York's repeal
of its state prohibition law in Gambino v. United States.0 7 The
defendants in the case were arrested and searched by New York
state troopers while transporting intoxicating liquor in an automo-
bile in violation of the Volstead Act. "[Ihe liquor and other property
taken were immediately turned over to a federal deputy collector of
customs for prosecution in the federal court for northern New
York."' ' The defendants moved to suppress the evidence on the
ground that "the arrest, the search and the seizure were without a
warrant and without probable cause, in violation" of the Fourth and
Fifth Amendments.'o9 The Court agreed that the search and seizure
lacked probable cause, 110 but at the time the restrictions of the
Fourth and Fifth Amendments did not apply to the States,"' and
evidence acquired through "the wrongful act of a stranger"112 to the
federal government would not be suppressed." 3
107. 275 U.S. 310 (1927).
108. Id. at 312-13.
109. Id. at 313.
110. Id. The Court refused to explain this conclusion, stating simply that "[wie are of
opinion on the facts, which it is unnecessary to detail, that there was not probable cause." Id.
Kenneth M. Murchison calls Gambino an "enigmatic" decision, because the Court's holding
that the officers lacked probable cause was reached "without explaining why the facts known
to the investigating officers were insufficient" and because the holding was inconsistent with
the Court's earlier explication of probable cause in Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132
(1925). KENNETH M. MURCHISON, FEDERAL CRIMINAL LAW DOCTRINES: THE FORGOTTEN
INFLUENCE OF NATIONAL PROHIBITION 62-63 (1994). In fact we know that Justice Holmes was
quite troubled by this aspect of the case. See infra note 119.
111. Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 398 (1913).
112. Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States, 251 U.S. 385, 391 (1920); see also Burdeau
v. McDowell, 256 U.S. 465, 475 (1921).
113. Because of the obvious advantages "of basing a case even in a United States court
upon a search beyond the condemning reach of the federal rule," United States attorneys
began routinely to use "evidence secured by local police. Indeed, it has been said that, because
of the rigidly narrow grounds upon which a federal search will be declared reasonable, the
activity of the state officers is indispensable." Note, Prohibition Searches by New York State
Police, 37 YALE L.J. 784, 785 (1928). 'The number of prosecutions based upon searches by
state officers has rapidly increased and it is now the admitted policy of the federal authorities
to rely wherever possible upon the activity of the local peace officers for the arrest and
prosecution of the typical bootlegger and inland rumrunner." Id. Federal use of evidence
gathered by state actors in violation of constitutional norms applicable to the federal
government later became known as the "silver platter doctrine." See, e.g., Elkins v. United
States, 364 U.S. 206, 252 (1960) (Harlan, J., dissenting); Lustig v. United States, 338 U.S. 74,
79 (1949).
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As the Court framed the question, therefore, the issue was
whether New York state troopers were in effect federal agents, even
though there was no evidence that the troopers had "acted under the
directions of... federal officials in making the arrest and seizure."1 4
If "the search and seizure was made solely for the purpose of aiding
the United States in the enforcement of its laws,""1 5 the evidence
would be suppressed; but if the New York troopers were acting to
enforce "state law,"'1 6 the evidence would be admitted.'17
After the repeal of the Mullan-Gage law, New York had no
state statute prohibiting the sale and transportation of liquor. But
if, as those like Coolidge and Borah contended, states were never-
theless under an affirmative obligation to enforce the Eighteenth
Amendment, the defendants' arrest might have been in the service
of fulfilling New York's independent legal responsibilities. In
Gambino, the Court, speaking unanimously through Justice
Brandeis, evaded this question, holding that "[w]hether the laws of
the state actually imposed upon the troopers the duty of aiding the
federal officials in the enforcement of the National Prohibition Act
we have no occasion to inquire." ' Instead the Court concluded that
the evidence should be suppressed because Governor Smith had
declared that... state troopers are required to aid in the enforce-
ment of the federal law "with as much force and as much vigor
as they would enforce any state law or local ordinance;" and that
the repeal of the Mullan-Gage law should make no difference in
their action, except that thereafter the peace officers must take
the offender to the federal court for prosecution.1 9
114. Gambino, 275 U.S. at 316. "[T]he rights guaranteed by the Fourth and Fifth
Amendments may be invaded as effectively by ... co-operation, as by the state officers' acting
under direction of the federal officials." Id.
115. Id. at 317.
116. Id.
117. Edward P. McGuire, Note, Evidence: Admission of Liquor Seized by State Troopers in
a Prosecution by the Federal Government, 3 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 156, 158 (1928) ("Had [the
police] been acting for the state of New York the evidence would have been admissible in a
Federal Court."); see also Chamberlain, supra note 96, at 392.
118. Gambino, 275 U.S. at 317. The New York Court of Appeals was similarly disinclined
to determine whether state police officers were independently obliged to enforce federal
prohibition law. See, e.g., People v. Lafaro, 165 N.E. 518, 519-20 (N.Y. 1929); Note, The Duty
of the States in Respect of Prohibition, 63 U.S. L. REV. 561 (1929).
119. Gambino, 275 U.S. at 315; see also supra note 106. Brandeis stressed that "[a]id so
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Although in Gambino the Taft Court sidestepped the deep
questions of federalism raised by New York's repeal of its Mullan-
Gage law, the Court had actually addressed these issues by
given was accepted and acted on by the Federal officials." Gambino, 275 U.S. at 315. The
conference notes of Justice Stone reveal that at conference only Butler and Stone had initially
voted to suppress the evidence. Taft, Holmes, Van Devanter, Brandeis, and Sanford had voted
to affirm the defendants' conviction. (McReynolds had passed, and Sutherland was absent.)
The opinion was assigned to Brandeis, who apparently changed his mind and carried the
Court with him for his new conclusion.
The initial draft of Brandeis's proposed opinion survives. In that draft Brandeis had
authored a long footnote detailing Smith's oft-repeated desire for New York peace officers to
enforce the Volstead Act. He also included a long footnote that explained the extent of
cooperation between federal and state police in New York and the consequent urgency of
clarifying whether "such a system of cooperation constitutes the New York City police a
Federal agency which makes its officers amenable to the Fourth amendment." THE LOUIS
DEMBITZ BRANDEIS PAPERS, Reel 35 (Univ. Publ'ns of Am., 1985) [hereinafter BRANDEIS
PAPERS]. When Taft concurred in Brandeis's opinion, he wrote: "I don't think it either
necessary or proper to make the Governor's remarks a basis of this opinion. I think that ought
to be stricken out. It will be the occasion of great comment." Id. Van Devanter concurred in
Brandeis's change of outcome, but noted his agreement "with suggestion of others that it
would be well to omit" the footnotes referring to Governor Smith and to the New York City
police. Id. Butler also concurred in the opinion "subject to elimination of the footnote as
suggested by Justice Van Devanter." Id. Sanford concurred with the thought "that certain of
the notes should be omitted." Id. Stone also suggested the elimination of the footnotes
discussing the relationship between New York police and federal authorities. He wrote
Brandeis: "I think this will ameliorate the mistakes made in Burdeau v. McDowell and like
cases and I am for it." Id. Brandeis omitted the two footnotes in his published opinion. Of all
the Justices, only Holmes seemed to retain his initial reservations about the ultimate
disposition of the case. He wrote Brandeis: "Is this consistent with Hester v. United States,
265 U.S. at 57? It is a model of research and thoroughness and I admire it-but I should like
to see the Const. protection limited." Id.
The Court's decision in Gambino was "far reaching," because it rendered "the enforcement
of liquor laws in New York much more difficult, and in many instances impossible." Note,
supra note 113, at 790. It rapidly became grounds for mobilization for New York
prohibitionists:
Assemblyman Jenks indicated that in their fight this year the Drys would
stress the recent decision of the United States Supreme Court which held that
State police cannot search for liquor unless armed with a search warrant.
"I think the recent decision of the Supreme Court ... has shown the fallacy of
Governor Smith's claim that State officers can enforce prohibition," said
Assemblyman Jenks.
"We have got to have a State enforcement law to make State agencies really
effective in the enforcement of prohibition. Events of the last few years have
shown that the State officers cannot aid very materially in the enforcement of
prohibition without a State law."
Dry Bills Start Battle in Albany; State Parallel to Volstead Act Offered by Jenks in Two
Assembly Measures, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 10, 1928, at 4.
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implication in an earlier decision, United States v. Lanza.20 At issue
in Lanza was the question of whether the Fifth Amendment bar
against double jeopardy applied to defendants who had been
convicted of violating a state prohibition statute forbidding the
possession, manufacture, and transportation of liquor, and who
were subsequently charged by the federal government with
violations of the Volstead Act based on the identical acts.121 The
Court, in a unanimous opinion authored by Taft, concluded that
although the Double Jeopardy Clause protected citizens against
successive prosecutions for the same offense, states and the federal
government were "two sovereignties, deriving power from different
sources" and hence that the defendants had for constitutional
purposes "committed two different offenses by the same act.' 22
Successive prosecutions for distinct offenses did not violate double
jeopardy. Lanza offered a "classic formulation" of what later became
known as the "dual sovereignty" concept of double jeopardy,'23 a
concept that has remained valid constitutional law until this very
day.
124
120. 260 U.S. 377 (1922).
121. Id. at 379-80.
122. Id. at 382. Four years later, in Hebert v. Louisiana, 272 U.S. 312 (1926), the Court
unanimously reaffirmed the holding of Lanza in an opinion by Van Devanter:
[O]ne who ... commits two distinct offenses, one against the United States and
one against the State ... may be subjected to prosecution and punishment in the
federal courts for one and in the state courts for the other without any infraction
of the constitutional rule against double jeopardy, it being limited to repeated
prosecutions "for the same offense."
Id. at 314 (quoting Lanza, 260 U.S. at 382); see Dry Law's Teeth Whetted; Supreme Court
Holds Same Offense Punishable by Both State and Federal Agencies, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 2, 1926,
at 2.
123. Note, Double Prosecution by State and Federal Governments: Another Exercise in
Federalism, 80 HARV. L. REV. 1538, 1540-41 (1967).
124. See, e.g., United States v. Lara, 541 U.S. 193, 199 (2004); Heath v. Alabama, 474 U.S.
82, 88 (1985); Abbate v. United States, 359 U.S. 187 (1959); Bartkus v. Illinois, 359 U.S. 121
(1959). The concept came under attack at the time it was enunciated. See, e.g., JA.C. Grant,
The Lanza Rule of Successive Prosecutions, 32 COLUM. L. REv. 1309, 1331 (1932) ("Shall we
fritter away our liberties upon a metaphysical subtlety, two sovereignties?"). It has remained
academically unpopular ever since. See, e.g., Erin M. Cranman, The Dual Sovereignty
Exception to Double Jeopardy: A Champion of Justice or a Vwlation of a Fundamental Right?,
14 EMoRY INTL L. REV. 1641 (2000); Kevin J. Hellmann, Note, The Fallacy of Dueling
Sovereignties: Why the Supreme Court Refuses To Eliminate the Dual Sovereignty Doctrine,
2 J.L. & POL-Y 149 (1994).
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Lanza was the first decision "in which the Supreme Court, faced
with an actual instance of double prosecution, failed to find some
remedy, consistent with the law, to avoid it."'26 In the popular press
the decision was blasted as "repulsive to believers in justice"'26 and
as nullifying "a fundamental American principle ... in order to
impose a measure of discipline on the American people."'2 7 In New
York, opposition to the possibility of successive prosecutions became
a major rallying-cry for the repeal of the Mullan-Gage law.'28
125. Grant, supra note 124, at 1311. Lanza was contrary to the explicit legislative history
of the Eighteenth Amendment, as well as to the explicit representations of major pro-
prohibition lobbying groups, like the Anti-Saloon League, who were responsible for the
Amendment's passage. Id. at 1311 & n.13. The Eighteenth Amendment's reference to
"concurrent power" was drafted by a House committee, whose Chairman explicitly stated that
the reference meant that the federal government could not prosecute for an offense based
upon an act "if the state government does." 56 CONG. REC. 424 (1917); see MURCHISON, supra
note 110, at 109-11.
126. Double Dry Enforcement, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 13, 1923, at 20. Three years later, after the
Court's decision in Hebert, 272 U.S. 312, the New York Times could find consolation only in
the thought that "each fresh reminder of how much liberty has been thrown away in an
attempt to repeal custom and to enact the morality of the Anti-Saloon League is helpful for
the return of common sense and something at least of earlier freedom." Double Jeopardy, N.Y.
TIMES, Nov. 3, 1926, at 22. Public reaction to Hebert was particularly violent. The decision
was widely held to evidence a "sinister departure from American fairness" caused by the fact
that "Prohibition destroys, not only the written, but the unwritten law of the land. It is a
solvent in which the letter and the spirit alike are blended into the current cure-all reform."
Bad News for Bootleggers, LITERARY DIG., Nov. 20, 1926, at 18 (quoting the St. Louis Post
Dispatch). The Baltimore Sun opined that
[i]t is inconceivable that a Supreme Court ... should have made such a decision
only a few years back. But since Volsteadism became the law of the land many
things have changed.... [Ilt is not surprising that legal doctrines which have no
place in justice or in common sense should be enunciated and supported.
Id.
127. Double Jeopardy, CHI. DAILY TRIB., Apr. 15, 1923, at 8. The possibility of multiple
prosecutions for the identical act was widely regarded as "manifestly unjust." Anthony A.
Goerner, Note, Constitutional Law: Double Jeopardy: Double Liability, 12 CORNELL L.Q. 212,
213 (1927); see Smashing Another American Principle, CHI. DAILY TRIB., Mar. 12, 1923, at 8;
Double Jeopardy, 27 LAW NOTES 4 (1923).
128. It was widely said at the time that "the most startling immediate result" of Lanza
"was the repeal of the New York state prohibition act," Grant, supra note 124, at 1310,
because the implication of Lanza was that the only way for a state to avoid double prosecution
was to repeal its own prohibition law. "In 1923 ... in New York the cry of double jeopardy was
the most important slogan of the campaign for repeal. This was due to the fact that in
December, 1922, the Supreme Court [in Lanza] had laid down the law in no unequivocal
terms." MCBAIN, supra note 17, at 146. As Governor Smith noted, the repeal of the Mullan-
Gage law would
do away entirely with the possibility of double jeopardy for violation of the laws
enforcing the Eighteenth Amendment.... Under the United States Supreme
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Because. Lanza's holding was not compelled by existing
precedents,'29 the case has been interpreted as expressing "the
inclination of the Court-and the public-to support enforcement
authorities during the early years of prohibition."'' ° And it is
certainly true that the decision was, as contemporaries said, "a
sweeping victory" for "dry enforcement,"'' because Lanza meant
"that prisoners charged with breaking the dry laws may be severely
penalized by more than one tribunal."'3 2
Court decision in the Lanza case, a citizen is today subjected to double trial and
even to double punishment for a single offense .... This is an unwarranted and
indefensible exception to the fundamental constitutional guarantee contained
in both the Federal and State Constitutions that no person shall be twice tried
or punished for the same offense.
Smith, supra note 102, at 1; see also Austen G. Fox, Concurrent Enforcement: Neither
Conviction Nor Acquittal in the State Courts a Bar to Federal Prosecution, N.Y. TIMES, Mar.
13, 1923, at 20. In his private correspondence Taft refused to acknowledge the moral force in
the argument against double jeopardy. He insisted that the argument was merely a
makeweight for an underlying opposition to prohibition itself:
Austen Fox has risen in his majesty and thinks that the [Mullan-Gage] law
ought to be abolished, that the State ought to take no part in enforcing the law
because of the danger of double jeopardy. If it had not been through opposition
to the principle of the law altogether, double jeopardy would not have been
mentioned. The instances in which people have been punished twice for the
same act are so few, and the danger from them is so slight, that the use of that
as an argument to a practical man is ridiculous. In other words ... because the
wealthy classes, those who consult their own comfort before anything else, as
other people possibly do, don't like this limitation upon what they regard as
their personal liberty, but which is not personal liberty under the Constitution,
they are seizing on every little technicality to attack the law.
Letter from WHT to James R. Sheffield (July 8, 1923), microformed on TAFT PAPERS, supra
note 9, Reel 255.
129. MURCHISON, supra note 110, at 121. For an argument that Lanza's holding makes
sense if, but only if, Fifth Amendment protections against double jeopardy are not
incorporated against states via the Fourteenth Amendment, see Akhil Reed Amar & Jonathan
L. Marcus, Double Jeopardy Law After Rodney King, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 8 (1995).
130. MURCHISON, supra note 110, at 121; see DAVID E. KYVIG, REPEALING NATIONAL
PROHIBITION 32-33 (2d ed. 2000).
131. 2 Prison Terms for One Drink Upheld by U.S.; Supreme Court Decision Big Victory for
Drys, CHI. DAILY TRIB., Dec. 12, 1922, at 2.
132. Double Penalties in Dry Law Cases; Supreme Court Holds the Same Offense
Punishable by State and Nation, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 12, 1922, at 5. In a prewar tract written for
the Anti-Saloon League, Wayne Wheeler had advised prohibitionists to
draft your laws so that you can secure cumulative penalties. In other words,
with the same evidence you can make a law violator pay the federal tax, and also
the state liquor tax.... By the above method you can hit a law violator from three
to five times successively and it usually puts them out of commission.
WHEELER, supra note 6, at 95-96.
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But Lanza should also be understood as a contribution to the
debate about the nature of state duties under the Eighteenth
Amendment. If the "concurrent power" provision of the Eighteenth
Amendment were itself to obligate states to enforce prohibition,
state prohibition statutes would reflect a single national, constitu-
tional sovereignty. 3' Lanza, however, specifically rejected this
interpretation of the Amendment. 'To regard the Amendment as the
source of the power of the States to adopt and enforce prohibition
measures is to take a partial and erroneous view of the matter.' ' "&
State prohibition measures do not "derive their force"'35 from the
Eighteenth Amendment,
but from power originally belonging to the States, preserved to
them by the Tenth Amendment, and now relieved from the
restriction heretofore arising out of the Federal Constitution....
We have here two sovereignties, deriving power from different
sources, capable of dealing with the same subject matter within
the same territory. Each may, without interference by the other,
enact laws to secure prohibition, with the limitation that no
legislation can give validity to acts prohibited by the Amend-
ment. Each government in determining what shall be an offense
133. Thus in repudiating the conclusion of Lanza, one commentator argued:
The Eighteenth Amendment, if it is a law at all, is one law-a law for the
whole Union. It has, indeed, appointed several agents ... to wit, the Congress and
the several States, to enforce its prohibitions, but it begins and ends with being
one law.
The thesis that one act which violates one law can be two crimes is shocking
and false. The misconception has come about through failure to perceive the
degraded position to which the States have been reduced by the Eighteenth
Amendment. In legislating under it they are not acting as legislative
sovereignties; they are acting as Federal agents. The Mullan-Gage act, for
example, is ... the act of a legislative agent who is deputized under the second
section of the amendment to exert what is there described as a "concurrent
power."
The Fifth Amendment, prohibiting double jeopardy for the same offense ...
forbids double jeopardy for one offense against the Eighteenth Amendment, even
when the act is punished both by the Congress and the States.
Lex Talionis, No Double Jeopardy; Contention that Mullan-Gage Act Is Not a State but a
Federal Law, N.Y. TIMES, May 26, 1923, at 14; see Alexander Sidney Lanier, Prohibition and
Double Jeopardy, 8 VA. L. REG. 740, 740 (1923); Note, Prohibition and Double Jeopardy, 8 VA.
L. REG. 774, 776 (1923).
134. United States v. Lanza, 260 U.S. 377, 381 (1922).
135. Id. at 381-82.
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against its peace and dignity is exercising its own sovereignty,
not that of the other.
1 3 6
Contemporaries recognized that this reasoning effectively settled
the debate about the existence of affirmative state obligations to
enforce the Eighteenth Amendment. Howard Lee McBain, Ruggles
Professor of Constitutional Law at Columbia, characterized the
implications of Lanza as of
the highest importance. For manifestly if the states derive from
the amendment no power to enact prohibition laws, they are of
a certainty under no obligation, moral or legal, to enact such
laws because of the amendment.... [A] state has today ...
complete option to adopt or decline to adopt prohibition as a
state policy.
137
His logic was widely cited 3 ' and accepted, 39 with the consequence
that those who sought seriously to defend state responsibilities to
enforce prohibition were forced to confront or distinguish Taft's
opinion in Lanza.4 '
In Lanza, the Taft Court neutralized the potential for the
Eighteenth Amendment radically to restructure the American
polity. The Court refused to conceptualize states as mere instrumen-
talities of national prohibition. But it also for the first time explicitly
136. Id. at 382; see Hebert v. Lousiana, 272 U.S. 312, 314-15 (1926).
137. MCBAIN, supra note 17, at 30-31. For an example of the influence of McBain's book,
see Text of Speech by Charles E. Hughes at Worcester, Urging the Election of Hoover, N.Y.
TIMES, Oct. 31, 1928, at 18.
138. Emerson T. Anthony, The Veto Message Analyzed, CHI. DAILY TRIB., Apr. 17, 1931, at
12; Austen G. Fox, Not a State Duty, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 30, 1931, at 22.
139. "Since the states do not derive their power to legislate from the eighteenth
amendment, it follows that the amendment imposes no obligation upon the states to adopt a
policy of state prohibition." Karl Huston, A Survey of All Laws At Present Affecting
Intoxicating Liquors in Oregon and a Consideration of the Proper Enforcing Agents for Such
Laws, 12 OR. L. REv. 293, 295 (1933). Lanza suggests "that the 18th Amendment itself
imposes no obligations upon the states to aid in its enforcement. Such enforcement laws as
a state may choose to pass derive their validity, not from the Amendment, but from the
original police power of the state." Note, supra note 118, at 562.
140. See, e.g., Borah, Civic RIGHTEousNEss, supra note 99; M'Adoo Sees a Wet Plot by
Corrupt City Machines To Gain Federal Control, supra note 99; Jesse F. Orton, State
Enforcement Acts; Mr. Orton Holds Eighteenth Amendment Places Mandate on
Commonwealths, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 23, 1930, § 3, at 2; Ritchie and Doran Clash at Institute,
supra note 98.
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legitimated successive prosecutions by federal and state entities
for the same act, even though such double prosecutions were
widely regarded as unjust and repulsive. Lanza signified that the
Court would sustain the "discipline"' that effective prohibition
enforcement demanded, even if that discipline were inconsistent
with traditional conceptions of fairness. Faced with a choice
between customary norms and the need effectively to enforce
prohibition, the Taft Court opted for the latter. Lanza in this regard
set a pattern that would continue throughout the 1920s. The Taft
Court would be widely and correctly perceived as a "bone dry"
institution grimly committed to the success of prohibition."'
141. See supra text accompanying note 127.
142. Herbert Little, The Omnipotent Nine, AM. MERcURY, Sept. 1928, at 48, 54 ("The
Supreme Court is bone dry.... The validity of the Eighteenth Amendment and of the
enforcement acts has been upheld completely ...."); see KYVIG, supra note 130, at 32-35; Dry
Law Stands Firm Against All Assaults; The Eighteenth Amendment and Volstead Act Have
Won an Unbroken Series of Victories in the Federal Courts over a Period of Nearly Eight Years,
N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 20, 1927, § 10, at 9; Roy A. Haynes, High Court's Stand Praised by Haynes;
Decisions on Prohibition Pointed to as Bulwark of Enforcement, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 21, 1923, at
19; John E. Monk, Observations from Times Watch-Towers; Drys Eye High Court; Count
Possible Retirement in Fear Successors Might Incline to Wet Views, N.Y. TIMES, July 1, 1928,
§ 3, at 1 ("The Supreme Court, as at present constituted, uniformly has upheld the Eighteenth
Amendment and the Volstead act in all cases brought before it."); A. H. Ulm, New Dry
Enforcement Code Slowly Evolved, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 21, 1926, § 8, at 22 ("'The Supreme Court
has been very strict in construing the Eighteenth Amendment and the Volstead act favorably
to the contentions of those who have been charged with enforcement,' said a lawyer who has
had a good deal to do with the handling of the Government's side in many cases. 'The Court
at times has been stricter than we expected it would be."). The decisions of the Court were
in fact regarded as so important to the maintenance of prohibition that "the politicians of the
Anti-Saloon League" insisted in 1928
that the composition of the court is one of the great issues of this campaign....
The inference is drawn that if the next President is personally and politically
dry, he will make sure that only thorough-going prohibitionists are put on the
bench. But if the next President is not himself a believer in the prohibition
theory then he will make it his business to nominate wets only for the court.
Packing the Supreme Court, HARTFORD COURANT, July 4, 1928, at 6; see Monk, supra. For
examples of Taft Court decisions upholding prohibition, see Olmstead v. United States, 277
U.S. 438 (1928); Dugan v. Ohio, 277 U.S. 61 (1928); Grosfield v. United States, 276 U.S. 494
(1928); United States v. Lee, 274 U.S. 559 (1927); Maul v. United States, 274 U.S. 501 (1927);
Ford v. United States, 273 U.S. 593 (1927); McGuire v. United States, 273 U.S. 95 (1927);
Murphy v. United States, 272 U.S. 630 (1926); Lambert v. Yellowley, 272 U.S. 581 (1926); Port
Gardner Investment Co. v. United States, 272 U.S. 564 (1926); Dodge v. United States, 272
U.S. 530 (1926); Van Oster v. Kansas, 272 U.S. 465 (1926); United States v. One Ford Coupe
Automobile, 272 U.S. 321 (1926); Ma-King Products Co. v. Blair, 271 U.S. 479 (1926);
Maryland v. Soper, 270 U.S. 9 (1926); Druggan v. Anderson, 269 U.S. 36 (1925); Selzman v.
United States, 268 U.S. 466 (1925); Dumbra v. United States, 268 U.S. 435 (1925); Samuels
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III
The logic of "dual sovereignty" that underlay Lanza permeated
the federalism jurisprudence of the Taft Court.143 Yet because the
Taft Court insisted on reading the "concurrent power" provision of
the Eighteenth Amendment as primarily augmenting the power of
the federal government, the Court read the Supremacy Clause as
requiring that national prohibition preempt all inconsistent state
law. The Court was thus forced to uphold the constitutional
legitimacy of national police regulations that widely suppressed the
prerogatives of local state authority to regulate intimate details of
personal conduct. In other contexts, however, the Taft Court had
interpreted the logic of dual sovereignty precisely to require
constitutional respect for the distinct sphere of local self govern-
ment.
In 1922, for example, the Court in Bailey v. Drexel Furniture
Co.' had sought to preserve "the ark of our covenant"' 4 by refusing
to enforce a federal child labor tax statute146 that dealt
with subjects not entrusted to Congress but [were] committed by
the supreme law of the land to the control of the States.... In the
maintenance of local self government, on the one hand, and the
v. McCurdy, 267 U.S. 188 (1925); Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132 (1925); James
Everard's Breweries v. Day, 265 U.S. 545 (1924); Hester v. United States, 265 U.S. 57 (1924);
Cunard Steamship Co. v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 100 (1923); Grogan v. Hiram Walker & Sons, 259
U.S. 80 (1922); Vigliotti u. Pennsylania, 258 U.S. 403 (1922); Hawes v. Georgia, 258 U.S. 1
(1922); and Corneli v. Moore, 257 U.S. 491 (1922). But see Commercial Credit Co. v. United
States, 276 U.S. 226 (1928); Gambino v. United States, 275 U.S. 310 (1927); Marron v. United
States, 275 U.S. 192 (1927); United States v. Berkeness, 275 U.S. 149 (1927); Tumey v. Ohio,
273 U.S. 510 (1927); Byars v. United States, 273 U.S. 28 (1927); United States v. Katz, 271
U.S. 354 (1926); Agnello v. United States, 269 U.S. 20 (1925). Taft wrote to his prohibitionist
brother Horace that "I don't think you need worry about our Court and the Volstead Act. We
have decided most of the questions so that they are fixed .... " Letter from WHT to Horace D.
Taft (Dec. 16, 1926), microformed on TAFr PAPERS, supra note 9, Reel 287.
143. See Robert Post, Federalism in the Taft Court Era: Can It Be 'Revived"?, 51 DUKE L.J.
1513 (2002).
144. (Child Labor Tax Case), 259 U.S. 20 (1922).
145. Id. at 37.
146. Revenue Act of 1918, Pub. L. No. 65-254, §§ 1200-1207, 40 Stat. 1057,1138-40 (1919).
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national power, on the other, our country has been able to
endure and prosper for near a century and a half.147
Prohibition would split the Taft Court because there were some, like
Taft, who believed that the enforcement of prohibition was a
fundamental constitutional imperative, whereas there were others,
like Sutherland, who believed that it was far more important to
preserve the constitutional prerogatives of the states. In the end the
Taft Court would repudiate these prerogatives in ways that
strikingly anticipate the nationalism of the New Deal.
Federalism was a highly contentious subject during the 1920s.
The importance of decentralization was acknowledged by all, but
progressives tended to regard localism as merely a functional
principle, whereas conservatives tended to invest it with independ-
ent normative significance. The second section of the Eighteenth
Amendment, with its obscure reference to the "concurrent power" of
"Congress and the several States,"4 ' served as a mirror in which
contemporaries could read their own preferred account of the
meaning of American federalism.
In 1923 Woodrow Wilson asked Brandeis to draw up a "statement
of principles" about prohibition for the Democratic Party, 49 and
Brandeis's reply well expressed a progressive, functional account of
federalism. Brandeis interpreted the Eighteenth Amendment's
reference to "concurrent power" to signify that the American people
"recognized fully that the law could not be enforced without the
co-operation of the States with the Nation..'.. The intention was that
each government should perform that part of the task for which it
was peculiarly fitted."'' " Brandeis postulated that "[tihe Federal
147. Bailey, 259 U.S. at 37.
148. U.S. CONST. amend. XVIII, § 2.
149. Letter from Woodrow Wilson to Frank I. Cobb (Apr. 18, 1923), microformed on
WOODROW WILSON PAPERS, Series 12, Reel 526 (Library of Cong. 1974); see ALFRED LIEF,
BRANDEIS: THE PERSONAL HISTORY OF AN AMERICAN IDEAL 427-28 (1936); ALPHEUS THOMAS
MASON, BRANDEIS: A FREE MAN'S LIFE 567 (1946). The Brandeis statement, attributed to
Woodrow Wilson, together with an account of its submission to the platform committee of the
1924 Democratic Convention, may be found in Carter Glass, New Light on Wilson and
Prohibition; In a Challenge to Wets, Senator Glass Reveals Inner History of the Late
President's Attitude and Shows How He Devised a Different Enforcement Policy for the States
and the Federal Government, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 3, 1929, § 9, at 1.
150. Letter from Woodrow Wilson to Frank I. Cobb, supra note 149. In 1916 Wilson's
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Government's part is to protect the Untied States against illegal
importation of liquor from foreign countries and to protect each
State from the illegal introduction into it of liquor from another
State." Brandeis acknowledged that "[t]o perform that part of the
task effectively requires centralized, unified action and the employ-
ment of the large federal powers and resources." 1 ' The job of a
state, by contrast, was to police "the illegal sale within it of liquor
illegally manufactured in it," for that
is a task for which the State Governments are peculiarly fitted;
and which they should perform. That part of the task involves
diversified governmental action and adaptation to the widely
varying conditions in, and the habits and sentiments of the
people of, the several States. It is a task for which the Federal
Government is not fitted.
52
nomination of Brandeis as Associate Justice had been opposed by the Anti-Saloon League,
because in 1891 Brandeis had represented the Massachusetts Protective Liquor Dealers'
Association, and he had argued against prohibition. 2 THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED
STATES: HEARINGS AND REPORTS ON SUccESsFuL AND UNSUccESSFUL NOMINATIONS OF
SUPREME COURT JUSTICES BY THE SENATE JUDICIARY COMMITTEE, 1916-1972, at 1054-72 (Roy
M. Mersky and J. Myron Jacobstein eds., 1975). Brandeis had taken the position that:
Liquor drinking is not a wrong; but excessive drinking is.
Liquor will be sold; hence the sale should be licensed.
Liquor is dangerous; hence the business should be regulated.
No regulation can be enforced which is not reasonable.
Id. at 1057. Brandeis had argued that Massachusetts legislators should
[t]ake the community in which you live; do not imagine one very different from
your own, where men will not drink because you say they shall not. No law can
be effective which does not take into consideration the conditions of the
community for which it is designed; no law can be a good law-every law must
be a bad law-that remains unenforced.
Id. at 1059. When asked if the enactment of a statute banning liquor would demonstrate the
actual will of a community, Brandeis responded: "No. It is evidence which creates
presumption; but the presumption may be rebutted by the facts." Id. at 1064.
151. Letter from Woodrow Wilson to Frank I. Cobb, supra note 149.
152. Id. Felix Frankfurter would later use almost this exact language to argue the identical
position. See Felix Frankfurter, A National Policy for Enforcement of Prohibition, 109 ANNALS
AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 193, 193 (1923). Frankfurter explained that "[c]entralized nation-
wide enforcement is impossible of achievement. It will either break or corrupt the federal
machinery that attempts it ...." Id. at 194. Brandeis would write Frankfurter approvingly of
his article:
Do not change the Volstead Law in any respect. Leave the percentage of
alcohol where it is. Merely provide in the annual appropriation bills that the
prohibition money shall be used for protection against smuggling from abroad
& from one state or territory into another, and the suppression in the District
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'To relieve the States from the duty of performing" this task, said
Brandeis, "violates our traditions; and threatens the best interests
of our country."'53 It was a duty, however, that was purely political,
for to ensure its fulfillment "the people of each State must look to
their state governments."''
Brandeis's account of federalism turns on principles of institu-
tional design; it postulates that national and state governments
should each be assigned duties commensurate with their institu-
tional competencies. Brandeis interpreted the "concurrent power"
provision of the Eighteenth Amendment to divide state from federal
authority along lines of instrumental capacity.'55 He assumed that
the constitutional question was not whether prohibition should be
enforced, but which level of government could best enforce it. But in
the context of prohibition this assumption was spectacularly
misplaced. As evidenced by the repeal of the Mullan-Gage law, wet
states like New York had no intention of enforcing prohibition,
which they regarded as a national imposition.
The vulnerability of Brandeis's account of federalism became
evident in July 1929, when George Wickersham, newly appointed
Chairman of Herbert Hoover's National Commission on Law
Observance and Enforcement, proposed to the Conference of
Governors a plan essentially identical to that crafted by Brandeis. 5 '
Noting that "open disrespect for the Volstead law" was a "great
of Columbia & any government reservation, etc.
Letter from Louis D. Brandeis (LDB) to Felix Frankfurter (Oct. 24, 1923), in "HALF BROTHER,
HALF SON": THE LETTERS OF LOUIS D. BRANDEIS TO FELIX FRANKFURTER 146 (Melvin I.
Urofsky & David W. Levy eds., 1991) [hereinafter BRANDEIS-FRANKFURTER LETTERS].
153. Letter from Woodrow Wilson to Frank I. Cobb, supra note 149.
154. Id. It is hard to know whether Brandeis actually expected this political duty to be
fulfilled. Compare supra note 150, with Letter from LDB to Felix Frankfurter, May 20, 1921,
in BRANDEIS-FRANKFURTER LETTERS, supra note 152, at 76 (commenting that "the Prohibition
Amendment is perhaps serving... a good purpose" in making manifest "the State's obligation
to police itself').
155. At one point, even Calvin Coolidge articulated sentiments about the enforcement of
prohibition that sounded in this kind of functional view of federalism. See To Put Local
Dryness Up to Local Officers, LITERARY DIG., Apr. 4, 1925, at 7-9.
156. The similarity between Wickersham's plan and Wilson's proposal to the 1924
Democratic Convention was widely noted. See, e.g., Bishop Cannon Hits Wickersham's View,
N.Y. TIMES, July 23, 1929, at 11; Dry Foes To Oppose Wickersham Board in Obtaining Funds,
N.Y. TIMES, July 20, 1929, at 1; Holds Wickersham Should Quit Post; Caraway Asserts His
Dry Views Destroy His Usefulness on Hoover Commission, N.Y. TIMES, July 18, 1929, at 1.
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source of demoralizing and pecuniarily profitable crime," and noting
that "[t]hus far the Federal Government alone has borne the brunt
of enforcement," Wickersham suggested that the "burden" of
implementing prohibition be shared between the federal govern-
ment and the states. "If the National Government were to attend to
preventing importation, manufacture and shipment in interstate
commerce of intoxicants, the State undertaking the internal
police regulations to prevent sale, saloons, speakeasies and so
forth, national and State laws might be modified so as to become
reasonably enforceable .... ,'
Wickersham's proposal was immediately attacked on the ground
that it would negate a major purpose of the Eighteenth Amendment,
which was to create a national policy against liquor. The proposal
was said to "nullify the Eighteenth Amendment,"'58 because
suspension of federal enforcement would "in effect repeal the
Eighteenth Amendment in wet localities."'59 Insofar as the
Wickersham plan meant "the virtual substitution of local option by
States in place of national prohibition,"'" it set off an explosive
controversy that was politically fatal.'6 ' The lesson was that the
division of authority between the national government and the
157. Wickersham's letter, which was sent to New York Governor Franklin Roosevelt for
presentation to the Conference of Governors, is reproduced in Wickersham Would Change Dry
Law, States Taking Over Local Enforcement; Asks Governor To Consider His Plan, N.Y. TIMES,
July 17, 1929, at 1. Wickersham argued:
Every State Executive has sworn to support and defend the Constitution of
the United States. The Eighteenth Amendment is a part of the Constitution, just
as much as any other part of it. Surely it is pertinent to their conference to
suggest and consider how they may best carry out their solemn undertaking.
Id.
158. Dry Foes To Oppose Wickersham Board in Obtaining Funds, N.Y. TIMES, July 20,
1929, at 1.
159. Wickersham Views Attacked by Volstead; Proposal Would In Effect Repeal 18th
Amendment, Dry Leader Contends, N.Y. TIMES, July 17, 1929, at 2. This was because "State
enforcement will depend on the local attitude toward prohibition." Wickersham Plan Splits
Governors, N.Y. TIMES, July 18, 1929, at 1.
160. The Wickersham Letter, 129 NATION 107 (1929) ("Mr. Wickersham's plan is not a
scientific solution of the liquor problem; it is not even a strictly honest one. But in the light
of ten years' experience with the Volstead Act, and in the midst of the hypocrisy and failure
of present methods of enforcement, one is compelled to consider results rather than
technique.').
161. Governors Shelve Wickersham's Plan and Drys'Motions, N.Y. TIMES, July 19, 1929,
at 1; Mr. Wickersham's Bomb, N.Y. TIMES, July 17, 1929, at 24.
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states could not be constructed along merely functional lines so long
as the Eighteenth Amendment required a commitment to national
prohibition that States did not share. 162
Prohibition therefore raised issues of federalism that could not be
resolved merely by what we may call "functional dual sovereignty."
Instead prohibition required contemporaries to address the question
of whether the regulation of liquor should be assigned to states or
to the national government. In other contexts the Taft Court did not
shy away from explicitly embracing such a frankly normative
account of federalism, which we may call "normative dualism." For
example, the Taft Court had appealed to exactly this idealized
version of federalism in Bailey to strike down the child labor tax
statute.'63
The ideals of normative dualism had been mobilized from the
outset in order to resist national prohibition. In the National
Prohibition Cases these ideals were used to attack as unconsti-
tutional the Eighteenth Amendment itself."6 This seemingly
paradoxical claim rested on the notion that prohibition entrenched
a particular rule of conduct in the Constitution, and that this
entrenchment so deeply invaded "the police powers of the States,"
and so violently undermined the status of States "as true local,
self-governing sovereignties," that the Eighteenth Amendment
constituted a "complete subversion of our dual and federal system
of government."'65 As used by advocates in the National Prohibition
162. Given this tension, Wickersham's letter appeared to offer wet states the implicit
option of modifying the national Volstead Act so as to make enforcement of prohibition more
locally palatable. The possibility of this option outraged prohibition advocates. See Bishop
Cannon Hits Wickersham's View, supra note 156, at 11. Cannon and Crawford charged that
the possibility of modifying the Volstead Act "seems to intimate the necessity for some kind
of bargaining by means of which certain states would be persuaded to perform their
prohibition enforcement duties, should they be given certain concessions, which concessions,
however, are not indicated ...." Id.
163. See supra text accompanying notes 144-47.
164. The Natl Prohibition Cases, 253 U.S. 350 (1920).
165. Id. at 366-67 (reporting the argument of Elihu Root). "It is submitted that the
authority conferred in Article V to amend the Constitution carries no power to destroy its
federal principle in a most fundamental aspect." Id. at 367. An eyewitness described Root's
summation:
Mr. Root put his glasses in his pocket, and, drawing himself up to his full height,
pointing his finger at the Chief Justice, with the whole nine Justices fixing their
eyes upon him, he concluded his argument with these memorable words, which
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Cases, "the dual sovereignty in our federal system of Nation and
State each supreme within its own sphere""' did not signify a
merely functional division of labor between state and federal
governments, but instead a fundamental constitutional commit-
ment, symbolized by the Tenth Amendment," 7 to maintain "state
control over local affairs."1
This line of argument resonated widely throughout the 1920.69
Even the Nation opined that if the Eighteenth Amendment were
overthrown, "the right of self-government which the Constitution
guarantees to the people of all the States will continue unimpaired,"
but that if the Amendment were sustained, "that right will perhaps
have burned themselves forever into my memory: "If Your Honors ... shall find
a way to uphold the validity of this amendment, the government of the United
States, as we have known it, will have ceased to exist.... Your Honors will have
found a legislative authority hitherto unknown to the Constitution and
untrammeled by any of its limitations.... In that case, Your Honors, John
Marshall need never have sat upon your Bench...."
2 PHILIP C. JESSUP, ELIHU RoOT 479-80 (1938) (quoting Nicholas Murray Butler, address at
the Odeon, St. Louis, Missouri (Dec. 14, 1927)).
166. Nat7 Prohibition Cases, 253 U.S. at 370 (reporting the argument of William D.
Guthrie).
167. 'The Eighteenth Amendment must be read in connection with the Tenth Amendment."
Id. at 377.
168. Id. at 371.
169. See, e.g., Nicholas Murray Butler, The Constitution One Hundred and Forty Years
After, 12 CONST. REV. 121, 123 (1928):
It is the complete departure from the fundamental principles of the
Constitution ... that makes the Eighteenth Amendment so objectionable and so
offensive to everyone who understands American government and who believes
in it. The incorporation in the Constitution for the first time of definite
legislation and the attempted transfer by amendment to the Federal
Government of the police power of the States, which can not be taken away
without shaking the very foundations of the Constitution itself, are the real
cause of the nation-wide dissatisfaction and revolt against the Eighteenth
Amendment and the legislation built upon it.
James Beck, Solicitor General of the United States from 1921 to 1925, was particularly
exercised by this point:
Certainly, the leaders of prohibition showed scant respect for the Constitution
when they wrote this illegitimate amendment into that noble instrument and
thus destroyed its perfect symmetry and turned a wise compact of government
into a mere police code. Certainly, they had scant respect for the Constitution
when they thus destroyed its basic principle of local self government and in this
matter of daily habit, relegated the sovereign States to the ignominious position
of mere police provinces.
BECK, supra note 103, at 14-15; see id. at 23.
WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW
disappear so far as the police power is concerned, and the way be
opened for a Federal centralization practically complete."'' 0 There
was widespread concern that prohibition imposed a "rigid unifor-
mity" 7' that was "in essence a complete repudiation of the spirit of
our federal system of self-governing states."'72 The Eighteenth
Amendment was said to introduce "a radical change in the organic
structure of our federal Government" by commissioning the federal
government "to legislate upon the purely local and domestic affairs
of every community in every state of the Union," while simulta-
neously denying "to them the power all communities have been
accustomed to exercise for more than a century and a quarter,"
which was "to regulate their conduct according to their own
conceptions of propriety.' 73
From the perspective of normative dualism, the failure of George
Wickersham's plan for a functional division of labor was the readily
predictable consequence of Congress's effort to deploy national
police power to enact "morals legislation for such a vast area as the
United States."1 4 Prohibition was tolerable when enacted by a state
because "[t]he people of a state are vitally interested in its legisla-
tive and administrative policies" and "subconsciously feel that these
policies, in a way, are theirs and for this reason they submit to them
170. Prohibition and the Supreme Court, 109 NATION 818, 819 (1919). The appeal of this
argument was surprisingly broad, although not necessarily decisive. See, e.g., Charles K
Burdick, Is Prohibition Lawful?, 21 NEW REPUBLIC 245 (1920).
171. The Supreme Court, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 14, 1932, at 18.
172. Fabian Franklin, What's Wrong with the Eighteenth Amendment?, 109 ANNALS AM.
ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 48, 49 (1923).
173. Henry S. Priest, The Eighteenth Amendment an Infringement of Liberty, 109 ANNALS
AM. ACAD. POL. & Soc. Sm. 39,44 (1923). Under the Eighteenth Amendment "the right of local
self-government is torn from the individual states, whose people are made subject, even in the
small routine affairs of their daily lives, to those living in far distant localities and under
other conditions." Stayton, supra note 19, at 30; see also Seymour C. Loomis, The Legal and
Constitutional Aspects of the Proposed Prohibition Amendment to the Federal Constitution, 8
ScI. MONTHLY 335, 336-37 (1919) (arguing that the amendment was an unprecedented
inclusion of police regulation in a document previously limited to a statement of principles).
174. THOMPSON, supra note 27, at 378. The essential difficulty with Congress passing
"sumptuary laws controlling the private life and conduct of affairs in local communities" was
that "our local governments will grow weaker and the central government stronger in control
of local affairs until local government is dominated from Washington by the votes of distant
majorities indifferent to local customs and needs." Elihu Root, President, Am. Bar Ass'n,
Address of the President: Public Service by the Bar (Aug. 30, 1916), in 2 A.B.A. J. 736, 752
(1916).
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more readily." '175 "Such intimacy between the government and the
governed," however, "is not possible with a centralized control at
Washington."'76 One observer noted: 'The Marylander is quite
willing to yield even respect and obedience to a law he believes
oppressive, provided it was passed by his own people, but his
innate sense of independence resents the effort of Kansans to
impose a law on him through what he believes to be a smug piece of
sanctimonious humbuggery."177
Those who attacked national prohibition essentially argued that
federal police legislation was antidemocratic. Positive law could
transform custom, but only if positive law was backed by democratic
legitimacy. Democratic legitimacy required that those affected by a
law identify with the governmental unit enacting the legislation,
and that they conceive the governmental unit enacting the legisla-
tion as an appropriate vehicle for the expression of popular will.
National prohibition lacked democratic legitimacy to the extent that
Marylanders experienced it merely as a law imposed upon Maryland
by Kansas, rather than as the expression of the democratic will of
175. THOMPSON, supra note 27, at 366.
176. Id. at 367.
The danger is that we will burden Washington with a mass of powers,-growing
out of undigested ideas, relating to controversial matters not fundamental in
character, and about which no real consensus of opinion exists,-that, in most
instances, properly belong to the several states, where they can be more
effectively, because more sympathetically, handled than by what, of necessity,
must always seem a comparatively distant national government.
Robert von Moschzisker, Dangers in Disregarding Fundamental Conceptions when Amending
the Federal Constitution, 11 CORNELL L.Q. 1, 13 (1925).
177. Stayton, supra note 19, at 33.
One who studies the psychology of the subject is inevitably struck by the
anomaly that while state prohibition laws were generally obeyed and respected,
people seem to feel it a sort of duty to flout the Volstead Act. And inquiry quickly
reveals at least one reason-a belief that the law was passed not by a man's
neighbors, who had an interest in him and his affairs, but by some one living at
a distance, by strangers acting in a spirit of meddlesomeness.
Id.
Feeling that they have had a part in making the regulations, people will submit
more readily to local restrictive legislation. But if the regulations are made by
Congress, which is far removed from local interests, they are apt to be resented
as being superimposed. Violations of these regulations then become justified by
a local public opinion. This breeds a disrespect for federal law and for the
government that attempts to enforce it.
THOMPSON, supra note 27, at 384.
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the single unified people of the United States, of which Maryland
was merely one part. 7 '
Normative dualism allowed prohibition's critics to condemn the
Eighteenth Amendment as a form of domestic "imperialism."'79
Although the ratification procedures of Article V were designed to
preclude the possibility of such imperialism, throughout the 1920s
inhabitants of wet states continued to attack prohibition as a
national imposition.' This objection to prohibition demonstrated
178. It was thus argued that "[tihe exercise of police power was withheld from the United
States" because "[iln the Federal system the people cannot act collectively as a single nation."
ARCHIBALD E. STEVENSON, STATES'RIGHTS AND NATIONALPROHIBITION 80-81 (1927). Only "[i]n
each of the States" do "the people [act] collectively as a single unit." Id. Prohibitionists, of
course, denied this argument. "[W]hat is good democracy in a small area is just as good in a
large area ...." BEST, supra note 27, at 40.
179.
Every restriction of the authority of local self-government must show cause in
the interest of the liberties and opportunities of all and not in the mere desire
of one or more communities or groups to govern the life of others, albeit for their
own good. There may be an imperialism at home as well as abroad.
Charles Evans Hughes, President, Am. Bar Ass'n, Address of the President at the Annual
Meeting of the American Bar Association: Liberty and Law (Sept. 2, 1925), in 11 A.B.A.J. 563,
565 (1925).
180. The absence of any national community capable of endowing national prohibition with
democratic legitimacy is the essential thrust of Fabian Franklin's complaint:
The population of the United States is, in more than one respect, composed of
parts extremely diverse as regards the particular subject of this legislation. The
question of drink has a totally different aspect in the South from what it has in
the North; a totally different aspect in the cities from what it has in the rural
districts or in small towns.... How profoundly the whole course of the Prohibition
movement has been affected by the desire of the South to keep liquor away from
the negroes, needs no elaboration; it would not be going far beyond the truth to
say that the people of New York are being deprived of their right to the harmless
enjoyment of wine and beer in order that the negroes of Alabama and Texas may
not get beastly drunk on rotgut whiskey.... (Tihe Prohibitionist tyranny is in no
small measure a sectional tyranny, which is of course an aggravated form of
majority tyranny.
But what needs insisting on even more than this is the way in which country
districts impose their notions about Prohibition upon the people of the cities, and
especially of the great cities.... Could the tyranny of the majority take a more
obnoxious form than that of sparse rural populations, scattered over the whole
area of the country from Maine to Texas and from Georgia to Oregon, deciding
for the crowded millions of New York and Chicago that they shall or shall not be
permitted to drink a glass of beer?
FRANKLIN, supra note 51, at 72-75. Of course those concerned to defend prohibition sought to
evoke precisely the kind of national community denied by Franklin. See, e.g., MCADoO, supra
note 99, at 214-15 ("The National Government, like the state governments, is not an alien and
external force imposed upon the people by some outside agency. The National Government,
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the existence of a strange and unsettling gap between the positive
law of Article V and the brute sociological fact of democratic
identification. The attraction of normative dualism depended upon
the existence of this gap.
Normative dualism sought to resist the imperialism of federal
authority by excluding the federal government from the sphere of
local police regulations. States could properly enact police regula-
tions because they were imagined as natural units of community
identification capable of expressing a popular will that would endow
like the state governments, is the people's government."); see also Hevenward, supra note 44,
at 478 ('The issue of battle is drawn! On the one side are those who for the satisfaction of
their own ungodly purposes, set themselves against what they presumptuously call 'the
encroachments of Federal authority.' These men are bent on sapping and mining our national
solidarity and making their liberty a cloak for detestable license. They would reduce the
Constitution to a form of words devoid of force or meaning, and so manipulate the smaller
political units as to bring forth confusion and every evil work. On the other side are those
upon whom rests the spirit of our godly ancestors who through the agency of the Constitution
welded the colonies together into a unity that should be then and forever indissoluble."). The
contestable nature of the national community in the context of prohibition was particularly
evident in congressional antagonism to the Act of September 14, 1922, Pub. L. No. 67-298, ch.
306, 42 Stat. 837 (1922), which authorized the Chief Justice to assign district court judges
temporarily to sit wherever in the country the needs of the docket were greatest. Taft strongly
supported the Act, see Robert Post, Judicial Management and Judicial Disinterest: The
Achievements and Perils of Chief Justice William Howard Taft, 1998 J. Sup. CT. HIST. 50, 54-
57, but it was opposed by those who deplored the possibility of a "flying squadron ... of the
judiciary-a perambulatory crowd of judges to be floating in space throughout the entire
United States." 62 CONG. REC. 5106-07 (1922). In particular, it was feared
that the Anti-Saloon League, finding some judge in some district to be perhaps
lenient toward those who offend against the prohibition laws, will be able to
transfer a judge from a remote section of the country who harbors different
views upon that subject and thus displace the local judge in the administration
of the law.
62 CONG. REC. 5154-55 (1922). Of course this form of national discipline was exactly what
some supporters of the Act had in mind. Representative William J. Graham, a Republican
from Illinois, explicitly linked the bill to prohibition enforcement: "The [national prohibition]
law is being openly flouted .... I want to see additional judges appointed on the bench of the
United States ... who will inject some fear of God into the breasts of lawbreakers in this
country." 62 CONG. REC. 203 (1921). Opposition to the Act of September 14th displayed an
implicit background assumption that the very legitimacy of national federal law depended
upon its dialectical reconciliation with local values, so that during congressional debate it
could be said without contradiction that "it is absolutely contrary to the principles of our
Government to assign a judge from a distant territory to preside over cases arising in another
community." 62 CONG. REC. 4847 (1922). Southerners in particular viewed the Act within a
larger context of regional hostility: "Tihis is merely a provision which is an entering wedge
to having what once was called a lot of 'carpetbag judges' transported from one section of the
country to another." 62 CONG. REC. 204 (1921) (statement of Rep. Stevenson).
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such regulations with democratic legitimacy.181 It was commonly
said in the 1920s that the transfer of state authority to Washington
threatened the very value of "self-government,"82 for the national
regime was "too far removed from the people who are affected by its
regulations" and hence perennially in danger of becoming merely
"bureaucratic."8 3
If an essential challenge of progressivism was to foster an
identification with the federal government capable of endowing
routine police regulations with democratic legitimacy," and if this
identification did not definitively occur until the national crisis of
the Great Depression, the history of stubborn and unrepentant
resistance to national prohibition during the 1920s stands as stark
evidence of how precarious was the federal government's claim to
the resource of democratic identification during the preceding
decade. Throughout the 1920s prohibition was relentlessly attacked
as a form of domestic imperialism that exemplified "[tihe despotism
of absolute democracy. ''185
181. The police power could be effectively and democratically exercised by states because
"there is more likelihood of a general community of opinion in most of the states than in the
country as a whole, and that is of no small importance in the enforcement of a law." Lowell,
supra note 27, at 147-48. See STEVENSON, supra note 178, at 82-83 ("State sovereignty has
been the main bulwark against the bureaucracy and absolutism of centralization. The States
... respect local customs and habits. They authorize the exercise of sectional prejudices in both
social and political matters. Such local prejudices are created by long established custom in
which the history of the people, their climatic, economic and social conditions play an
important part. The right of our citizens to satisfy these prejudices has been considered an
essential in our conception of civil liberty.... In a country covering such wide geographical area
as the United States, local interests and prejudices will inevitably be widely divergent. Laws
enacted in one part of the country may be offensive or serve no useful purpose in another
where the people live under vastly different circumstances.").
182. See Post, supra note 143, at 1569-72.
183. THOMPSON, supra note 27, at 366.
Advocates of the old order see in the change a breaking down of the principle
of local self-government. To their minds the danger of majority tyranny, made
possible by a centralization of power in a republic of such vast extent and varied
interests, outweighs all the advantages of national uniformity and efficiency.
Advocates of the new order think otherwise. They argue, moreover, that the
states have become too great and populous to serve as units for purposes of home
rule; that their boundaries are for the most part artificial and correspond to no
real distinctions in the ordinary life of men.
CHARLES W. PIERSON, OUR CHANGING CONSTITUTION 47-48 (1922).
184. See supra text accompanying note 59.
185. Priest, supra note 173, at 43. The insight of normative dualism was that legislation
enacted according to democratic procedures could nevertheless be experienced as tyrannical
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Justice Sutherland well expressed the constitutional implications
of normative dualism in 1920, two years before his appointment to
the Court. Noting that when he was in the Senate nobody "in either
house of Congress had the slightest idea what was intended by"
the idea of "concurrent power" in Section 2 of the Eighteenth
Amendment,"s Sutherland proposed that Section 2 be interpreted
in light of "the general plan and purpose of the constitution as a
whole, which clearly is to commit to the general government control
over the inter-relations of the states and their peoples, while leaving
to the states control over individuals and individual interests, and
over local and internal matters of police." '187 Sutherland did not
conceive this division, as did Brandeis, as merely functional. He
instead imagined the division between state and federal power as
intrinsically normative. Sutherland interpreted Section 2 "as
authorizing Congress to enforce [prohibition] by appropriate
legislation" and "as authorizing the several States to enforce it by
appropriate legislation," so that Congress and the States would be
confined to legislating "within their respective and historic fields of
jurisdiction."1
Construed in this way, the Eighteenth Amendment would not
authorize Congress to invade "the field of state jurisdiction,"89
because the "framers of the Amendment ... did not desire to
interfere with the internal powers of the States to deal with the
subject in its local as distinguished from its national import.' ' s°
if passed in ways that did not respect "[tihe feeling among the citizens that the government
is their government in which they have a vital interest." THOMPSON, supra note 27, at 369.
That feeling "is the soul of democracy." Id. Prohibition was on this account "an act of tyranny
because it is felt as an act of tyranny." Should We Obey the Prohibition Laws? A Socratic
Dialogue, 81 FORUM 328, 331 (1929) (quoting Fabian Franklin). See James E. Beck, Should
the Eighteenth Amendment be Respected?, CONG. DIG., Mar. 1930, at 83 (referring to "this
system of tyranny and hypocrisy").
186. Letter from George Sutherland (GS) to William D. Guthrie (Mar. 15, 1920)
(Sutherland Papers).
187. Letter from GS to William D. Guthrie (Mar. 18, 1920) (Sutherland Papers).
Sutherland's ideas were conveyed to William Guthrie as the latter was preparing his brief in
the National Prohibition Cases, 253 U.S. 350 (1920). Guthrie incorporated into his brief
Sutherland's ideas and even language. Letter from William D. Guthrie to GS (Mar. 25, 1920)
(Sutherland Papers).
188. Letter from GS to William D. Guthrie (Mar. 15, 1920) (Sutherland Papers).
189. Letter from GS to William D. Guthrie (Mar. 18, 1920) (Sutherland Papers).
190. Letter from GS to William D. Guthrie (Mar. 15, 1920) (Sutherland Papers).
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Sutherland therefore rejected as improper Congress's use of the
Volstead Act to preempt the meaning of "intoxicating beverages" in
Section 1 of the Amendment, because the Act made "the power of
the state ... not 'concurrent' but subordinate and, in effect, really no
power at all." '191
The Court decisively rejected Sutherland's reading of Section 2 in
the National Prohibition Cases. In conclusions recited by Justice
Van Devanter, the Court held:
The words "concurrent power" ... do not mean joint power, or
require that legislation thereunder by Congress, to be effective,
shall be approved or sanctioned by the several States or any of
them; nor do they mean that the power to enforce is divided
between Congress and the several States along the lines which
separate or distinguish foreign and interstate commerce from
intrastate affairs.
... The power confided to Congress ... while not exclusive, is
territorially coextensive with the prohibition of the first section,
embraces manufacture and other intrastate transactions ... and
is in no wise dependent on or affected by action or inaction on
the part of the several States or any of them.'92
This holding plainly suggested "that Congress may legislate ... on
the subject of intoxicants for the whole country, and that any
inconsistent state legislation would be annulled by such federal
enactments."'93
191. Letter from GS to William D. Guthrie (Mar. 18, 1920) (Sutherland Papers).
192. Nat' Prohibition Cases, 253 U.S. at 387.
193. CHARLES K. BURDICK, THE LAW OF THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION: ITS ORIGIN AND
DEVELOPMENT 616 (1922). Only Justice McKenna, in dissent, interpreted "concurrent power"
to mean that "there must be united action between the States and Congress, or, at any rate,
concordant and harmonious action." Nat Prohibition Cases, 253 U.S. at 405 (McKenna, J.,
dissenting). He explained that this interpretation would "bring to the States ... or preserve to
them, a partial autonomy, satisfying, if you will, their prejudices, or better say, their
predilections" upon which "our dual system of government is based." Id. at 406. "And this
predilection for self-government the Eighteenth Amendment regards and respects." Id.
McKenna argued against the supremacy of federal statutes enforcing the Eighteenth
Amendment on the ground that the "source" of supremacy was "the Constitution of the United
States," and "that § 2, by giving concurrent power to Congress and the States," endowed state
statutes enforcing the Amendment with a constitutional source that did not give "Congress
supreme power over the States." Id. at 400-01. "The Eighteenth Amendment is part of the
Constitution of the United States, therefore of as high sanction as Article VI." Id. at 401.
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The Court refused to interpret the Eighteenth Amendment
through the lens of normative dualism, and as a result prohibition
became definitively associated with national regulation and national
enforcement. This made the tension between prohibition and
regionally-based customary norms particularly intense, leading in
some contexts, as in the repeal of the Mullan-Gage law, to outright
defiance. It also put particular strain on the viability of normative
dualism as a convincing constitutional account of American
federalism. This strain was especially evident in two decisions of the
Taft Court that followed the National Prohibition Cases in reading
the Eighteenth Amendment to reject normative dualism.
In the first, James Everard's Breweries v. Day,"4 the Taft Court
upheld the authority of Congress to forbid "physicians from
prescribing intoxicating malt liquors for medicinal purposes.' 96 In
a unanimous opinion authored by Justice Sanford, the Court
reasoned that even though the Eighteenth Amendment prohibited
traffic in intoxicating liquors only "for beverage purposes," neverthe-
less Congress could ban the medicinal use of beer in order "to make
that prohibition effective."' Sanford's opinion was ruthlessly
nationalistic. If the prohibition "is within the authority delegated to
Congress by the Eighteenth Amendment," Sanford wrote,
its validity is not impaired by reason of any power reserved to
the States.... And if the act is within the power confided to
Congress, the Tenth Amendment, by its very terms, has no
application, since it only reserves to the States "powers not
delegated to the United States by the Constitution."'97
194. 265 U.S. 545 (1924).
195. Id. at 554, 560. At issue was the Supplemental Prohibition Act of Nov. 23, 1921, ch.
134, 42 Stat. 222. The statute was enacted to prevent the issuance of permits authorizing the
manufacture and sale of beer for medicinal purposes. Attorney General A. Mitchell Palmer
had ruled in 1921 that such permits were not prohibited by the Volstead Act. 32 Op. Att'y
Gen. 467 (1921). See Beer as Medicine, 2% Gallons at Time; New Regulations Issued by
Revenue Bureau Cause Consternation in Dry Camp, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 25, 1921, at 1; Under the
Whip, N.Y. TIMES, June 29, 1921, at 14 ("Another triumph of discipline has been achieved by
the Anti-Saloon League.").
196. Everard's Breweries, 265 U.S. at 560. Taft regarded Everard's Breweries as a "pretty
important" case. Letter from WHT to Charles P. Taft, 2d (Mar. 9, 1924), microformed on TAFr
PAPERS, supra note 9, Reel 262.
197. Everard's Breweries, 265 U.S. at 558.
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Deliberately invoking the expansive construction of McCulloch v.
Maryland, Everard's Breweries held that Congress had power to
achieve the purposes of the Eighteenth Amendment by "any means,
appearing to it most eligible and appropriate, which are adapted to
the end to be accomplished and consistent with the letter and spirit
of the Constitution." '198 The Court "may not inquire into the degree"
of the necessity of these means, "as this would be to pass the line
which circumscribes the judicial department and to tread upon
legislative ground."'" The only question for the Court was whether
"prohibiting traffic in intoxicating malt liquors for medicinal
purposes has no real or substantial relation to the enforcement of
the Eighteenth Amendment, and is not adapted to accomplish that
end and make the constitutional prohibition effective."' 00 In
answering that question, the judgment of Congress "must be given
great weight," and the Court would extend "every possible presump-
tion ... in favor of the validity" of a federal statute.20 '
Anticipating the Darby Court's dismissal of the Tenth
Amendment as a mere "truism,"2 2 Everard's Breweries reads
strikingly like post-New Deal decisions ceding to Congress virtually
unfettered authority. The Court's opinion meant that Congress
could "do just about anything it wants to under" the Eighteenth
Amendment.2 3 As Thomas Reed Powell quipped, it appears "that
Congress might have saved the space which the word 'beverage'
takes up in the printed Amendment."2 4 Everard's Breweries gave
to the national government a breadth of power that prompted
profound popular disquiet, testimony to national prohibition's
threat to entrenched ideas of normative dualism.0 5
198. Id. at 559.
199. Id.
200. Id. at 560.
201. Id. (quoting Adkins v. Children's Hospital, 261 U.S. 525, 544 (1923)).
202. United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 123-24 (1941) ("Our conclusion is unaffected by
the Tenth Amendment which provides: 'The powers not delegated to the United States by the
Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to
the people.' The amendment states but a truism that all is retained which has not been
surrendered.").
203. Editorial, Supreme Court Decision Mops Last Wet Hope, CHI. DAILY TRIB., June 10,
1924, at 5.
204. Thomas Reed Powell, Umpiring the Federal System, 1922-1924, 40 POL. SCI. Q. 101,
104(1925).
205. The Literary Digest could discover only a single newspaper editorial "approving the
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Almost as an afterthought, Sanford concluded his opinion with
the idea that the statute could not be characterized as "an arbitrary
and unreasonable prohibition of the use of valuable medicinal
agents '20 because beer and malt liquor "are not generally recog-
nized as medicinal agents" and the question of their medical value
is, "at the most, debatable."2 7 The afterthought was to prove highly
significant when the Taft Court decided its second and far more
controversial decision about the nature of federal power under the
Eighteenth Amendment.0'
ruling." The Supreme Court's Ban on Beer, LITERARY DIG., June 28, 1924, at 17. The response
of the New York Times was typical:
Apparently, there is no limit to the power of Congress in the enforcement of the
Eighteenth Amendment....
... As Dr. GEORGE DAVID STEWART, President of the Academy of Medicine,
said:
Only the doctor knows how necessary alcohol is in certain cases, and how
much should be used. In diphtheria cases, for example, especially where
secondary infection has set in, nothing on God's earth will cure them but alcohol.
Let them die, then! What is the judgment of mere physicians compared with
the judgment of Congress?
Editorial, Dr. Congress, N.Y. TIMES, June 10, 1924, at 20; see also Editorial, Prescription by
Legislation?, WASH. POST, June 12, 1924, at 6 ("It would be interesting to know how far the
process of prescription by legislation can be carried.... Is the pharmacopoeia to be embodied
in the revised statutes, and is Congress to enact what medicines may and may not be
prescribed, and what surgical operations may and may not be performed?"). At the very
moment that Everard's Breweries was provoking such controversy, "many States" were
routinely-and apparently noncontroversially-banning medical uses of beer pursuant to local
prohibition laws. Everard's Breweries, 265 U.S. at 562. This disparity can best be explained
as reflecting the popular influence of the ideals of normative dualism.
206. Everard's Breweries, 265 U.S. at 561.
207. Id. at 562.
208. I should also mention, in this context, Selzman v. United States, 268 U.S. 466 (1925),
in which the Court unanimously upheld federal power under the Eighteenth Amendment to
regulate denatured alcohol, stating:
The power of the Federal Government, granted by the Eighteenth Amendment,
to enforce the prohibition of the manufacture, sale and transportation of
intoxicating liquor carries with it power to enact any legislative measures
reasonably adapted to promote the purpose. The denaturing in order to render
the making and sale of industrial alcohol compatible with the enforcement of
prohibition of alcohol for beverage purposes is not always effective. The
ignorance of some, the craving and the hardihood of others, and the fraud and
cupidity of still others, often tend to defeat its object. It helps the main purpose
of the Amendment, therefore, to hedge about the making and disposition of the
denatured article every reasonable precaution and penalty to prevent the proper
industrial use of it from being perverted to drinking it.
Id. at 468-69.
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In Lambert v. Yellowley °9 the Court upheld Congress's authority
to regulate the prescription of vinous and spirituous liquors,210
which at the time was a far more common and accepted medical
practice than the prescription of beer and malted liquor.21" ' The
decision was five to four. Brandeis wrote the opinion for the Court,
and he was joined by Taft, Holmes, Van Devanter, and Sanford.21 2
209. 272 U.S. 581 (1926).
210. At issue were the provisions of two statutes. The first was chapter 85, title 2, section
7 of the National Prohibition Act, which provided:
No one but a physician holding a permit to prescribe liquor shall issue any
prescription for liquor.... Not more than a pint of spirituous liquor to be taken
internally shall be prescribed for use by the same person within any period of
ten days and no prescription shall be filled more than once.
Lambert, 272 U.S. at 587. The second was chapter 134, section 2 of the supplemental Act of
November 23, 1921, which provided:
No physician shall prescribe nor shall any person sell or furnish on any
prescription, any vinous liquor that contains more than 24 per centum of alcohol
by volume, nor shall any one prescribe or sell or furnish on any prescription
more than one-fourth of one gallon of vinous liquor, or any such vinous or
spirituous liquor that contains separately or in the aggregate more than one-half
pint of alcohol, for use by any person within any period often days. No physician
shall be furnished with more than one hundred prescription blanks for use in
any period of ninety days, nor shall any physician issue more than that number
of prescriptions within any such period unless on application therefor he shall
make it clearly apparent to the commissioner that for some extraordinary reason
a larger amount is necessary whereupon the necessary additional blanks may
be furnished him.
Lambert, 272 U.S. at 591. Almost from the start these statutes were attacked as violating the
rights of physicians and the needs of patients.
Here we are beyond any question of the merits or demerits of prohibition in
itself. Here, as some of the most distinguished physicians of this city have
written, "the point at issue is the right of the physician to select his remedies
and to decide what doses of these remedies each patient requires." That right,
so far as the use of alcohol as a remedy is concerned, Dr. Congress proposes to
take away.... [Tihis Federal prescription of prescriptions will force conscientious
physicians who believe in the therapeutic use of alcohol to break the law. The
health, the life, of their patients will necessarily outweigh in their minds the
ignorant interference of fanatical or fanatic-frightened laymen with medical
practice.
Editorial, Medical Liberty Chained, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 10, 1921, at 12.
211. Lambert was "regarded as one of the most important tests to which the Volstead Act
has been subjected." Liquor Rule Sustained; Prescriptions To Retain Limit, L.A. TIMES, Nov.
30, 1926, at 1. The banner over the story in the Chicago Tribune read: "High Court Upholds
'Dr.' Volstead." CHI. TRIB., Nov. 30, 1926, at 1.
212. The Brandeis papers indicate that he initially circulated a brief and abrupt opinion
that cited Everard's Breweries, documented extensive state regulation of the prescription of
alcoholic beverages for medicinal purposes in order to enforce municipal prohibition laws, and
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Sutherland authored a spirited dissent, joined by McReynolds,
Butler, and Stone.2"3 The plaintiff in the case was Dr. Samuel
then concluded with the peremptory announcement that "[tihere is no right to practice
medicine which is not subordinate to the police power ... or to the power of Congress to make
laws necessary and proper for carrying into execution the command of the Eighteenth
Amendment." BRANDEIS PAPERS, supra note 119, Reel 29. Holmes and Sanford signed on to
the draft, but Taft and Van Devanter were apparently dissatisfied, and Van Devanter drafted
everything between what is now footnote 2 of the published opinion and its last paragraph,
which Van Devanter also extensively edited. Id. Brandeis mostly accepted these changes, and
circulated the new draft with the notation: "Additions and Changes made at the suggestion
of the Chief Justice and Mr. Justice Van Devanter are indicated in pencil on the margin." Id.
Taft wrote Van Devanter that "I am perfectly delighted that you made your addition to B's
opinion. It shows up the weakness of the dissent." Letter from WHT to Willis Van Devanter
(WVD) (Nov. 30, 1926) (Van Devanter Papers).
213. There is a note in the Brandeis papers to the effect that "McR. B & Su. say one of them
will write a dissent & ask that it go over to the next term so that it can be done. St[one] says
he will await dissent to see whether they can get away from the 2 per cent case. If not he will
go with the majority." BRANDEIS PAPERS, supra note 119, Reel 29. Stone wrote Sutherland
that, while he "entirely" agreed with Sutherland's dissent,
the point in the case with which I have great difficulty is the aspect given this
whole question by the decision of the Court in the half per cent case, which is
Ruppert v. Caffrey [251 U.S. 264 (1920)] ... if I remember correctly. There the
Court held that conceding that half per cent beer was not intoxicating and that
there was no general power lodged with the federal government to regulate or
prohibit the consumption of non.intoxicating beverages, nevertheless the power
to prohibit this particular type of non-intoxicating beverage was incidental to the
general power to prohibit intoxicating beverages. Had I been on the Court at
that time I should have voted with the minority, but I now find difficulty in
distinguishing the reason adopted by the majority from that applicable to the
present case.
In the foregoing I am indicating, not a conclusion, but a doubt, which I think
should be dealt with in your dissent.
Letter from Harlan Fiske Stone (HFS) to GS (Sept. 30, 1926) (Stone Papers). Several months
later Stone wrote Sutherland asking if he would incorporate the following passage in his
dissent:
The question whether a state has power to regulate or prohibit the use of
intoxicating liquor as a medicine is different from the question presented here.
A state has plenary power in that respect, save only as it is limited by the
Fourteenth Amendment. Linder v. United States, supra. But here the question
is whether that power was transferred from the state to the national
government by the adoption of the Eighteenth Amendment, not whether its
exercise is unreasonable or arbitrary. It is insisted that the power is incidental
to the granted power to prohibit the use of intoxicating liquor as a beverage and
that by the grant of the incident the power of the state to regulate the practice
of medicine, so far as the use of intoxicating liquor as a medicine is concerned,
has been destroyed notwithstanding the limitation of the Tenth Amendment.
Letter from HFS to GS (Nov. 27, 1926) (Stone Papers). Stone continued, "I think this comes
a little closer to the real vice of the argument of the majority than your statement that the
authority of Congress is here exercised not as ancillary to the power granted, etc. etc." Id.
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W. Lambert, "a distinguished physician,"2 14 who alleged that the
Lambert was decided on November 29, and Sutherland's dissent does not contain Stone's
proposed paragraph, with its striking invocation of the Tenth Amendment.
214. Lambert, 272 U.S. at 588. Lambert was the "president of the Association for the
Protection of Constitutional Rights, which was organized ... by 105 physicians" to challenge
federal control of the authority of doctors to prescribe liquor. Unlimited Liquor Prescriptions,
LITERARY DIG., May 26, 1923, at 10. From 1904 to 1919 Lambert was the Dean of the
Columbia College of Physicians and Surgeons, and he was president of the New York
Academy of Medicine from 1927 to 1929. For a full biography, see 37 NAT'L CYCLOPEDIA AM.
BIOGRAPHY 281-82 (1951).
Lambert was a close personal acquaintance of Taft and served as a physician to Taft's
relatives in the New York area. See Letter from Horace D. Taft to WHT (Nov. 2, 1922),
microformed on TAFr PAPERS, supra note 9, Reel 247; Letter from WHT to Horace D. Taft
(Nov. 9, 1922), microformed on TAFT PAPERS, supra note 9, Reel 247 ("I am very glad that Sam
thinks you have gained in the last eight months. It seemed to me, when I saw you in New
York, that you looked much better."); Letter from WHT to Horace D. Taft (Oct. 26, 1922),
microformed on TAFT PAPERS, supra note 9, Reel 246; Letter from WHT to Mrs. William A.
Edwards (Nov. 17, 1922), microformed on TAFT PAPERS, supra note 9, Reel 247 ('I am glad to
think that Horace is better. The trace of albumen hasn't disappeared, but his diet has
evidently done him good, and Sam Lambert has now [illegible] him to eat some eggs but no
meat."). After the decision in Lambert, Taft wrote his brother:
Sam Lambert's wife was here as one of Nellie's Colonial Dames and when I
saw her I told her that if she had managed the case, with her direct methods,
because she appealed to me, as I told you, by seizing my coat lapel and saying
that I must decide for Sam, the case might have gone what she thought was the
right way. I told her to tell Joe Auerback that if she had been employed as
counsel, the result might have been different.
Letter from WHT to Horace D. Taft (May 24, 1927), microformed on TAFT PAPERS, supra note
9, Reel 292. After the Court's decision, Lambert filed a petition for rehearing, arguing that the
Court had in its opinion mistakenly believed that the majority of physicians were "opposed
to the use of alcohol as a therapeutic." Liquor as Medicine Ruling Under Fire; Committee of
Doctors To Seek Reversal of Limiting Decision by Supreme Court, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 14, 1926,
at 17. See Medicinal Liquor up in Court Again; Dr. Lambert Asks Supreme Bench To Reopen
Case Rejected Five to Four, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 6, 1927, at 3. Taft wrote his brother Horace:
I don't see just how Sam Lambert can try again on the question, for we
intended to make an end of him, and I think we have done so. If he thinks we
are going back to try over the question whether a majority of doctors are in favor
or opposed to larger liberality in the matter of the use of whiskey as a medicinal
agent, he is greatly mistaken. I used to think that the prohibitionists were the
craziest people in the landscape, but I really think their opponents are more
nearly lunatics than they.
Letter from WHT to Horace D. Taft (Jan. 16, 1927), microformed on TAFT PAPERS, supra note
9, Reel 288. After the Court's denial of Lambert's petition, Horace replied, "I see that you have
turned down Sam Lambert and I hope that now he can get some sleep." Letter from Horace
D. Taft to WHT (Jan. 18, 1927), microformed on TAFT PAPERS, supra note 9, Reel 288.
Lambert, however, continued to press his case, arguing for the medicinal value of liquor "in
the treatment of many diseases and nervous conditions, particularly those of the aged."
Advocates Liquor as Benefit to Aged; Lambert of Medical Academy Urges Doctors To Force
New Dry Law from Congress, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 5, 1928, at 27; Says Dry Act Curbs Medical
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relevant statutory restrictions interfered with his practice of
medicine because he presently had under his care patients whose
treatment required prescriptions of alcohol that Congress prohib-
ited.215
The Court essentially treated Everard's Breweries as dis-
positive.21
If Congress may prohibit the manufacture and sale of intoxicat-
ing malt liquor for medicinal purposes by way of enforcing the
Eighteenth Amendment, it equally and to the same end may
restrict the prescription of other intoxicating liquor for medicinal
purposes. In point of power there is no difference; if in point of
expediency there is a difference, that is a matter which Congress
alone may consider." 7
Congressional limitations on the amount of liquor that physicians
could prescribe 218 "must be taken as embodying an implicit congres-
sional finding that such liquors have no such medicinal value as
gives rise to a need for larger or more frequent prescriptions. Such
a finding, in the presence of the well-known diverging opinions of
physicians, cannot be regarded as arbitrary or without a reasonable
basis." '219 The Court concluded:
Practice; Dr. Samuel W. Lambert Asserts Definition of Intoxicants Invades Doctors' Rights,
N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 28, 1927, at 3; see also Letter from Horace D. Taft to WHT (Oct. 19, 1928),
microformed on TAFT PAPERS, supra note 9, Reel 305 ("Another piece of delicious absurdity
comes from a quotation by the Wets of Sam Lambert. Nothing is so firmly fixed in the minds
of the Wets or so loudly trumpeted as that we are drinking more than ever under prohibition.
Now comes Sam in an address and states that there has been a dreadful increase in diabetes,
because alcohol is needed to burn up the sugar in the human system and now that people
have so largely given up alcoholic drinks the increase in diabetes occurs. The Wets rejoice over
this decision by a high medical authority and are quite capable of citing in parallel columns
the two arguments against prohibition, one that we are drinking more than ever and the other
that the fact that we are drinking so little is destroying us.").
215. Lambert v. Yellowley, 291 F. 640, 640-41 (S.D.N.Y. 1923).
216. Lambert, 272 U.S. at 594 ("We have spoken of that case at length because the decision
was by a unanimous court and if adhered to disposes of the present case.').
217. Id. at 595. This language was actually written by Justice Van Devanter. See supra
note 212.
218. See supra note 210.
219. Lambert, 272 U.S. at 595. This language was actually written by Justice Van
Devanter. See supra note 212.
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High medical authority being in conflict as to the medicinal
value of spirituous and vinous liquors taken as a beverage, it
would, indeed, be strange if Congress lacked the power to
determine that the necessities of the liquor problem require a
limitation of permissible prescriptions, as by keeping the
quantity that may be prescribed within limits which will
minimize the temptation to resort to prescriptions as pretexts
for obtaining liquor for beverage uses.
220
In dissent, Sutherland sardonically noted that he was "Very
certain" that Everard's Breweries "would not have been a unani-
mous" decision if it had stood for what the Court now interpreted it
to mean.22' Sutherland understood Everard's Breweries to rest
"upon the ground that Congress, upon conflicting evidence, had
determined that malt liquors possessed no substantial medicinal
value and judicial inquiry upon that question was, therefore,
foreclosed. 222 In Lambert, by contrast, Congress had concluded
that vinous and spirituous liquors were "of medicinal value,"
although requiring regulation to prevent possible abuse. 3
Because there were no congressional findings about proper
prescription dosages for alcohol,224 the "only fact in this record
bearing upon that subject" was Lambert's allegation that the
statutory regulations were contrary to his medical judgment.2 25 In
220. Lambert, 272 U.S. at 597. In Brandeis's original draft, this sentence had read: "High
medical authority is in conflict as to the medicinal value of spirituous and vinous liquors
taken as a beverage. It would, indeed, be strange if Congress lacked the power to determine
that the necessities of the liquor problem require a reasonable limitation of the permissible
doses." BRANDEIS PAPERS, supra note 119, Reel 29. Changes in the paragraph were all drafted
by Van Devanter. The Court's reference to conflict of medical authority referred to a 1917
resolution of the American Medical Association declaring "that the use of alcoholic liquor as
a therapeutic agent was without 'scientific basis' and 'should be discouraged."' Lambert, 272
U.S. at 591. In Lambert itself, however, the American Medical Association filed an amicus
brief disavowing its previous resolution and arguing that the "limitations on dosage of which
complaint is now made ... have no foundation in scientific observation or in experience.... They
are, it is believed arbitrary and unreasonable." Brief for American Medical Ass'n as Amicus
Curiae Supporting Appellant, Lambert v. Yellowley, 272 U.S. 581 (1926) (No. 47).
221. Lambert, 272 U.S. at 600 (Sutherland, J., dissenting). Sutherland, of course, had
participated in Everard's Breweries.
222. Id.
223. Id. at 600, 602.
224. Id. at 601-02.
225. Id. at 602. There were, moreover, no congressional findings connecting dosage
limitations to the necessities of enforcement. Id. at 603.
[Vol. 48:1
PROHIBITION IN THE TAFT COURT ERA
such circumstances, to give essentially unlimited deference to
congressional judgments of necessity would "deprive the states of
the exclusive power, which the Eighteenth Amendment has not
destroyed, of controlling medical practice and transfer it in part to
Congress., 226 "[U]nder the pretense of adopting appropriate means,
a carefully and definitely limited power" of prohibiting intoxicating
liquors for beverage purposes "will have been expanded into a
general and unlimited power" of prohibiting such liquors for all
purposes, including medicinal ones.227 This would contradict "the
letter and spirit of the Constitution ... and especially of the Tenth
Amendment."228
Because this statute by fixing inadequate prescriptions prohibits
to the extent of such inadequacies the legitimate prescription of
spirituous and vinous liquors for medicinal purposes, it exceeds
the powers of Congress, invades those exclusively reserved to the
states, and is not appropriate legislation to enforce the Eigh-
teenth Amendment.229
Sutherland's dissent expresses the same concept of normative
dualism that had informed his earlier interpretation of "concurrent
power."2 30 In contrast to the legislation at issue in Everard's
Breweries, the statutes in dispute in Lambert regulated the practice
of medicine and therefore directly intruded into the police power of
the states.231 In order to protect the integrity of that power, the
statutes were to be allowed only if truly necessary.232 Sutherland
226. Id. at 604. That state prohibition statutes were accorded deference in their regulation
of medical prescriptions of vinous and spirituous liquors, a fact extensively documented by
Brandeis's opinion, was thus irrelevant for Sutherland, because state regulations did not
undermine the constitutional values protected by normative dualism. Id. at 603.
227. Id. at 604.
228. Id. at 603-04.
229. Id. at 605.
230. See supra text accompanying notes 186-91.
231. See, e.g., Linder v. United States, 268 U.S. 5, 18 (1925) ("Obviously, direct control of
medical practice in the States is beyond the power of the federal government. Incidental
regulation of such practice by Congress through a taxing act cannot extend to matters plainly
inappropriate and unnecessary to reasonable enforcement of a revenue measure.").
232. As Sutherland put it in his presidential address to the ABA:
I believe in the most liberal construction of the national powers actually granted,
but I also believe in the rigid exclusion of the national government from those
powers which have been actually reserved to the states. The local government
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regarded the statutes at issue in Lambert as a "transfer"- of police
power to the federal government and a consequent loss of the
democratic legitimacy inherent in local self-government.233 It is
"striking,"' however, that in both Everard's Breweries and Lambert
the Taft Court decisively rejected this vision of normative dualism,
which is perhaps most conspicuously signified by Sanford's repudia-
tion of the Tenth Amendment as a symbol of the constitutional
value of local self-government that was to be balanced against the
deployment of federal power.23
is in immediate contact with the local problems and should be able to deal with
them more wisely and more effectively than the general government having its
seat at a distance. The need of preserving the power and enforcing the duty of
local self-government is imperative, and especially so in a country, such as ours,
of vast population and extent, possessing almost every variety of soil and
climate, of greatly diversified interests and occupations, and having all sorts of
differing conditions to deal with.
George Sutherland, President, Am. Bar Ass'n, Address of the President: Private Rights and
Government Control, in REPORT OF THE FORTIETH ANNUAL MEETING OF THE AMERICAN BAR
ASSOCIATION 212 (1917).
233. Lambert, 272 U.S. at 604.
234. David P. Currie, The Constitution in the Supreme Court: 1921-1930, 1986 DUKE L.J.
65, 120 ("It remains striking, however, that under the influence of the popular uprising that
culminated in the adoption of the amendment, a Court so strict in its scrutiny of legislative
means under the innocuous-looking due process clauses would assume such a relaxed attitude
in determining the appropriateness of means to achieve limited congressional
goals-especially since nothing in the opinions suggested that the Court's principles of broad
construction applied only to Prohibition cases.") (footnote omitted). The extreme deference
evinced by the Court in Everard's Breweries and Lambert should be contrasted to the Court's
pinched reasoning in Schlesinger v. Wisconsin, 270 U.S. 230 (1926), in which, over the dissent
of Holmes, Brandeis, and Stone, the Court struck down a Wisconsin statute conclusively
presuming that all gifts made within six years of death are "in contemplation of death" and
hence subject to an inheritance tax. Id. at 239. In dissent Holmes specifically cited Everard's
Breweries for the proposition that "with the States as with Congress when the means are not
prohibited and are calculated to effect the object we ought not to inquire into the degree of the
necessity for resorting to them."Id. at 242 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
235. See supra text accompanying note 197. Sanford's opinion in Everard's Breweries may
be contrasted with Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251 (1918):
The grant of power to Congress over the subject of interstate commerce was
to enable it to regulate such commerce, and not to give it authority to control the
States in their exercise of the police power over local trade and manufacture.
The grant of authority over a purely federal matter was not intended to
destroy the local power always existing and carefully reserved to the States in
the Tenth Amendment to the Constitution.
Id. at 273-74. Hammer ruled that the value of local self-government was to be protected by
judicial vigilance to ensure that congressional authority was exercised in a manner that was
consistent "with constitutional limitations and not by an invasion of the powers of the States."
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Although the Taft Court was, on the whole, a highly nationalist
institution,"' Everard's Breweries and Lambert nevertheless
contrast sharply to the normative dualism that infused many of the
Court's most important decisions, like Bailey v. Drexel Furniture
Co. ,237 which were much closer in spirit to the perspective expressed
in Sutherland's Lambert dissent.238 The pressure to uphold prohibi-
tion led the Court in Everard's Breweries and Lambert to a vision
of dual sovereignty that we may call "positive dualism," for it
awarded to both the federal government and the states the full,
unqualified measure of the authority enacted in the positive text of
the Constitution. Positive dualism necessarily tilts the balance of
power decisively toward the national government, because the
Supremacy Clause preempts all state law that is inconsistent with
federal regulation. The manifest tension between the normative
dualism of Bailey, so well expressed by Sutherland's dissent in
Lambert, and the positive dualism of the Court's opinions in
Everard's Breweries and Lambert, caused great consternation
among contemporaries, who asked whether there shall "be two
constitutions, one for prohibition and one for all other matters
whatsoever?" 239
IV
The story of ascendancy of federal power in America is usually
told in terms of a response to the increasing growth and interde-
pendence of national markets, "as a natural development and
outgrowth of modern industry.""24 Prohibition, however, suggests
Id. at 276. Sutherland's dissent drew direct inspiration from this passage. Lambert, 272 U.S.
at 604 (Sutherland, J., dissenting).
236. EDWARD A. PURCELL, JR., LITIGATION AND INEQUALITY: FEDERAL DIVERSITY
JURISDICTION IN INDUSTRIAL AMERICA, 1870-1958, at 192 (1992).
237. (Child Labor Tax Case), 259 U.S. 20 (1922).
238. For a discussion of Bailey, see Post, 8upra note 143, at 1558-63.
239. Forrest Revere Black, An Ill-Starred Decision-Lambert v. Yellowley, 15 CORNELL
L.Q. 243, 253 (1930).
240. THOMPSON, supra note 27, at 10.
[P]rogress toward the unitary state is not an accident but a logical development,
once national unity has been attained. The system of concurrence of powers
subject to national supremacy is the one to which the future belongs. States will
have to be content with what cities enjoy under constitutional home rule.
Ernst Freund, The New German Constitution, 35 POL. SCI. Q. 177, 184 (1920).
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that this story must be expanded to include a distinct theme,
which is the growth of the belief that the nation, as distinct from
individual states, was a natural unit of democratic self-determina-
tion. '4 Because this belief may apply to some spheres of federal
competence-war, foreign affairs, railroads-but not to others, we
can profitably conceive the remarkable advancement of federal
authority in the twentieth century as an expansion of the domains
of federal action to which this belief has attached.
The ratification of the Eighteenth Amendment represented a
proleptic leap of faith that the American people were ready to accept
the democratic legitimacy of federal regulation of intimate habits of
consumption.242 This faith was misplaced, for the 'light-hearted
contempt with which the Eighteenth Amendment" was "treated
by millions of good citizens--citizens who in other things are as
law-abiding as anybody" proved to be a "phenomenon" that was
entirely unanticipated. 43 It was not merely that prohibition was
flouted, it was rather that "great centers of population" were "wet in
practice and wet in principle." 44 'The real problem of prohibition
enforcement turns on the intensity of the conviction in certain
communities not merely that the law is a failure, but that it
ought to be a failure." '245 The widespread and flagrant defiance of
241. Consider the form of democratic identification implicitly underlying this typical
objection to federal centralization:
Shall the conduct of citizens of Mississippi be prescribed by vote of congressmen
from New York, or supervised at the expense of New York taxpayers? Will an
educational system suitable for Massachusetts necessarily fit the young of
Georgia? Such suggestions carry their own answer. In the very nature of things
there is bound to be a reaction against centralization sooner or later.
PIERSON, supra note 183, at 145.
242.
It was the great body of our people who represent the homes and firesides and
who comprise the bone and sinew of our body politic that made prohibition
possible. These people, through long years of observation of the evils of the
liquor traffic and experience of the benefits obtained through applying the
principle of prohibition to small communities by local option and State-wide
laws, came to believe its application to the Nation as a unit would be to the best
interests of our national welfare.
Wesley L. Jones, Is Nation Ready To Respect Prohibition Law?, 4 CONG. DIG. 20 (1924).
243. Franklin, supra note 172, at 50.
244. Walter Lippmann, Our Predicament Under the Eighteenth Amendment, 154 HARPER'S
MAG. 51, 52 (1926).
245. Id. at 53. To violate the law "even secretly should be a burden of shame to be
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prohibition246 thus involved not merely inadequate mechanisms of
enforcement, but also, and more distressingly, a calamitous collapse
of the law's legitimacy.247
undertaken by no respectable person; and yet all of us are well aware of the pride which many
otherwise excellent citizens take in breaking the Volstead Act." George S. Buck, The Crime
Wave and Law Enforcement, 131 OUTLOOK 16, 17 (1922).
246. "Prohibition in the United States, under the provisions of the eighteenth amendment
and the Volstead Act has proved a disastrous, tragic failure ...." William Cabell Bruce, U.S.
Senators Discuss Prohibition Issue, 5 CONG. DIG. 191, 191 (1926).
It has brought about close working relations between the bootlegger and
thousands of the most intelligent and virtuous members of American society who
feel no more compunction about violating the Volstead Act than the free-soiler
did about violating the fugitive slave law, or the southern white did about
nullifying ignorant negro suffrage; the Federal Constitution in each instance to
the contrary notwithstanding.
Id. "Any law that has brought in its trail the havoc, the defiance, and the corruption which
has followed the Volstead Act can not be successfully defended.... Today we have ... a general
disrespect for all law that threatens the very foundation of the Republic." Walter E. Edge,
U.S. Senators Discuss Prohibition Issue, 5 CONG. DIG. 191, 193 (1926). As early as 1922
Charles H. Strong, the President of the Unitarian Laymen's League, wrote Taft that
"[elverybody knows that the Prohibition Amendment and the Volstead Act have probably been
more persistently and flagrantly violated than any other law ever adopted in this country."
Letter from Charles H. Strong to WHT (Oct. 31, 1922), microformed on TAFT PAPERS, supra
note 9, Reel 246. For a fascinating and official map of wet and dry America that has a strong
correlation with present maps that distinguish red states from blue states, see Jack
O'Donnell, Wet Around the Edges, COLLIER'S WEEKLY, Jan. 26, 1924, at 5. In an engrossing
first-hand account of conditions in Pennsylvania, for example, the State was described as
"[s]uffering from 'a liquor deluge,' where practically every city is 'wet as the Atlantic Ocean,'
... a 'bootleggers' Elysium,' brazen in its defiance of Prohibition laws, where 'there are far
more wide-open saloons than ever flourished in pre-Prohibition days. How Wet Is
Pennsylvania?, LITERARY DIG., Nov. 10, 1923, at 38. By contrast, J.C. Burnham reports that
"local enforcement in many Southern and Western areas was both severe and effective."
Burnham, supra note 34, at 58.
For fascinating data on arrests for intoxication and death rates from alcoholism in both wet
states and dry states, see THE MODERATION LEAGUE, supra note 6. The League concluded that
"in wet states-that is, the states which had no state prohibition before national
prohibition-the low point of drunkenness was in 1920, the first year of national prohibition."
Id. at 4. By 1929, however, arrests for intoxication had "risen substantially to the level of pre-
prohibition or saloon days." Id. Dry states reached the low point for intoxication arrests in
1919, but by 1929 arrests were "39% above the 1914 level," which "indicates that conditions
of intemperance in these 'dry' states are worse today than before national prohibition." Id. at
5. Examining death rates from alcoholism (excluding deaths from wood or poison alcohol,
which virtually did not occur before national prohibition, id. at 13), the League found that the
low point in such death rates in wet states was in 1920, but that by 1929 "the death rate from
alcoholism is now as high as it formerly was in the saloon days." Id. at 11. In dry states "more
persons per capita are dying now from intemperate use of liquor than under state
prohibition." Id. at 13.
247. The "widespread and scarcely or not at all concealed contempt for the policy of the
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Contemporaries understood this collapse as caused by the fact
that prohibition had "no sanction in common sense or morals.... The
preposterous Volstead act, with all its unforeseen consequences ...
is not and can .not be enforced in great reaches of the country
because it has no hold on the reason or the moral sense of the
majority."248 It was endlessly reiterated that prohibition was a
National Prohibition Act" was generally acknowledged. NATVl COMM'N ON LAW OBSERVANCE
AND ENFORCEMENT, supra note 8, at 22. The best formulation of the point was by Walter
Lippmann:
No law is enforced absolutely. The penal law is broken by murderers and
thieves. The tariff law is broken by smugglers. The commercial law is broken by
swindlers. The tax laws are broken by tax-dodgers. Is a breach of the Volstead
Act in the same category of law breaking? Well, Harper's Magazine does not
publish articles by murderers, thieves, smugglers, swindlers, and tax-dodgers
discussing the policy of the law they break. The opponents of capital punishment
do not form associations of murderers. The free traders do not hold banquets
attended by smugglers. The Secretary of the Treasury does not make speeches
to tax-dodgers. But cabinet officers, senators, congressmen, governors, mayors,
judges, chiefs of police, bankers, editors, and other pillars of society are openly
convivial with men who make no bones about their defiance of the Volstead Act.
Now a law which can be violated openly and without shame by men who are
normally law-abiding may fairly be called a law which is not enforced.
Lippmann, supra note 244, at 52. See also Hibben, supra note 21, at 218:
Men and women in significantly large and increasing numbers who command
the respect and confidence of their communities and who are naturally expected
to be supporters of law are in possession of liquor, serve it in their homes on
public as well as private occasions, and do so with no attempt whatsoever at
concealment, exactly as if there were no such thing as the Eighteenth
Amendment and the National Prohibition Act. They not only do not regard the
law seriously, they go further; the law has become in many social circles the butt
for ridicule and poor outworn jokes.
No law can be effectually enforced when the normal law-abiding citizens of the
community do not lend it their approval and support both in pronounced opinion
and practice.... When I speak of normally law-abiding citizens ... I have in mind
judges of our courts, members of Congress, lawyers, men of public-spirited
citizenship and the leaders in their communities of every good cause ....
248. Editorial, Prohibition, As Usual, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 2, 1926, at 26. "A law, to be
enforced, must find its justification in the conscience of the American people." BECK, supra
note 103, at 83.
And why is the Volstead Act unenforceable? It is because the idea that it is a
criminal thing at all times and under all circumstances to make, sell, or use an
intoxicating beverage is a purely artificial conception, at war with the
fundamental facts of human existence, and untenable in the forum of sound
human reasoning.
William Cabell Bruce, Is Nation Ready To Respect Prohibition Law?, 4 CONG. DIG. 20, 20
(1924).
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malum prohibitum rather than a malum in se,249 for prohibition
sought to interdict long-standing "traditions of habit and mind."2"
If an essential insight of federalism was that law, particularly police
regulations, should be kept as decentralized as possible so as to
ensure responsiveness to local mores and norms, the spectacular
failure of national prohibition confirmed the underlying and
conservative thought that the legitimacy of law depended upon its
being the
creation of historical growth ... supported in reality not so much
by organized force as by that sense of mutual obligation and
respect for the rights of others which lies at the root of, and
forms the foundation of, those settled rules of conduct among
individuals which alone make law and order in the community
possible.25'
249. 61 CONG. REC. 4039 (1921) (statement of Sen. Thomas E. Watson); Lowell, supra note
27, at 148-49; Henry Samuel Priest, Prohibition and Respect for Law, 221 N. AM. REv. 596,
599-600 (1925); Victor S. Yarros, Law--and Law Enforcement, 129 NATION 60, 61 (1929).
250. Conboy, supra note 22, at 359.
Only when public spirit is on the side of the law is the law generally obeyed.
Enforcement is always difficult, but when the law declares that conduct widely
practiced and widely regarded as innocent is a crime, enforcement is
impossible....
Prohibition aims directly at ... a social custom, the indulgence of which is not
in and of itself morally wrong. Constitutional and legislative fiat alone do not
and cannot restrain this custom or modify the mental attitude toward it.
David I. Walsh, Can Prohibition Be Enforced?, 9 CoNG. DIG. 81, 81 (1930); see Prohibition Is
Dying Natural Death. Darrow, CHI. DAILY TRIB., Sept. 25, 1927, at 2 ("Mr. Darrow believes
that to try to enforce a law in which the masses obviously do not believe and intend to avoid
is asking trouble. He said in many cities the authorities had ceased trying to enforce
prohibition.").
251. Conboy, supra note 22, at 354-55 (quoting Lord Parker); see Struthers Burt, The Sense
of Law, 80 SCRIBNER'S MAG. 157, 158-61 (1926) ("Law ... is man's sense of fair play .... [I]t is
a common thing, an ordinary thing, a daily thing; it is not even preserved for Sundays or
illnesses .... To the lay mind, which conceived law and which must live by law, a law is not a
law if it offends the sense of law, and millions of misguided experts cannot prove otherwise.
The sense of law stands above all law and all laws are subject to it and refer back to it....
There were, for instance, laws against drunkenness; there were not, before war with its false
legal values blurred the sense of all civilian law, laws against drinking, for drinking is not in
itself antisocial; to the contrary, it may frequently be social.... We are witnessing to-day ... the
curious spectacle of the law being punished by the sense of law, and this punishment will
continue, with all its disastrous consequences, until the law reforms itself.").
WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW
By losing touch with these foundations, national prohibition was
said to succumb to the "viciousness" characteristic of all "laws which
express excellent views of conduct but which run counter to the
settled habits or fixed desires of a part of the community."252 Justice
Clarke observed in 1922 that "[t]he Eighteenth Amendment
required millions of men and women to abruptly give up habits and
customs of life which they thought not immoral or wrong, but which,
on the contrary, they believed to be necessary to their reasonable
comfort and happiness.""2 3 The inevitable consequence was that
"respect not only for that law, but for all law, has been put to an
unprecedented and demoralizing strain in our country, the end of
which it is difficult to see." '254 Paradoxically, by upholding prohibi-
tion in the teeth of contrary commitments to the prevention of
double jeopardy and to normative dualism,2"' the Taft Court itself
contributed to the growing fear that the positive law of prohibition
was somehow incompatible with deeply held national values.
This fear was reinforced by a pervasive anxiety during the 1920s
that law itself was spinning out of control because it was proliferat-
ing wildly and increasingly detached from tradition and custom. In
an influential article, Arthur Twining Hadley, a former president of
Yale, complained that "[o]ne of the greatest dangers which now
confronts us is the increasing demand for ill-considered legislation,
and the increasing readiness of would-be reformers to rely on
authority rather than on public sentiment for securing their
ends." 56 The popular press was flooded with complaints about "the
252. Buck, supra note 245, at 16.
253. John H. Clarke, Observations and Reflections on Practice in the Supreme Court,
Address at the Annual Dinner of New York University Law Alumni (Feb. 4, 1922), in 8 A.BA.
J. 263, 267 (1922).
254. Id.; see also Justice Clarke Warns of Perils, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 5, 1922, at 1. Clarke was
promptly criticized by Senator Harris of Georgia, who said that "[tihe Supreme Court should
look after its own affairs." Criticizes Justice Clarke; Senator Harris Says He Should Attend
to Duties in Supreme Court, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 15, 1922, at 2. Harris specifically criticized
Clarke's reference to prohibition. 62 CoNG. REC. 2582 (1922). For examples of Clarke's
opposition to prohibition, see Grogan v. Hiram Walker & Sons, 259 U.S. 80 (1922); National
Prohibition Cases, 253 U.S. 350 (1920); Jacob Ruppert v. Caffey, 251 U.S. 264 (1920).
255. See supra notes 126-28, 205 and accompanying text.
256. Arthur Twining Hadley, Law Making and Law Enforcement, 151 HARPER'S MAG. 641,
643 (1925). Hadley identified self-government with voluntary obedience to the law:
"Conscience and public opinion enforce the laws; the police suppress the exceptions." Id. at
641. A law that can be enforced only by compulsion, rather than voluntary obedience,
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torrent of new laws which are deluging the country to the confusion
of everyone, lawmakers included. 25 7 Contemporaries believed they
were witnessing the "greatest outpouring of statutory law the world
has ever seen. Statute is piled upon statute, administrative agency
upon administrative agency, and to the great body of statutory law
has been added a mass of administrative orders ... until in the
general confusion we have almost lost our place."25 'We have
hundreds of thousands of laws that should have no place upon the
statute books and that come to be disregarded as a matter of course
and merely stimulate a disregard of all law of whatever character,"
one commentator observed. 'The Eighteenth Amendment and its
enforcing Act are a conspicuous type of such frivolous enact-
ments. 25 9 Prohibition was repeatedly cited as "an extreme case" of
the kind of 'legislative turpitude" that enacted laws without regard
substitutes "autocracy" for "self-government." Id. at 643. Manifestly pointing at prohibition,
Hadley declared that "[t]o-day it is from the law maker rather than from the law breaker that
our American traditions of self-government have most to fear." Id. "What can we do to protect
ourselves," Hadley asked, "against this spirit of over-regulation which seeks to place under
official control not only the organization of industry and commerce but the conduct and even
the thought of the people themselvesT' Id. at 644. His provocative answer was "nullification,"
a "process of blocking the law by disobedience." Id. at 645. "The Fugitive Slave Law was thus
nullified by the people of the North; the Reconstruction Acts were thus nullified by the people
of the South." Id. Nullification is "the safety valve which helps a self-governing community
avoid the alternative between tyranny and revolution." Id. at 646.
257. Excessive Lawmaking the Bane of America, 74 CURRENT OPINION 461, 461 (1923). 'The
people," it was said, "are genuinely disturbed by the flood of lawmaking which each year
engulfs our country." Editorial, Laws upon Laws, SATURDAY EVENING POST, Aug. 6, 1927, at
26. "Railing at law and law-makers has become of late one of our popular national sports."
Farnam, supra note 50, at 433. For examples, see Philos Cooke, Anarchy in the Law:
Throughout the United States Average of 2,123 Laws Passed Each Month upon Which Citizen
Must Inform Himself, 14 LA FOLLETTE'S MAG. 172 (Nov. 1922); Epidemic Insane Lawmaking,
110 INDEPENDENT 307 (1923); The Rain of Law, LITERARY DIG., Apr. 7, 1923, at 15.
258. Marvin B. Rosenberry, Law and the Changing Order, 220 N. AM. REV. 18,22-23 (1924).
"Each year upwards of 12,000 new statutes are ground out, and the highest courts supplement
these with 13,000 interpretive decisions. It is little wonder if in this maze of legal
entanglements justice wanders helplessly." Editorial, Current Comment, 8 FREEMAN 601,601
(1924). The law has become "so complex and extensive that no living man can hope to learn
its provisions or observe it in full." William P. Helm, Jr., The Plague of Laws, 10 AM. MERCURY
10, 16 (1927). "Ten thousand law-mills have submerged America beneath their grist. No living
man can hope to know the law, and he who claims to do so is deserving only of long hairy ears
and a bale of hay." Id. at 10; see also The March of Events; Too Many Laws!, 54 WORLD'S
WORK 8, 9 (1927) ("Legislation, taken as a remedy, has itself become an ill.").
259. Priest, supra note 249, at 600.
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to public sentiment 26° and sought to change longstanding customs
by "constitutional and legislative fiat alone. '2 '
To stalwart progressives, of course, this more general "cry to the
uninformed against excessive legislation" was simply an "effort to
destroy confidence in public action, and especially in legislation,"
with the "purpose" of discrediting government as "the only agency
that can effectually protect human beings in their essential integrity
... If confidence in legislation and in government is destroyed
exploitation will go unchecked."262 Yet the debacle of prohibition
undercut confidence in the use of state power, and in particular in
laws that did not embody "inherited customs ... fortified by long
public acquiescence," but that resulted instead "from the vehemence
of some cult, bloc, class, or an economic or social 'ism; -all statutory
and all frankly designed to further or coerce, control, favor or
suppress a minority, a business, or the social conduct of private
citizens in a new and unaccustomed manner.""6
The distinction between law as the positive enactment of the state
and law as the organic expression of traditional social norms was
exactly the point of George Sutherland's presidential address to the
American Bar Association in September 1917. Sutherland asserted
that the most distinguishing characteristic of "our present-day
political institutions" was "[t]he passion for making laws."' "The
prevailing obsession," Sutherland observed, "seems to be that
statutes, like crops, enrich the country in proportion to their
260. Katharine Fullerton Gerould, Our Passion for Lawmaking: An Exploration of the
American Mind, 157 HARPER'S MAO. 700, 700 (1928). "I do not doubt that many of the people
who supported Prohibition actually believed that the inclusion of it in the Constitution would
turn a nation sober-not merely by the aid of guns and poisons, but by some miracle involved
in the words of the amendment." Id. at 702. But "[w]e cheapen law itself, the whole principle
of self-government, by enacting laws that public opinion will not sanction." Id. at 704.
261. Walsh, supra note 250, at 81; see James Truslow Adams, Hoover and Law Observance,
82 FORUM 1, 1-7 (1929).
262. Lapp, supra note 71, at 12-13.
263. Letter from Judge Charles M. Hough to Charles S. Whitman (June 16, 1923), in ABA
SPECIAL COMM. ON LAw ENFORCEMENT, REPo OF THE SPECIAL COMMrIrEE ON LAW
ENFORCEMENT 39, 39-40 (1923).
264. Sutherland, supra note 232, at 198; see also Pierce Butler, Some Opportunities and
Duties of Lawyers, Address at the Joint Meeting of the American Bar Association and
Minnesota Bar Association (Aug. 29, 1923), in 9 A.BA. J. 583, 586 (1923) ("A passion for new
enactments prevails. The enormous number of bills introduced in the legislatures shows the
extent to which it is thought that welfare can be promoted by lawmaking.").
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volume."265 Sutherland used prohibition to illustrate the contempo-
rary "mania for regulating people."2  '"To put the consumer of a
glass of beer in the penitentiary along with the burglar and the
highwayman is to sacrifice all the wholesome distinctions which
for centuries have separated debatable habit from indisputable
crime. 267 Prohibition was bound to fail,2 s Sutherland predicted,
because "[t]he successful enforcement of the law in a democracy
must always rest primarily in the fact that on the whole it com-
mends itself to a universal sense of justice, shared even by those
who violate it." 269
265. Sutherland, supra note 232, at 198. "Throughout the country the business world has
come to look upon the meeting of the legislature as a thing to be borne rather than desired,
and to regard with grave suspicion pretty much everything that happens, with the exception
of the final adjournment .... Id. at 199. Sutherland added:
The difficulty which confronts us ... is that we are going ahead so fast-so
many novel and perplexing problems are pressing upon us for solution-that we
become confused at their very multiplicity. Evils develop faster than remedies
can be devised. Most of these evils, if left alone, would disappear under the
powerful pressure of public sentiment, but we become impatient because the
force of the social organism is not sufficiently radical and the demand goes forth
for a law which will instantly put an end to the matter.
Id. at 200.
266. Id. at 201.
267. Id. at 201-02.
268.
It does not require a prophet to foresee that laws of this character exacting
penalties so utterly disproportionate to the offense, can never be generally
enforced, and to write them into the statutes to be cunningly evaded or
contemptuously ignored will have a strong tendency to bring just and wholesome
laws dealing with the liquor question into disrepute.
Id. at 202. It was said of Sutherland that he personally approved "of abstinence from alcoholic
beverages and of prohibition by local option." Proceeding in the Supreme Court of the United
States in Memory of Mr. Justice Sutherland, 323 U.S. v, xii (1944) (remarks of Attorney
General Biddle).
269. Sutherland, supra note 232, at 203.
Any attempt, therefore, to curtail the liberties of the citizen, which shocks the
sense of personal independence of any considerable proportion of the community
is likely to do more harm than good, not only because a strong feeling that a
particular law is unjust lessens in some degree the reverence for law generally,
but because such a law cannot be successfully enforced, and a law that inspires
neither respect for its justice nor fear for its enforcement is about as utterly
contemptible a thing as can be imagined.
Id. at 203-04.
It is plausible that Stone's attraction to this premise explains why he was more ready than
either Holmes or Brandeis to join conservatives on the Court to constrain prohibition. See
Appendix, Figures A, B; supra text accompanying note 11. In 1926 Stone wrote to Huger W.
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In popular discussion the "mania" for regulation Was almost
entirely associated with positive legislation, as distinct from
common law. Statutes were produced by political pressure and
lobbying. Common law, by contrast, was made by judges whose task
it was to express 'long-accepted custom, proved by experience.""2 v It
Jervey, his replacement as Dean of the Columbia Law School, that
[t]he problems of criminal law and crime depression are not primarily legal.
They grow out of social conditions which are the result of our sudden expansion
as an industrial country, of a breaking down of social restraints which have
come from the change in family life, and to sudden prosperity, and they have
been accelerated by the attempt to carry legislation too far in such acts as the
Volstead law and other similar types of legislation.
Letter from HFS to Huger W. Jervey (Dec. 6, 1926) (Stone Papers). The year before Stone had
publicly elaborated the same point, although without explicit reference to prohibition:
Certain it is that never before in history has any people exhibited such a child-
like and implicit faith in the efficacy of legislation to bring about the social
Utopia as have our own people in our own time. Forgetting that social custom
and the average moral standards of the community are more potent in the
control of human conduct than formal law, we nevertheless seem to regard
statute making as the chief and only ultimate agency of social reform and the
never failing means for the minute regulation and control of all human
activities. The vice of this procedure is that it leaves out of account the evils
which inevitably flow from the attempt to impose rules of conduct by legal
command which do not have the moral support of the great mass of the
community or which are not of sufficient importance to arouse active public
interest in their behalf. Ponderous volumes filled with statutes which by
common consent are ignored or are only partially or occasionally enforced are a
heavy burden on the spirit of obedience to law and they represent a costly
experiment in government. For whatever advantages we gain from a partial or
inadequate enforcement of the rule we adopt we pay a high price in loss of
respect for law and law enforcement agencies ....
Harlan F. Stone, Obedience to Law and Social Change, Annual Address of the Bar Association
of the State of New Hampshire, in 5 PROCEEDINGS OF THE BAR ASSOCIATION OF THE STATE OF
NEW HAMPSHIRE 27, 37 (1925). Stone's son reported that although
Father recognized the validity and binding effect of the 18th Amendment and
the laws passed pursuant thereto and enforced them vigorously as Attorney
General, he thought they were bad laws and were an undue infringement of
individual freedom. He thought the prohibitionists were "do-gooders" and
referred to the WCTU as the "We-see-to-you-ers." He did not care for "hard
liquor" and rarely took any, but he did enjoy and saw no harm in table wines,
sherry and the like.
Lauson H. Stone, My Father the Chief Justice, in YEARBOOK 1978, at 7, 12 (Supreme Court
Historical Soc'y ed., 1978). According to Mason, Stone was actually an avid and educated
collector of fine wines. ALPHEUS THOMAS MASON, HARLAN FISKE STONE: PILLAR OF THE LAW
726-33 (1956); Currie, supra note 234, at 120 n.302.
270. Barrett Wendell, Law and Legislation, 65 SCRIBNER'S MAG. 177, 177 (1919). Wendell
associated respect for custom with "the English conception of the Common Law," and a
misplaced faith in statutes with the "Continental type of mind." Id. at 178. He warned that
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was generally recognized that a modern state needed both kinds of
law, because in many contexts "rapid changes of conditions" moving
"too rapidly for customs to form" were "the chief reason why we are
bombarded by such a multitude of statutes, good, bad, and indiffer-
ent, seeking to accomplish changes by express prohibitions,
commands, and statutory remedies. ' 271 The important question,
therefore, was how active courts ought to become in supervising
"this mass of ill considered, badly drawn, experimental, first
impression legislation with which the country is flooded from year
to year,, 2" and how forceful courts ought to be in interpreting such
statutes in light of their understanding of "the customs and needs
of the community to be affected."
273
These questions arose in a number of contexts, of which perhaps
the most prominent was the issue of how far courts should go in
incorporating statutory principles into their judicial reasoning. More
than a decade before prohibition Roscoe Pound had presciently
identified as a "notable" characteristic "of American law today ... the
excessive output of legislation in all our jurisdictions and the
indifference, if not contempt, with which that output is regarded
by courts and lawyers., 274 This disregard was justified on the
ground that "common law was superior to legislation because it
was customary and rested upon the consent of the governed." '275 A
"[i]n regarding legislation as inherently absolute ... we are at least perilously near the danger
of forgetting that it cannot safely stray too far from the limits of custom." Id. at 179.
271. Root, supra note 174, at 748-49; see also Elihu Root, The Layman's Criticism of the
Lawyer, in REPORT OF THE THIRTY-SEVENTH ANNUAL MEETING OF THE AMERICAN BAR
ASSOCIATION 386, 391-94 (1914) [hereinafter Root, Layman's Criticism] ("Undoubtedly there
is much reason in these later days for new legislation. Our social and industrial conditions are
changing very rapidly. New relations, new rights, new obligations are being created for the
regulation of which the old laws and customs of the country are inadequate, and there must
be new laws to prevent injustice."); Farnam, supra note 50, at 437 ("New inventions and new
methods have led to new evils, economic, sanitary, and social, which do not cure themselves
and which have come so suddenly that there has been no time for the creation of a customary
law, still less of social conventions, to deal with them.").
272. Root, Layman's Criticism, supra note 271, at 393.
273. Id. at 392. The implicit assumption, of course, was that, left to their own devices,
"courts wish to do justice, and they will if they are permitted to." Id. at 399.
274. Roscoe Pound, Common Law and Legislation, 21 HARV. L. REV. 383, 383 (1908).
275. Id. at 406. Pound had no patience with this justification:
Today we recognize that the so-called custom is a custom of judicial decision, not
a custom of popular action. We recognize that legislation is the more truly
democratic form of law-making. We see in legislation the more direct and
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particularly pointed expression of the presumed superiority of
common law to statutory law could be found in the maxim that
"statutes in derogation of the common law are to be construed
strictly." 76 The Taft Court adhered to this maxim in at least one
decision, Panama Railroad Co. v. Rock,277 authored, not acciden-
tally, by Justice Sutherland.
Writing for a five-Justice majority, Sutherland overturned a
verdict in favor of a husband seeking damages for the wrongful
death of his wife on the ground that the meaning of the article of the
Civil Code of Panama authorizing recovery for "damage" caused by
"fault" was "to be determined by the application of common law
principles," which do not create a "private cause of action ... from the
death of a human being."'78 No doubt Sutherland understood his
decision as expressing a commitment to the continuity of custom
and tradition represented by the common law. The decision was
roundly criticized, however, not only for misunderstanding the
accurate expression of the general will.... Courts are fond of saying that they
apply old principles to new situations. But at times they must apply new
principles to situations both old and new. The new principles are in legislation.
The old principles are in common law. The former are as much to be respected
and made effective as the latter-probably more so as our legislation improves.
Id. at 406-07. Pound argued:
[Miodern statutes are not to be disposed of lightly as off-hand products of a
crude desire to do something, but represent long and patient study by experts,
careful consideration by conferences or congresses or associations, press
discussions in which public opinion is focussed[sic] upon all important details,
and hearings before legislative committees.
Id. at 384. "Courts," by contrast,
are less and less competent to formulate rules for new relations which require
regulation. They have the experience of the past. But they do not have the facts
of the present.... Judicial law-making for sheer lack of means to get at the real
situation, operates unjustly and inequitably in a complex social organization.
Id. at 403-04.
276. Id. at 387. Pound attacked this principle as assuming
that legislation is something to be deprecated. As no statute of any consequence
dealing with any relation of private law can be anything but in derogation of the
common law, the social reformer and the legal reformer, under this doctrine,
must always face the situation that the legislative act which represents the fruit
of their labors will find no sympathy in those who apply it, will be construed
strictly, and will be made to interfere with the status quo as little as possible.
Id.
277. 266 U.S. 209 (1924).
278. Id. at 211, 214.
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meaning of Panama's civil law code,2' 9 but also for its failure to
accord any weight at all to the fact that "substantially every State
in the Union" had modified the common law by adopting a wrongful
death statute.2 °
By interpreting the Panama Code in a manner that ignored such
statutes, Sutherland in effect refused to recognize state legislation
as evidence of evolving custom. In a dissent joined by Taft,
McKenna, and Brandeis, Holmes was explicit that
courts in dealing with statutes sometimes have been too slow to
recognize that statutes even when in terms covering only
particular cases may imply a policy different from that of the
common law, and therefore may exclude a reference to the
common law for the purpose of limiting their scope. 1
None other than Roscoe Pound wrote Holmes congratulating him on
his dissent, stating that Sutherland's opinion "would have been fine
ammunition for the Populists a generation ago."282
279. See Note, Death by Wrongful Act in the Civil Law-Common Law Technique and Civil
Authorities, 38 HARV. L. REV. 499 (1925).
280. Thomas W. Shelton, A Deserving Dissenting Opinion, 98 CENT. L.J. 109, 109 (1925).
The decision "was immediately repudiated by congressional action." James McCauley Landis,
Statutes and the Sources of Law, HARVARD LEGAL ESSAYS 1934, reprinted in 2 HARV. J. ON
LEGIS. 7, 20 (1965); see Law of Dec. 29, 1926, Pub. L. No. 69-534, ch. 19, § 7, 44 Stat. 924, 927.
Landis attacked the Court's decision in Panama Railroad Co. for demonstrating "neglect of
the significance to be attached to legislation." Landis, supra, at 20; see also J.M. Landis,
American Family Laws, 45 HARV. L. REV. 952, 953 (1932) (reviewing the book of the same
title).
281. Panama R.R. Co., 266 U.S. at 216 (Holmes, J., dissenting). Panama Railroad Co. was
later repudiated by the Court. Moragne v. State Marine Lines, Inc., 398 U.S. 375, 390-93
(1970) ("This legislative establishment of policy carries significance beyond the particular
scope of each of the statutes involved."); see also Gooch v. Or. Short Line R.R. Co., 258 U.S.
22, 24 (1922) ("For although courts sometimes have been slow to extend the effect of statutes
modifying the common law beyond the direct operation of the words, it is obvious that a
statute may indicate a change in the policy of the law, although it expresses that change only
in the specific cases most likely to occur to the mind.").
282. Letter from Roscoe Pound to Oliver Wendell Holmes (OWH), (Jan. 13, 1925) (Holmes
Papers).
The spectacle of a great court astute to find reasons for holding that a railroad
company in 1924 is not liable for death by wrongful act committed under the
jurisdiction of the civil law unless an express text so declaring in so many words
can be found, is not edifying.
Id. Sutherland's opinion, wrote Pound, "gives much aid and comfort to the adherents of an
extreme economic interpretation. It is not easy to find any other ratio decidendi, unless it be
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Panama Railroad Co. should be contrasted to Gleason v.
Seaboard Air Line Railroad Co.,' in which Justice Stone, writing
for a unanimous Court, overruled the venerable and influential
precedent of Friedlander v. Texas & Pacific Railroad Co.2" to hold
that a carrier could be liable for a fraudulent bill of lading issued by
an employee for his own benefit. Stone crafted his opinion to reflect
"accepted notions of social policy,"" which in his view included the
idea that even an innocent principal ought to be liable for the torts
of its agents. In contrast to Panama Railroad Co., Stone explicitly
deduced this principle of social policy from "[t]he tendency of
modern legislation in employers' liability and workmen's compensa-
tion acts and in the [federal] Bills of Lading Act ... and of judicial
decision as well."2" Stone's opinion, which accepted statutes as
evidence of evolving norms, brought the Court's jurisprudence into
conformity with the Uniform Bills of Lading Act, which had been
adopted by "a large number of states."" 7
Sutherland refused to join Stone's opinion. It was not that
Sutherland objected to the outcome of the Court's decision, for
he specifically noted his concurrence in the Court's judgment.
Sutherland's disagreement turned instead entirely on questions of
method. Sutherland had insisted to Stone that the Court put its
opinion "squarely and explicitly upon" the judicially constructed
common law maxim that "wherever one of two innocent persons
must suffer by the acts of a third, he who has enabled such
third person to occasion the loss must sustain it."28 Evidently
an assumption that Anglo.American common law is the jural order of the universe." Id.
283. 278 U.S. 349 (1929).
284. 130 U.S. 416 (1889).
285. Gleason, 278 U.S. at 356.
286. Id. at 356-57; see also Act of Aug. 29, 1916, Pub. L. No. 64-239, ch. 415, § 23, 39 Stat.
542.
287. George S. Koles, Note, Principal and Agent: Fraudulent Acts of Agent for Own Benefit,
14 CORNELL L.Q. 363, 367 (1929). It also conformed the Court's jurisprudence with the so-
called "New York" rule, which had previously been a minority position. See Note, Carriers-
Agency-Bills of Lading-Liability for Fraudulent Act of Agent in Issuing Bill of Lading, 15 VA.
L. REv. 670, 673 (1929).
288. Letter from GS to HFS (Dec. 28, 1928) (Sutherland Papers); Return of GS to HFS
(Stone Papers). Sutherland had also pressed Stone "exressl' to overrule Friedlander, id.,
a step which the original draft of Stone's opinion had tactfully avoided. Stone eventually
modified his opinion to meet Sutherland's request. Letter from HFS to GS (Dec. 19, 1928)
(Stone Papers). When Frankfurter later wrote Stone to congratulate him "for frankly rejecting
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an untenable authority rather than refining it away," Letter from Felix Frankfurter to HFS
(Jan. 5, 1929) (Stone Papers), Stone was quite willing to accept credit for the boldness of the
act. "It is quite impossible to ever completely overtake such an error, but the old practice of
overruling in silence or by attempting to get around the difficulty by refinements and thin
distinctions is almost as mischievous as the original fault." Letter from HFS to Felix
Frankfurter (Jan. 8, 1929) (Stone Papers).
In contrast to Sutherland, and in keeping with his vote in Panama Railroad Co., Taft had
professed himself quite pleased with Stone's draft opinion, writing, "Good. I am very glad you
have cleaned this up so well." Return from WHT to HFS (Stone Papers). Holmes had
dissented from the Court's holding in conference, later writing Stone about the first draft of
his opinion that
[y]ou make out very handsomely the liability of the Ry. Co. for the
representation that the cotton had been received. But the fact that the railroad
had received the cotton does not make it liable to a party paying on the faith of
a forged bill of lading. This bill of lading stands like one forged by a third person.
Letter from OWH to HFS (Dec. 15, 1928) (Stone Papers). Stone sought to placate the elder
Justice in a note arguing that the jury in the case had specifically found inducement and
reliance. Letter from HFS to OWH (Dec. 19, 1928) (Stone Papers). Holmes, however, was
implacable: "Non obstante your letter I don't see how a representation that goods had been
received could warrant or induce payment on a forged bill of lading-whatever the jury found.
I do not see how the representation could have more effect because false than if it had been
true." Letter from OWH to HFS (Dec. 20, 1928) (Stone Papers). Stone eventually withdrew
from the field:
Sorry we are not in entire accord about the cotton bill of lading case. We are
so seldom on opposite sides of the fence that I hate to break a good precedent,
but I suppose the pleadings, the facts and the verdict in this case establish what
is in accord with common experience, that the payor on a draft drawn against
a casual shipment of merchandise would not pay the draft until he knew that
there were goods represented by the documents and that they had in fact
arrived, however fair the documents might be on their face. I don't suppose that
a false representation has to be the sole cause of the injury. It is enough that it
is a contributing cause and that the injury would not have happened without it.
However, I withdraw from the debate before I am beaten, but as is the way of
humankind, cling to my error.
Letter from HFS to OWH (Dec. 21, 1928) (Stone Papers). Eventually Holmes signed on to the
opinion, noting that "I doubt if I shall dissent-but I don't think my objection was answered the
other day and I doubt if it can be logically." Return from OWH to HFS (Stone Papers).
Oddly, in the original draft of his opinion, Stone had included a passage to the effect that
"[a] good many years ago Mr. Justice Holmes pointed out that the arguments in favor of
creating such an exception [to the rule of principal liability for the fraud of an agent] are
equally objections to the rule itself. Holmes, The Common Law, 231 n.3." (Stone Papers),
Butler had flagged the passage, commenting "I doubt whether this should be done. It is not
necessary and I am not sure that it is in the best taste." (Stone Papers). McReynolds also
objected to the passage, writing "I think this is badly stated & I do not like the reference to
a book by a living member of this court." (Stone Papers). McReynolds, with typical tact, went
on to comment: "I am with the result you reach. But I think you would be wise to revise the
opinion and put it into more carefully chosen words. It is important & should show great
care." (Stone Papers). Eventually Stone revised the passage to read: "The arguments in favor
of creating such an exception are equally objections to the rule itself. Holmes, The Common
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Sutherland would join an opinion that drew its premises from
common law principles, but not an opinion that sought to identify
relevant social norms from evolving statutory policies.
Sutherland's opinion in Lambert shares with his approach in
Panama Railroad Co. and Gleason the premise that democratic
enactments should be subject to the discipline of judicial evaluation
for the purpose of integrating positive law into deeply held and
long-standing social values."9 He viewed such integration as
indispensable to the legitimation of positive law. The necessary (and
implicit assumption) of his approach was that courts were authori-
tative conservators of such values. This assumption was a central
tenet of conservative jurisprudence in the years before the New
Deal."m Sutherland was "raw" in his "opposition to the Volstead
Act"29 ' because prohibition was the very archetype of positively
enacted law that was profoundly at odds with custom and
tradition.292
Law (1882) 231 n. 3." Gleason, 278 U.S. at 357.
289. Sutherland cautioned:
It must not be forgotten that democracy is after all but a form of government
whose justification must be established in the same way that the justification
of any other form of government is established; namely, by what it does rather
than by what it claims to be. The errors of a democracy and the errors of an
autocracy will be followed by similar consequences. A foolish law does not
become a wise law because it is approved by a great many people.
Sutherland, supra note 232, at 203.
290. See Post, supra note 143, at 1589-605; Robert C. Post, Defending the LifeworId:
Substantive Due Process in the Taft Court Era, 78 B.U. L. REV. 1489, 1529-45 (1998)
[hereinafter Post, Defending the Lifeworld]. Solicitor General Beck put the matter concisely:
"To the American the law is but the reasoned adjustment of human relations and its true
sanction is largely in its reasonableness and not in the fiat of the State.... A law, to be
enforced, must find its justification in the conscience of the American people." BECK, supra
note 103, at 18-19.
291. See supra note 10.
292. Sutherland also disliked prohibition because he regarded it as a violation of personal
liberty:
The liberty of the individual to control his own conduct is the most precious
possession of a democracy and interference with it is seldom justified except
where necessary to protect the liberties or rights of other individuals or to
safeguard society....
In passing legislation of this character doubts should be resolved in favor of
the liberty of the individual and his power to freely determine and pursue his
own course in his own way should rarely be interfered with, unless the welfare
of other individuals or of society clearly requires it.
Sutherland, supra note 232, at 202.
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V
Although Justice Holmes was personally impatient with prohibi-
tion293 and did not conceal "his genial scepticism"of the idea that
liquor ought to be banned,294 he nevertheless felt obliged to use his
293. In Hamilton v. Kentucky Distilleries & Warehouse, Co., 251 U.S. 146 (1919), Brandeis,
writing for a unanimous Court, had upheld a wartime ban on the sale of liquor against the
claim that the ban constituted an unconstitutional taking of private property. Four years
later, in conversation with Felix Frankfurter, Brandeis explained: "At first went the other way
5 to 4, the Chief (White) was with me, Holmes against.... Holmes balked on 'Due Process'-the
thing that prevailed with him in the Mahon case later. I told him Mugler [v. Kansas, 123 U.S.
623 (1887)] governed but he never has liked that case. Undoubtedly his impatience with
prohibition explains this." Urofsky, supra note 12, at 324.
294. Zechariah Chafee, Jr., ILL STARRED PROHIBITION CASES: A STUDY IN JUDICIAL
PATHOLOGY, 45 HARv. L. REV. 947, 949 (1932) (reviewing Forrest R. Black's book of that
name); see also Tyson v. Banton, 273 U.S. 418, 446 (1927) (Holmes, J., dissenting) ("Wine has
been thought good for man from the time of the Apostles until recent years."); Knickerbocker
Ice Co. v. Stewart, 253 U.S. 149, 169 (1920) (Holmes, J., dissenting) ("I cannot for a moment
believe that apart from the Eighteenth Amendment special constitutional principles exist
against strong drink."). In response to her inquiries about prohibition, Holmes wrote to his
friend Charlotte Moncheur that
[m]y way of thinking is that whatever may have been the defects in knowledge
and forethought when the experiment was launched it must be given fifty years
or a century before we can be sure whether it is a great social improvement or
a mistake. Of course it has banished much fog and much poetry from life, but it
may pay in the long run. I don't like to hear of people who should set an example
buying from bootleggers and giving dinners in the old form. On the other hand
I still have a little whiskey that I had before the 18th Amendment and on rare
occasions give a friend a glass. And when a friend has sent me a bottle as a
Christmas present I have not felt bound to return it, although I should prefer
that it should not be done.
Letter from OWH to Baroness Moncheur (Jan. 27, 1928) (Holmes Papers). In his private
correspondence, Holmes reported telling "a casual unknown dame who came in here one
Monday" that "alas the exquisite vanished in this Country with the 18th Amendment."
Holmes "told her that abuses were the parents of the exquisite-and then remembered that
she might be a reporter, for all I know. But no headlines have exposed my cynicism." Letter
from OWH to Mrs. John Chipman Gray (Mar. 25, 1922) (Holmes Papers). Holmes wrote Lady
Leslie Scott that he was "rather amused that two men have each sent me a present of a bottle
of whiskey, which I fear is an infringement of the law on their part, if not on mine .... At all
events, as I wrote to one of them, I have not forgotten the prayer 'Lead us into temptation."
Letter from OWH to Lady Leslie Scott (Dec. 24, 1927) (Holmes Papers). Earlier that year
Holmes's close friend Frederick Pollock had written Holmes recounting"lurid reports ... about
the demoralizing effects of Prohibition in the Middle Western States.... Bolshevism is not the
only alarming product of half-educated sentimentalism." Letter from Frederick Pollock to
OWH (Mar. 17,1927), in 2 HOLMES-POLLOCKLETTERS: THE CORRESPONDENCE OFMR. JUSTICE
HoLMES AND SIR FREDERICK POLLOCK 1874-1932, at 195 (Mark DeWolfe Howe ed., 1941)
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judicial offices to sustain it. Because Holmes denied the existence
of any "transcendental body of law" to which judges could appeal
in order to discipline positive statutory and constitutional enact-
ments,29 he believed a judge must perform a kind of self-abnega-
tion, subordinating himself to the social policies and objectives of
positive and enacted law.296 "I strongly believe," he wrote, "that my
agreement or disagreement has nothing to do with the right of a
majority to embody their opinions in law."29 Holmes concluded that
those who drafted and ratified the "Eighteenth Amendment meant
a great revolution in the policy of this country, and presumably and
obviously meant to upset a good many things on as well as off the
statute book,"29 and he accordingly understood his judicial duty to
be to interpret the Eighteenth Amendment and its implementing
legislation in ways designed to effectuate that revolution.2 As he
wrote Frankfurter in a sentence that contained a reference to
prohibition: "I loathed most of the things I decided in favor of."3"
[hereinafter HOLMES-POLLOCK CORRESPONDENCE].
295. Black & White Taxicab & Transfer Co. v. Brown & Yellow Taxicab & Transfer Co., 276
U.S. 518, 533 (1928) (Holmes, J., dissenting); see Post, supra note 143, at 1593-99.
296. On the connection between Holmes's positivism and his deference to majoritarian
decision making, see MORTON J. HORWIT, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW 1870-
1960: THE CRISIS OF LEGAL ORTHODOXY 140-42 (1992). Horwitz identifies Holmes's 1897 essay
Te Path of the Law as the moment when Holmes realized that "[clustom was no longer the
buffer between consent and coercion." Id. at 140. "[J]udicial restraint," Horwitz writes,
"follows from the collapse of [Holmes's] search for immanent rationality in customary law."
Id. at 142; see Robin West, Three Positivisms, 78 B.U. L. REV. 791 (1998).
297. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 75 (1905) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
298. Grogan v. Hiram Walker & Sons, 259 U.S. 80, 89 (1922). Holmes's observation in
Grogan was immediately recognized as signifying "the earnest desire of the Supreme Court
to aid the government generally in its attempt to carry out a 'noble experiment. Forrest
Revere Black, An RI-Starred Prohibition Case: Olmstead v. United States, 18 GEO. L.J. 120,
124-25 (1930); see, e.g., Wayne B. Wheeler, Enforcing the Dry Law, 68 FORUM 747, 747-48
(1922).
299. As Holmes wrote to his friend Harold Laski, "I always say, as you know, that if my
fellow citizens want to go to Hell I will help them. It's my job." Letter from OWH to Harold
Laski (Mar. 4, 1920), in 1 HOLMES-LASIa LETTERS: THE CORRESPONDENCE OF MR. JUSTICE
HOLMES AND HAROLD J. LASKI 1916-1935, at 249 (Mark DeWolfe Howe ed., 1953).
300. Letter from OWH to Felix Frankfurter (Dec. 23, 1921), in HOLMES AND FRANKFURTER:
THEIR CORRESPONDENCE, 1912-1934, at 133 (Robert M. Mennel & Christine L. Compston eds.,
1996).
I have been chuckling since Monday with some devil talk I let off to an
unknown female at our At Home. I told her abuses were the parents of the
exquisite which disappeared from this country with wine-that you couldn't
have a society like that of Greece except on some sort of slavery-and that I
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Unlike Sutherland, Holmes did not believe that judges had
unique access to authoritative social customs and traditions. This
contrast led to a sharp difference in the voting pattern of the two
Justices in the context of prohibition, with Holmes far more likely
than Sutherland to uphold the enforcement of the Eighteenth
Amendment."0 ' We have come to associate this difference with the
distinction between pre-New Deal liberalism and pre-New Deal
conservatism, with the former aspiring to judicial restraint and the
latter to aggressive protection of fundamental values. But on this
account we must explain the voting patterns of conservatives like
Taft, Van Devanter, and Sanford, whose conduct in the context of
prohibition, as Lambert indicates, was closer to Holmes's than to
that of Sutherland. °2 Why did these conservative Justices persis-
tently seek to strengthen and sustain prohibition, rather than to
mollify it?
Van Devanter and Sanford 3 have not left us a documentary
record in which to search for an answer to this question. But Taft
has bequeathed us a rich trove of letters and publications that allow
us to understand why he consistently sought, like Holmes, to
effectuate the objectives and authority of prohibition. The puzzle of
his behavior is particularly sharp, because prior to 1919 Taft had
consistently opposed prohibition on grounds very similar to those of
Sutherland. In 1907, for example, Taft had attacked statewide
prohibition, observing:
It is, of course the duty of the legislator in the enactment of
laws to consider the ease or difficulty with which, by reason of
popular feeling or popular prejudice, laws after being enacted
can be enforced. Nothing is more foolish, nothing more utterly at
variance with sound public policy than to enact a law which, by
reason of the conditions surrounding the community in which it
is declared to be law, is incapable of enforcement. Such an
instance is sometimes presented by sumptuary laws, by which
loathed most of the things I decided in favor of.
Id.
301. The difference between Holmes and Sutherland is well represented in Figures A and
B in the Appendix.
302. See Figures A and B in the Appendix.
303. It was said of Sanford that he "displayed a marked zeal for prohibition enforcement."
Allen E. Ragan, Mr. Justice Sanford, 15 E. TENN. HIST. Soc'Y PUBLICATIONS 74, 81 (1943).
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the sale of intoxicating liquors is prohibited under penalty in
localities where the public sentiment of the immediate commu-
nity does not and.will not sustain the enforcement of the law. In
such cases the legislation is usually the result of agitation by
people in the country who are determined to make their fellow-
citizens in the city better. The enactment of the law comes
through the country representatives, who form a majority of the
legislature; but the enforcement of the law is among the people
who are generally opposed to its enactment, and under such
circumstances the law is a dead letter."
As national prohibition became an issue, Taft's analysis con-
verged with that of Sutherland's. Taft conceptualized national
prohibition as a symptom of the larger "evil" of "excess of legisla-
tion," °5 which was caused by "the erroneous belief that any reform
could be accomplished merely by legislation."3 °6 Statutes did not
necessarily reflect the sentiments and morals of the community,
because they tended to be passed by legislators "prone to enact laws
... only because their votes would profit them politically. 3 7 Taft
explained the passage of an early version of the Eighteenth
Amendment in the House of Representatives on the ground that
congressmen had been frightened into voting for prohibition by well
organized minority groups "whose votes [congressmen] feared might
defeat them if they voted their own convictions." 30 8 Taft argued that
304. WILLIAM HowARD TAFT, FOUR ASPECTS OF CMc DUTY 46-47 (1906).
305. For Local Option Mr. Taft Explains; Ex-President Amplifies Recent Address in Which
He Opposed National Prohibition; Suggests Another Plan, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 24, 1915, at 10
[hereinafter Local Option]; see Taft Hits Prohibition; National Legislation, He Says, Would
Revolutionize Government, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 29, 1914, at 4; Misunderstood on Prohibition,
Says Prof. Taft, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Jan. 6, 1915, at 5; Editorial, The Question of
Prohibition, WASH. POST, Jan. 4, 1915, at 6.
306. Local Option, supra note 305.
307. Id.; see, e.g., Butler, supra note 264, at 586 ("In many places legislative method is
imperfect.... Lawmakers are influenced by powerful groups and yielding to pressure-and
often to manufactured public opinion-pass laws and yet more laws. Leaders of selfish
organizations control large numbers of votes. Their power continues after election day and
their determinations, made without regard to any interest save their own, communicated
sometimes in the form of orders, unduly affect the conduct of legislators and other public
officers.").
308. Local Option, supra note 305. Almost from the outset there were those who doubted
that prohibition was ever supported by a majority of the American people. See, e.g.,
Prohibition as a Warning, 17 NEw REPUBLIC 359,360 (1919) ("The history of non-enforcement
in prohibition states gives color to the belief that scarcely anywhere have the convinced
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national prohibition was a very bad idea because: "lI]t was a direct
blow at -local self-government and at the integrity of our Federal
system, which depended on preserving the control by the States of
parochial and local matters.... Tihe regulation or prohibition of
the liquor traffic was essentially a local matter, because opinions
with reference to how it should be treated varied with every
community." 9
Taft maintained his public opposition to the Eighteenth
Amendment right up to the moment of its ratification. Calling
national prohibition "an irretrievable national blunder" that would
"hang a permanent millstone around our necks," '1 his analysis was
eloquent, forceful, and remarkably prescient:
A national prohibition amendment to the Federal Constitu-
tion will be adopted against the views and practices of a majority
of the people in many of the large cities .... The business of
manufacturing alcohol, liquor and beer will go out of the
hands of law-abiding members of the community, and will be
transferred to the quasi-criminal class. In the communities
where the majority will not sympathize with a Federal law's
adherents of prohibition commanded a substantial majority. Nobody supposes that the
remarkable progress of the eighteenth amendment through Congress and the state
legislatures represents a corresponding fervency of purpose in the body of the people. Would
a universal referendum on federal prohibition yield even a majority vote? We doubt it. But a
majority is not needed to pass a law or a constitutional amendment if a clearly drawn moral
issue is involved. No legislator, no man with political aspirations, can afford to have himself
counted on the wrong side of a moral issue. He will vote on the side of morality, even if he
considers it a bogus morality. For the memory of the moral is tenacious, and the vengeance
of the moral is relentless, ruthless.").
309. Local Option, supra note 305. Taft declared himself in favor of local option,
by which the sale of liquor is forbidden in communities that by the expression
of a majority of the voters show that public opinion will sustain the enforcement
of such a law. To pass laws forbidding the manufacture and sale of liquor and
then have large parts of a State where liquor is sold freely and in defiance of the
law is a demoralization of all law that is most detrimental to the interest of the
whole community.
Id. For expressing these sentiments, Taft was briefly advanced as a "wet" candidate for
President. See Wets Want Taft for President, CH. TRiB., June 4, 1915, at 17. He was also
opposed by the National Anti-Saloon League as a potential nominee for the Supreme Court.
See Protest on Lehmann or Taft for Supreme Bench; National Anti-Saloon League Urges
Wilson Not To Name Either Man-Labeled Foes of Prohibition, CHI. DAILY TRIB., Jan. 28,
1916, at 7.
310. Letter from WiT to Allen B. Lincoln (Sept. 2, 1918), microformed on TAFr PAPERS,
supra note 9, Reel 197.
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restrictions, large numbers of Federal offices will be needed for
its enforcement....
... The pressure for violation and lax execution in communi-
ties where the law is not popular, will be constant and increas-
ing. The reaching out of the great central power to brush the
doorsteps of local communities, far removed geographically and
politically from Washington, will be irritating in such states and
communities, and will be a strain upon the bond of the national
union. It will produce variation in the enforcement of the law.
There will be loose administration in spots all over the United
States, and a politically inclined National Administration will be
strongly tempted to acquiesce in such a condition. Elections will
continuously turn on the rigid or languid execution of the liquor
law....
The theory that the National Government can enforce any law
will yield to the stubborn circumstances and a Federal Law will
become as much a subject of contempt and ridicule in some parts
of the Nation as laws of this kind have been in some states....
The regulation of the sale and use of intoxicating liquor
should be retained by the states. They can experiment and
improve.... If the power of regulation is irrevocably committed to
the General Government, the next generation will live deeply to
regret it.
For these reasons, therefore, first, because a permanent
National liquor law in many communities will prove unenforce-
able for lack of local public sympathy, second, because attempted
enforcement will require an enormous force of Federal policemen
and detectives, giving undue power to a sinister and partisan
subordinate of the National Administration, and third, because
it means an unwise structural change in the relations between
the people of the States and the Central Government, and a
strain to the integrity of the Union, I am opposed to a national
prohibition amendment."
311. Id.; see Letter from WHT to Allen B. Lincoln (June 8, 1918), microformed on TAFT
PAPERS, supra note 9, Reel 195. Taft's letters to Lincoln were published in the New Haven
Journal-Courier. They were revived and republished in October 1928, and trumpeted as an
"amazingly accurate forecast of what would result after the enactment of the amendment, and
the passage of the Volstead act." Taft Condemned National Dry Law; Letters Written in 1918
Show His Views Were as Smith's Now; Made Striking Prediction; Foresaw Contempt for Law
and Rise of Bootlegging, WORLD, Oct. 2, 1928, at 1, 4. The letters were republished in the
Baltimore Sun and the St. Louis Post-Dispatch, and also in the Outlook, which called Taft "a
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Within a week of the Eighteenth Amendment's ratification,
however, Taft swallowed his antagonism and announced that "[i]t
is now the duty of every good citizen in the premises, no matter
what his previous opinion of the wisdom or expediency of the
amendment, to urge and vote for all reasonable and practical
legislative measures by Congress adapted to secure the enforcement
of this amendment."'312 "This is a democratic government," Taft
pleaded, "and the voice of the people expressed through the
machinery provided by the Constitution for its expression ... is
prophet and a seer." Prophet Taft, 150 OUTLOOK 974, 975 (Oct. 17, 1928). The republication
put Taft "in a very awkward situation." Letter from WHT to Irving Fisher (Nov. 21, 1928),
microformed on TAFT PAPERS, supra note 9, Reel 306. Taft's letters were used by Al Smith as
part of his presidential campaign. See Stenographic Report of Gov. Smith's Speech in
Philadelphia Last Night; Quotes Taft and Wilson Against Dry Law, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 28, 1928,
at 2; Text of Smith's Speech Over Radio, WASH. POST, Oct. 28, 1928, at M6; Letter from WrT
to Gerald Fitz Gibbon (Oct. 29, 1928), microformed on TAFT PAPERS, supra note 9, Reel 305;
Letter from WHT to Helen J. Manning (Oct. 28, 1928), microformed on TAFT PAPERS, supra
note 9, Reel 305; Letter from WHT to Charles P. Taft, 2nd (Oct. 28, 1928), microformed on
TAFT PAPERS, supra note 9, Reel 305; Letter from WHT to Horace D. Taft (Oct. 28, 1928),
microformed on TAFT PAPERS, supra note 9, Reel 305. Taft thought it "very unfair to quote
those letters to indicate my present attitude in respect to the enforcement of the law." Letter
from WHT to Senator Frederick H. Gillett (Oct. 24, 1928), microformed on TAFT PAPERS, supra
note 9, Reel 305; see Letter from WHT to I.M. Ullman (Oct. 11, 1928), microformed on TAFT
PAPERS, supra note 9, Reel 305 ("What I said was said ten years ago, but the situation has
greatly changed, and since I said those things I harangued the Alumni at Yale with all the
force I could, to say to them that they violated their duty and were ignoring the country by
ignoring the National Prohibition law."); see also Taft Won't Discuss 1918 Dry Law Letters;
Says Place on Bench Precludes Talking on Views Held Then that Opposed Federal Legislation,
N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 4, 1928, at 5.
Later in his life Taft would propound slightly different versions of the three reasons why
he opposed prohibition. See, e.g., Letter of WHT to Francis Peabody (July 12, 1923),
microformed on TAFT PAPERS, supra note 9, Reel 255 ("I was opposed to the policy of the
Amendment, because I thought prohibition could not be enforced effectively among our
numerous population of foreign origin, especially when they were living in congested centers
in large cities; second, because I thought it was dealing with a matter that was parochial and
unduly extending the power of the Central Government, and imposing on it a burden that it
should be free from; and, third, because prohibition, as a political issue, was certain to divert
popular attention away from material issues upon which the undivided attention and good
sense of the people should be centered to reach a right conclusion. But unfortunately the
coincidence of the War, the misconception of what was going on in Europe in respect to the
prohibition of intoxicating liquor, and the temporary spirit of self-restraint and sacrifice, put
the measure through, and it is now working like a ratchet wheel, so that there is not the
slightest chance, for a great many years, of repealing the 18th Amendment, and we are put
in a situation where we must fight it through and must enforce it, if we can.").
312. William Howard Taft, Enforce Prohibition, in WILLIAM HowARD TAFT: COLLECTED
EDITORIALS, 1917-1921, at 172, 172-73 (James F. Vivian ed., 1990).
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supreme. Every loyal citizen must obey. This is the fundamental
principle of free government." '13 "A citizen who is in favor of the
enforcement of only the laws for which he has voted, and in the
principle and wisdom of which he agrees," Taft argued,
is not a law-abiding citizen of a democracy. He has something of
the autocratic spirit. He is willing to govern, but not to be
governed. He is not willing to play the game according to the
rules of the game. Therefore, whatever my previous view, I am
strongly in favor now of putting the amendment to a test as
favorable as possible for its successful operation.
314
313. Id. at 173.
One who, in the matter of national prohibition, holds his personal opinion and
his claim of personal liberty to be of higher sanction than this overwhelming
constitutional expression of the people, is a disciple of practical Bolshevism....
... The only proper and effective plan ... is to unite with the advocates of
prohibition in a real bona fide effort to enforce the law. If it is successful and
improved morality follows, let the opponents of the amendment confess
themselves wrong and rejoice in a real reform in the welfare of society. If, on the
other hand, in spite of the best teamwork, the hopes of those responsible for the
amendment are blasted and only failure and demoralization follow, the case for
a retracing of steps is made.
Id.; see Taft on the Liquor Question; Prohibition Amounts to Confiscation in Some Cases, but
It Must Be Enforced with a Heavy Hand-No Use To Talk of Knocking Out the Law, LA.
TIMES, Feb. 9, 1919, at 1113.
314. William Howard Taft, Is Prohibition a Blow at Personal Liberty? LADIES HOME J., May
1919, at 78. Taft rejected
the argument against prohibition based on the postulate that in a free
government like ours, in which no man is to be deprived of life, liberty and
property except after due process of law, it is contrary to the spirit of our
civilization and constitution to enforce upon people such a curtailment of their
freedom of action in their diet.
Id. at 31. He explained:
How far we should go in limiting liberty for the welfare of all is, of course a
constantly recurring question....
Reasonable restraint of personal liberty of action for the common welfare is
really a matter of degree. It is to be settled by the general and dominant opinion
of all the people in a community of common purpose, common ideals and the
common enjoyment of the blessings of liberty and justice. This crystallizes into
a kind of moral code based on the vicious effect of practices sufficiently serious
to affect the welfare of the community.
Our courts recognize this crystallization of public sentiment. When it is
manifested in constitutional amendment and statute, they enforce it as part of
the law of the land. They hold that it is not a forbidden restriction of personal
liberty, but it is only the curtailment of complete freedom of action that is
necessary in the interest of society....
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Taft stuck to this attitude throughout the 1920s.316 In 1923 he
lamented the "present lack of respect for law in this country,"
tracing its origins to prohibition which was "at variance with the
habits of many of our people, especially in the large cities."31
Acknowledging that his own "fears" about prohibition "have been
realized only too fully," he nevertheless concluded that "there is
nothing to be done ... except to set ourselves to the serious task of
enforcing the law and to cease protesting against its enactment
and by such an attitude encouraging its violation. 3 7 That same
year he addressed Yale alumni and roundly condemned the
tendency of "the intelligent and the well-to-do" to treat prohibition
"with contempt."1 8 Defending prohibition on the ground that it
had been fairly enacted under "the rules of the game of popular
government," he argued that "[I]t is not patriotic, it is not sports-
manlike to evade or disobey."319
[The] array of the immoral and vicious effects of the free manufacture and
sale of liquor upon the community can leave no doubt that the curtailment of
personal freedom in effective prohibition is small as compared with its benefit
to society. This settles its conformity to true principles of personal liberty.
Id. at 78.
315. Upon Taft's resignation from the bench in 1930, the New York Herald Tribune said
of him: "Chief Justice Taft, though outspokenly opposed to the Eighteenth Amendment and
the Volstead act, long before he went to the bench, took the position that these enactments
being law they should be enforced. All his decisions consistently upheld the letter and spirit
of the prohibition laws." Retiring Chief Justice First To Be Honored by Two Highest Offices
Within Gift of Republic, N.Y. HERALD TRIB., Feb. 4, 1930, at 12.
316. Taft, supra note 27, at 10-11.
317. Id. at 12.
318. Extract from Address Delivered by William H. Taft at the Yale Alumni Luncheon, New
Haven, Connecticut (June 20, 1923), microformed on TAFT PAPERS, supra note 9, Reel 590
[hereinafter Extract]; see Taft Warns at Yale on Breaking Laws; Speaking at Dinner After
Commencement, He Says Dry Infractions Breed Evil, N.Y. TIMES, June 21, 1923, at 10; Mr.
Taft Demands Obedience to Law; Tells Yale Alumni Prohibition Observance and Enforcement
Is Test of All Law, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, June 21, 1923, at 5. 'The people whom I have in
mind are the first to complain of mob law, lawless violence of laborites and other disturbances
of the peace, but when it comes to a violation of the 18th Amendment, and the Volstead law,
they seem to feel no obligation to protest." Extract, supra, at 2. "It is most discouraging," Taft
wrote in a letter, "that those who are educated and ought to know the vice of a disregard of
law should be willing to violate it and set an example for others to do so." Letter from WHT
to Clement G. Clarke (Mar. 20, 1925), microformed on TAFT PAPERS, supra note 9, Reel 272.
Some of Taft's remarks to the Yale Alumni were later republished in 150 OUTLOOK 1156
(1928).
319. Extract, supra note 318, at 3. Defiance, Taft said, would endanger "the traditional
Anglo-Saxon respect for the administration of the law." Id. at 1.
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You can say it is parochial and that there ought not to have been
a constitutional amendment of that sort because it is parochial,
but it is on the statute books and we can't get rid of it, and it is
there by a vote according to the form of the Constitution.320
Strict compliance with prohibition was necessary, in other words,
because prohibition was the positive law of the nation; it had been
enacted according to the rules of Article V.1
21
The claim that prohibition should be vigorously enforced because
it had been enacted according to the governing procedures of
democratic lawmaking sounds like the liberal positivism of Holmes.
At times Taft would strike a Holmesian note of judicial restraint
and self-denial. "I was opposed very much to prohibition because of
320. Id. at 4.
321. Taft's emphasis on respecting the integrity and authority of these rules made him
particularly hostile to the claims advanced in National Prohibition Cases, 253 U.S. 350 (1920),
see supra text accompanying notes 164-68, which were to the effect that the Eighteenth
Amendment was itself unconstitutional:
I think that the claims made by the Wets in the higher courts were the most
extraordinary collection ever put forward by serious-minded men. It only shows
how bitter they were.... I cannot believe that any Supreme Court would read into
any Amendment a change in the Amendment article of the constitution, the
subject of Amendment not being mentioned in the article. If ever an instrument
was plain the constitution is plain in regard to the method of Amendment. Any
alteration of it seems so utterly gratuitous that it is hard to see where a
Supreme Court would stop if it accepted such a thing. Any limitation of that
power seems equally preposterous. Think of the reductio ad absurdum. The
Supreme Court has been under fire and in great danger a number of times owing
to the discovery that the power of interpretation of the constitution is so great....
The friends of the Court have said that if the interpretation put upon the
constitution at any point by the Court does not suit the people they can amend
it. The angry answer is that everybody knows that to amend the constitution is
practically impossible, it has been made so difficult. Now come these gentlemen
and propose that when an Amendment has been put through the very difficult
process outlined by the constitution itself and has the support of two-thirds by
both houses of Congress and the ratification by forty-six states that nine elderly
gentlemen on a Bench shall pat the people on the head and say, "We think this
is not good for little boys". They must reach up into the air or into their inner
consciences or somewhere and without any limitation whatever except their own
fitness of things decide that this Amendment does not belong in the constitution.
It is the most extraordinary gift of absolute power that can be imagined and
something that the court has never dreamed of claiming.
Letter from WHT to Jesse F. Orton (Nov. 28, 1928), microformed on TAFr PAPERS, supra note
9, Reel 306.
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the difficulties of its enforcement, and I utterly deny the principle
that the drinking of whiskey or wine or beer is in itself, aside from
the law, immoral," he once wrote a close friend. 22 "But," Taft
continued:
the people of the United States differed from me and amended
the Constitution and made this law. Now I believe in popular
government, and the only method by which popular government
can be made useful and effective is that when one is beaten at
the polls or in the Legislature, to bow to the result and lend all
his efforts to the maintenance of the dignity of law and the
preservation of its strength, else we shall have demoralization
of all law, and that means anarchy.323
But we know that Taft was not a liberal, like Holmes, who
believed that judges ought to refrain from evaluating democratically
enacted legislation according to fundamental social values.3 24 Taft's
322. Letter from WHT to Gertrude Ely (Dec. 22, 1923), microformed on TAFr PAPERS, supra
note 9, Reel 259.
323. Id. Taft added:
In the attitude of people like those who join the Molly Pitcher Club, and others
in New York with whom I am familiar, and some of whom are members of my
family, is that all laws should be enforced except those which affect their comfort
and convenience and tastes, and as to those evasion is justifiable. Well of course
such an attitude is utterly indefensible and if encouraged and successful means
an end to useful popular government.
Id. Taft had no patience at all with Arthur Hadley's call for nullification, supra note 256,
which he regarded as representing the view of "the luxury loving rich" that "the way to defeat
the law is to disobey it." Letter from WHT to Charles H. Strong (July 1, 1925), microformed
on TAFT PAPERS, supra note 9, Reel 275. Taft believed that "[a] republic is where the majority
must rule and the minority must bend to the laws made by the majority-otherwise the
members of the minority are not good Republicans or Democrats either." Letter from WHT
to J.H. Kelley (Nov. 7, 1923), microformed on TAFT PAPERS, supra note 9, Reel 258. Elsewhere,
Taft used his own history as an example of proper citizenship:
The truth is that I was one of the foremost in opposing the 18th Amendment,
chiefly for the reason that I thought its enforcement would be full of difficulty
and present problems that we ought not to undertake. But I was overborne, and
the 18th Amendment has become the law of the land, and like a loyal American,
obedient to the Constitution, I am in favor of enforcing the Amendment in every
possible and reasonable way.
Letter from WHT to Louis A. Cuvillier (Nov. 9, 1926), microformed on TAFT PAPERS, supra
note 9, Reel 286.
324. See, e.g., St. Louis & O'Fallon Ry. Co. v. United States, 279 U.S. 461 (1929); United
Rys. & Elec. Co. v. West, 280 U.S. 234 (1930); Cudahy Packing Co. v. Hinkle, 278 U.S. 460
(1929); Frost v. Corp. Comm'n, 278 U.S. 515 (1929); Williams v. Standard Oil Co., 278 U.S.
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urgent need to sustain prohibition did not derive, therefore, from a
simple commitment to uphold democratic decision making. Taft was
in fact concerned about something quite different. Although Taft
had originally "opposed the constitutional amendment" because he
"felt that it would meet a lack of sympathy... by a lot of foreigners
of the lower classes who would violate it if they could," what shocked
him after ratification was the extent of the "spirit of lawlessness
among the intelligent and wealthy which now exists." '325 The
235 (1929); Louis K. Liggett Co. v. Baldridge, 278 U.S. 105 (1928); Quaker City Cab Co. v.
Pennsylvania, 277 U.S. 389 (1928); Ribnik v. McBride, 277 U.S. 350 (1928); Louisville Gas &
Elec. Co. v. Coleman, 277 U.S. 32 (1928); Untermyer v. Anderson, 276 U.S. 440 (1928); Del.,
Lackawanna & W. R.R. Co. v. Morristown, 276 U.S. 182 (1928); Blodgett v. Holden, 275 U.S.
142 (1927); Compania General de Tabacos de Filipinas v. Collector of Internal Revenue, 275
U.S. 87 (1927); Power Mfg. Co. v. Saunders, 274 U.S. 49 (1927); Fairmont Creamery Co. v.
Minnesota, 274 U.S. 1 (1927); Tyson & Brother-United Theatre Ticket Offices, Inc. v. Banton,
273 U.S. 418 (1927); Di Santo v. Pennsylvania, 273 U.S. 34 (1927); Frost & Frost Trucking Co.
v. R.R. Comm'n, 271 U.S. 583 (1926); Weaver v. Palmer Bros. Co., 270 U.S. 402 (1926);
Schlesinger v. Wisconsin, 270 U.S. 230 (1926); Jay Burns Baking Co. v. Bryan, 264 U.S. 504
(1924); Tex. Transp. & Terminal Co. v. New Orleans, 264 U.S. 150 (1924); Ky. Fin. Corp. v.
Paramount Auto Exch. Corp., 262 U.S. 544 (1923); Lemke v. Farmers Grain Co., 258 U.S. 50
(1922); Truax v. Corrigan, 257 U.S. 312 (1921).
325. Letter from WHT to James R. Sheffield (July 8, 1923), microformed on TAFr PAPERS,
supra note 9, Reel 255. Taft continued:
My impatience at the present situation is toward the well-to-do class, the
intelligent part of the community, who are not willing to give up something that
isn't essential to their life or happiness, and inist[sic] upon violatin[sic] the law
because they don't like it. They are very much troubled over the lawlessness of
somebody else-the lawlessness of the labor unions and the weakness of
legislatures and of Congress in dealing with questions of that sort, but the
minute that their convenience or comfort or tastes are interfered with by a law
declared to be valid, according to the only machinery that we have for that
purpose, then they settle back and connive at the violation of law and make fun
of it, and have no sympathy with its enforcement, naturally, because they are
engaged in violating it, or at least in encouraging bootleggers to violate it. This
shows such inconsistency on the part of persons who are intelligent enough to
see the necessary trend of their conduct toward a demoralization of all law, that
I have no sympathy with them at all.... There is a disposition to condemn the
Volstead law without knowing much about what it involves. There is in it some
machinery which is extreme. I don't like the use of an injunction in enforcing
criminal law, but those defects are only emphasized because there is opposition
to the law altogether.
Id. In a letter to his brother, Taft described a typical incident of upper-class contempt for
prohibition involving Nicholas Longworth, a congressional representative from Ohio who the
following year would become Speaker of the House, and his wife Alice, the daughter of
Theodore Roosevelt:
I was very much amused at the dinner which was given by Eugene Meyer, a
successful Jew, who has done some very good work for the Government under
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"attitude of intelligent and well-to-do people toward the law and its
enforcement" was "most alarming," because "[t]hey should know
that demoralization is the necessary consequence of the attitude
which they are now taking in the patronizing of bootlegging and in
their general contemptuous attitude toward the law." 2'
This suggests that Taft strongly supported prohibition because
he was alarmed that prohibition was a "conspicuous" law under
sustained attack by influential sectors of the population whose
attitudes mattered because they could "impair the influence of
the Constitution and laws of he country" and thereby "wreck the
future of the society whose basis must rest upon them."27 For Taft
Wilson's regime and also under the present Administration, to help, in a sensible
way, credits to farmers. He has a pretty wife, and they wished to give us a
dinner. It came off Saturday night, and among others there were Alice and Nick
Longworth. Out of what I regard as proper respect, they did not have any liquor
at all, and Alice was making fun of Nick because he could not get anything to
drink. His hostess was engaged in the same thing. Apparently it is necessary for
Nick to liquor up at every dinner. It is that sort of thing that encourages the
youth ....
Letter from WHT to Horace D. Taft (Mar. 10, 1924), microformed on TAFT PAPERS, supra note
9, Reel 262. Taft's concerns in this regard were widely shared:
Not the least demoralizing feature of enforcement of national prohibition, is the
development of open or hardly disguised drinking winked at by those in charge
in respectable places where respectable people gather. People of wealth,
professional and business men, public officials and tourists are drinking in
hotels, cafes and tourist camps ....
NATL COMM'N ON LAW OBSERVANCE AND ENFORCEMENT, supra note 8, at 39. It was commonly
believed that
[olur highest officials violate the law privately when there is no danger of
discovery or publicity. We heard one remark not so very long ago that he had
built one of the most marvelous cellars in America and stocked it with more than
enough to last him a lifetime-at least six varieties of wine were served at his
table-but he is viciously against all "reds" and laboring men and anybody else
who "will not obey our laws, by heaven, sir." Inveighing against those who would
undermine our Constitution, he himself does his uttermost to bring it into
contempt and to prove the theory that those sworn to uphold this particular law
are our worst lawbreakers.
Who Undermines Prohibition?, 116 NATION 736, 736 (1923).
326. Letter from WHT to Francis Peabody (July 12, 1923), microformed on TAFT PAPERS,
supra note 9, Reel 255.
327. Extract, supra note 318, at 7-8; see Letter from WHT to Mrs. George H. Stanlidge (Jan.
24, 1923), microformed on TAFT PAPERS, supra note 9, Reel 250 ("Everyone I think who sees
clearly deprecates the contemptuous tone toward the prohibition law which so many affect.
I was opposed to prohibition because I was afraid of the difficulties of the enforcement and the
demoralization of all law by the neglect to enforce such an important measure as that of
prohibition, but now that the amendment has been adopted, the laws passed in pursuance of
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the question of the enforcement of prohibition had become "funda-
mental" 2 ' because it had become the front line in the battle for the
rule of law itself."9 At risk was "traditional Anglo-Saxon respect for
the administration of the law."33
Prohibitionists had initially argued for ratification of the
Eighteenth Amendment on the ground of its substantive merits, but
after 1919, as resistance to prohibition and the Volstead Act began
to swell, arguments in favor of prohibition shifted decisively toward
the rule-of-law themes that so moved Taft. 3 ' Senator William E.
Borah, for example, argued:
it should be obeyed and all good citizens should preserve an attitude of obedience toward it
and respect for its enforcement.").
328. Letter from WHT to Clarence H. Kelsey (May 18, 1923), microformed on TAFT PAPERS,
supra note 9, Reel 253.
329. For this reason Taft apparently believed that all efforts to modify prohibition to
accommodate community sentiment should be resisted. It is fascinating that when a reporter
misinterpreted Taft to have proposed amending the Volstead Act to allow for beer and light
wine, Taft Stops Here, Pours Out Hopes for Dry Throats, CHI. DAILY TRIB., June 26, 1920, at
4, Taft was quick to disavow the proposal:
As a matter of fact, I am not in favor of amending the Volstead act in respect
to the amount of permissible alcohol in beverages. I am not in favor of allowing
light wines and beer to be sold under the eighteenth amendment. I believe it
would defeat the purpose of the amendment. No such distinction as that between
wines and beer on the one hand, and spirituous liquors on the other, is practical
as a police measure.... Any such loophole as light wines and beer would make the
amendment a laughing stock.
WHT, Letter to the Editor, Mr. Taft on the Dry Law, CHI. DAILY TRIB., July 27, 1920, at 6; Taft
Would Not Amend the Volstead Act, N.Y. TIMES, July 27, 1920, at 13. Taft did concede,
however, that the Volstead Act "could be better enforced by moderate penalties and
reasonable provisions than by draconian severity, and that harshly inquisitorial measures and
heavy penalties, sought by fanatics, would obstruct rather than aid the law and would stir
protest and turn the people against prohibition." Id.
330. Extract, supra note 318, at 1.
331. See Charles H. Brent, Law and Order, 42 WORLD'S WORK 267, 268-69 (1921) ('The
most alarming feature of the situation just now is not merely disregard for the laws but also
symptoms of disregard for the Constitution. The Eighteenth Amendment is just as much a
part of the Constitution as any of the original articles. I am not concerned with the character
of this amendment. I am viewing it solely as an integral part of the most sacred and binding
obligation governing American citizenship. The only possible excuse for disobeying it is self-
indulgence.... The fact of the matter is that successful democracy presupposes individual self-
respect and self-restraint for the sake of the commonwealth.... There can be no corporate self-
control where every citizen is part of the Government unless there is personal self-control.
Towering above all public measures and mass movements to-day, stands the need of a new
steadiness and a new determination to discipline our tastes, our customs, our recreations.").
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Important as the question of prohibition is, the question that is
now presented is ... the higher and bigger and broader question
of whether we, as a free people, can maintain and enforce the
provisions of the Constitution as they have been written. That
involves the whole question of constitutional integrity, of
constitutional morality-indeed, of the ultimate success of free
government itself."2
As early as 1921 the Judicial Section of the American Bar
Association distributed "A Warning to the American People":
Reverence for law and enforcement of law depend upon the
ideals and customs of those who occupy the vantage ground of
Of course this shift of emphasis was noticed by the opponents of prohibition. See, e.g.,
Stephen Leacock, 5 CONG. DIG. 200 (1926) ('[Prohibitionists] are putting their trust in
coercion, in the jail, in the whip and the scourge. They are done with the moral appeal. They
are finished with persuasion. They want, however, authority. They want to say Thou shalt'
and 'Thou shalt not,' and when they say it, to be obeyed under the fear of the criminal law....
What they propose is virtually to send all people to jail who dare to drink beer, and to send
them again and again for each new offense, to break them into compliance as people were
once broken upon the wheel."); see also Temperance?, 126 NATION 6 (1928) ("The truth of the
matter is that in the bitterness provoked by the efforts to defy and to enforce the Eighteenth
Amendment its original purpose has been lost sight of.... [Miany of its protagonists ...
forgetting their humanitarian purpose, have allowed their zeal for good to pass the proper
bounds.").
332. Borah, Civic Righteousness, supra note 99, at 644. Borah asserted that "there can be
no more vital problem presented to a free people than the problem of whether or not they can
hold and maintain the Constitution of which they have deliberately written." Id. Borah
continued:
We all know from a review of history that lawlessness is the insidious disease
of republics. It is the one great malady against which every true patriot will
ever be on guard. It is but a short step from the lawlessness of the man of
means who scouts some part of the fundamental law because forsooth it runs
counter to his wishes, to the soldier who may be called into the street to protect
property, but who, taking counsel of his sympathies, fraternizes with the mob.
The great question, therefore, before the American people now is, not that of
prohibition, because that as a policy, has been settled. The supreme question
is: after we have determined as a people on prohibition, whether we have the
moral courage, the high determination, and the unwavering purpose to enforce
that which we have written into the Constitution.
Id. at 647. In another setting, Borah proclaimed:
Whether prohibition stays or goes, the Constitution should be maintained
and supported as it is written by all law-abiding people until it is changed in
the manner pointed out by the Constitution. Obedience to the law is the rock
foundation upon which our whole structure rests. To disregard it is to strike at
the life of the Nation.
William E. Borah, U.S. Senators Discuss Prohibition Issue, 5 CONG. DIG. 191, 192 (1926).
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life in business and society. The people of the United States by
solemn constitutional and statutory enactment, have under-
taken to suppress the age-long evil of the liquor traffic. When,
for the gratification of their appetites, or the promotion of their
interests, lawyers, bankers, great merchants and manufactur-
ers, and social leaders both men and women disobey and scoff at
this law, or any other law, they are aiding the cause of anarchy
and promoting mob violence, robbery and homicide. They are
sowing dragon's teeth, and they need not be surprised when they
find that no judicial or police authority can save our country or
humanity from reaping the harvest.'
The idea that defiance of prohibition threatened the authority of
all law became a pervasive feature of pro-prohibition rhetoric.3 34
Calvin Coolidge proclaimed that "for any of our inhabitants to
observe such parts of the Constitution as they like, while disregard-
ing others, is a doctrine that would break down all protection of life
and property and destroy the American system of ordered liberty."3 5
Herbert Hoover named "disregard and disobedience of law" as "[t]he
most malign" of the "dangers" facing the country.3 ' Hoover ex-
plained:
Our whole system of self-government will crumble either if
officials elect what laws they will enforce or citizens elect what
laws they will support. The worst evil of disregard for some law
is that it destroys respect for all law. For our citizens to patron-
ize the violation of a particular law on the ground that they are
opposed to it is destructive of the very basis of all that protection
333. Sections and Allied Bodies, 7 A.B.A. J. 483, 484-85 (1921).
334. See, e.g., M'Adoo's Ohio Talk Fails To Disclose His Plans for 1928, WASH. POST, Jan.
29, 1927, at 3 ("He declared the United States, in continued flouting of prohibition laws, is
approaching 'the slippery path to anarchy.').
335. Calvin Coolidge, Fourth Annual Message (Dec. 7, 1926), in 3 THE STATE OF THE UNION
MESSAGES OF THE PRESIDENTS, supra note 18, at 2690, 2706. In his first State of the Union
Message, Coolidge had announced that "[firee government has no greater menace than
disrespect for authority and continual violation of law. It is the duty of a citizen not only to
observe the law but to let it be known that he is opposed to its violation." Calvin Coolidge,
First Annual Message (Dec. 6, 1923), in 3 THE STATE OF THE UNION MESSAGES OF THE
PRESIDENTS, supra note 18, at 2642, 2648; see MCADOO, supra note 99, at 259.
336. Herbert Hoover, Inaugural Address 1929: President Hoover's Statement to the
American Public, 8 CONG. DIG. 76, 76 (1929).
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of life, of homes and property which they rightly claim under
other laws."3 7
Wayne Wheeler, leader of the powerful Anti-Saloon League, put the
argument in garish tones:
For officers or the people to permit laws to be violated is a
deadly attack upon the Government. Its contagion spreads from
one law to another. It distills its deadly poison into the arteries
of our jurisprudence.... It assassinates the vital processes of
orderly control. It is a prolific source of disease to the whole
social order, and jeopardizes the life of the race.'
337. Id. at 77. Criminologist George W. Kirchwey argued that Hoover was incorrect to
argue that defiance of prohibition automatically implied anarchic disrespect for all law:
That in this period of "lawlessness" and "demoralization" incident to the
attempted enforcement of the prohibition law, the offenses of assault, fraud,
vagrancy, prostitution and larceny ... should all have fallen off by 50 per cent or
more and burglary by 10 per cent or more should give pause to our Jeremiahs.
George W. Kirchwey, Our Lawlessness that Alarms Hoover, N.Y. TIMES, May 26, 1929, § 5
(Magazine), at 5. Kirchwey concluded: "Our flippant attitude with respect to prohibition does
not in the slightest degree affect our abhorrence of crime. We may not believe, as [Hoover]
does, in the sanctity of 'law as law' (there are pernicious and foolish laws as well as wise and
good ones)." Id. Analogous arguments were made on the constitutional level:
I would venture to make a ... suggestion to the Hoover commission....
... [W]hy not invite Messrs. Taft, Coolidge, and Hoover to appear ... and state
why they have done nothing, while in the White House, to enforce the Negro
suffrage provisions of the Constitution? What President has sent a special
message earnestly recommending reduction of the representation of the South
in Congress? If no such message has ever been sent, why has a part of the
sacrosanct Constitution been treated as a dead letter? And what has the
President or either of the living ex-Presidents to say about the example they set
to the nation by their indifference and hostility to that part of the Constitution?
Yarros, supra note 249, at 60-61.
338. Wayne B. Wheeler, Law and Order, 124 OUTLOOK 146, 146 (1920). "There is only one
way for this Nation to avert the disaster that was visited on Rome, on France, on Russia, on
all nations that sowed the seed of anarchy," Wheeler wrote. "Every loyal, Christian patriot,
every hundred per cent American, must stand for law and order. Every officer of the law who
deserts his office should be treated like the soldier who deserts his country in a war. We can
have treason in times of peace as well as in days of national warfare." Id. at 146-47.
Debating Wheeler in Carnegie Hall on the question of whether prohibition should be
nullified by disobedience, Clarence Darrow scoffed at the idea that defiance of prohibition
would corrupt the legal order itself. To Wheeler's claim that "it is the duty of every good
citizen to obey every provision of the Constitution," Darrow replied:
I undertake to say that there isn't a man in the United States who does it or
tries to do it. Not one. I am not going to camouflage this. Does Mr. Wheeler
believe it? He knows better. Dare he go down among the Southern constituents
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Taft was as aware as anyone of "the inherent difficulties in
enforcing a law which changes the habits of a great many people. 339
He had early on articulated his appreciation of the limited scope
that could or should be accorded to merely positive law. But he had
come to believe that widespread defiance of prohibition by otherwise
law-abiding citizens had to be terminated because it threatened to
undermine the legitimacy of the legal order itself. 'The solution,"
Taft concluded, "requires a great deal of time and patience. The
habits of an important section of a congested part of the country
can not be changed over night or in years. The reform and the
adaptation of society to that at which the Amendment aims must be
gradual."34 ° Although before ratification Taft had "despaired of any
success," by 1928 Taft came to "really think that it is possible ... to
achieve a satisfactory result.""4 "The persistence with which the
people maintain in Congress a two-thirds majority in both Houses,"
Taft wrote, "gives me much hope, and I am inclined to think that
and tell them to give the negroes the rights that are guaranteed by at least three
provisions?
I tell you this, there isn't a man of the intelligence of an ordinary moron who
doesn't know that people believe in enforcing only those laws that they believe
in. For sixty years every Federal provision in reference to the constitutional
rights of the negroes and every law has been notoriously violated in every
Southern prohibition State, and no prohibitionist dare raise his voice, and you
daren't.
Wheeler Clashes with Darrow Here in Dry Law Debate, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 24, 1927, at 1; see
Should We Obey the Prohibition Laws? A Socratic Dialogue, supra note 185, at 331:
MR. [GEORGE] MARTIN.... The Fifteenth Amendment has been nullified, as
everyone knows; and the very fact that an amendment can be nullified and that
the country can forget about it, provides a needed safety valve for a constitution
that can't be amended. If you tried to get a repeal of the Fifteenth Amendment
to-day, you couldn't do it. So the only way out is for the South to nullify it and
let the rest of the country forget about it.
MR. [IRVING] FISHER. But this isn't the Fifteenth Amendment. That amendment
really affected just the South.
MR. [GEORGE] MARTIN. It seems to me that this Prohibition question is another
sectional issue pretty much of the same kind. Eventually the West and the
South, which are aridly dry, will forget that the East is wet and will grow tired
trying to enforce their will upon it.
339. Letter from WHT to Charles H. Strong (July 1, 1925), microformed on TAFT PAPERS,
supra note 9, Reel 275.
340. Letter from WHT to Irving Fisher (Nov. 21, 1928), microformed on TAFT PAPERS, supra
note 9, Reel 306.
341. Id.
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this will wear down the moderate wets to a consciousness that the
only solution is pressure in favor of enforcement. ' 4 s
This conclusion separated Taft from Sutherland,4 3 with whom
Taft otherwise self-consciously shared a similar conservative
jurisprudence.344 If Sutherland believed that his judicial role was to
interpret prohibition statutes so as to align them more closely with
underlying social norms,3 4' Taft took it as his responsibility to
342. Id.
343. The disparity between Taft and Sutherland may have been even more stark than the
public record discloses. For example, in Byars v. United States, 273 U.S. 28 (1927), Sutherland
wrote an opinion for a unanimous court reversing the judgment below and excluding evidence
found as a result of a warrant to search for liquor that had not been based upon probable
cause. Stone's docket book indicates that Taft, Holmes, and McReynolds had at conference
voted to affirm. InAgnello v. United States, 269 U.S. 20 (1925), there was a similar disparity
between Taft's public and private views. Agnello was a unanimous decision authored by
Butler addressing the question, as Butler put it in his docket book, "Is a search warrant
necessary to search a man's house for drugs? Lower court held not in the circumstances here."
Butler's docket book records that all members of the Court at conference voted to reverse the
lower court decision except for Holmes and Taft, who voted to affirm. Although Agnello
concerned a prosecution for cocaine rather than liquor, it had plain and obvious implications
for prohibition.
344. When Taft was appointed Chief Justice in 1921, he sent a note to Sutherland to the
effect that "I look forward to having you on the Bench with me.... Our views are much alike
and it is important that they prevail." Letter from WHT to GS (July 2, 1921) (Sutherland
Papers). When Sutherland was appointed to the Court in 1922, Taft wrote him a long letter
of welcome as someone who was coming "into the Court with a general opinion as to the
functions of the Court similar to my own." Letter from WHT to GS (Sept. 10, 1922)
(Sutherland Papers).
345. A striking example of the strange political bedfellows created by prohibition can be
seen in the fact that Sutherland's stance in this regard coincided almost exactly with the
position of Walter Lippmann. Lippmann argued that because in the case of prohibition "we
are faced with a law which cannot be enforced and which cannot be repealed," the only
solution was for the Supreme Court,
bowing to public opinion, to find by the proper reasoning that the States are not
violating the Eighteenth Amendment.... [Tihe Constitution, thank heavens,
means whatever a living Supreme Court says it means. And the Supreme Court,
thank heavens, is composed on the whole not of worshippers of a scared text, but
of jurists and statesmen and human beings.
Lippmann, supra note 244, at 54, 56. Adverting to the example of the Fifteenth Amendment,
Lippmann argued that whenever the Supreme Court has faced a constitutional provision
generally defied by "orderly disobedience"--"a disobedience which is open, frankly avowed,
and in conformity with the general sense of what is reasonable"-it has reinterpreted the
Constitution to align it with dominant public sentiment. Id. at 56.
When the Constitution has come into conflict with the living needs of the nation,
and when amendment was impossible, the method of changing the Constitution
has been to change it and then get the very human Supreme Court to sanction
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harden the teeth of prohibition so as to "wear down the recklessness
of those who would try to defeat the law by disobeying it."34 ' "It
sometimes seemed as though there were no lengths to which [Taft]
would not go, and along which he would not attempt to lead the
court, in his determination to uphold prohibition enforcement. ' 347 In
that crusade, Taft, and we can assume also Van Devanter and
Sanford, committed judicial conservatism to a policy of respect for
positive law in the context of what was surely the most controversial
and momentous issue of their time. That was the essential message
conveyed by the triumph of positive dualism in Lambert.
Over the rock of prohibition, therefore, judicial conservatism on
the Supreme Court splintered into two blocs. The first, associated
with Sutherland, Butler, and McReynolds, believed that legal
legitimacy could best be maintained if the positive law of prohibition
were ameliorated by widespread social values. The second, associ-
ated with Taft, Van Devanter, and Sanford, believed that defiance
of prohibition so threatened the survival of the legal order as to
require that these values be overridden by positive law. By empha-
sizing the need for law enforcement over the requirements of legal
legitimacy, Taft and his colleagues split conservative ranks in the
decade immediately preceding the New Deal, when the claims of
judicial conservatism to subordinate positive law to the immanent
values of custom were to be conclusively and forcefully repudiated.
If the test of loyalty to the laws were loyalty to the original intent of each
law, we should have to confess that we are a thoroughly lawless people.
Id. at 55-56.
346. Letter from WHT to Moses Strauss (Apr. 1, 1929), microformed on TAFr PAPERS, supra
note 9, Reel 310. The full passage reads:
We must be patient. We can not change the habits of a whole nation all at once,
and we have got to go through a trying experience in the non-enforcement of the
law, but if we keep up the strength of the conscience of the majority of the
people, which we now enjoy, I am quite sure that we shall wear down the
recklessness of those who would try to defeat the law by disobeying it.
347. 2 HENRY F. PRINGLE, THE LIFE AND TIMES OF WILLIAM HowARD TAFr 989 (1939).
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VI
In the 1920s Americans believed themselves swept up in a crime
wave of awful proportions.34 "Few subjects occupy more space in
contemporary literature," one author observed, "than analyses of the
crime wave, its extent, causes and possible remedies. " "49 Solicitor
348. For a sampling of the myriad of articles about the crime wave in the 1920s, see C.P.
Connolly, America-Land of the Lawbreaker, MCCLURE'S MAG., July 1923, at 40 ("Tear gas,
machine guns, armored cars-all the paraphernalia of modern war-have been called into
play by the police in fighting the great American crime wave. Yet lawlessness in the United
States still keeps mounting to ever more appalling proportions."); Chicago Crime Wave Still
Sweeps On, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 24, 1920, at 2; Crime Wave Fills Prisons, N.Y. TIMES, May 15,
1922, at 20; Crime Wave Now Greatest in Secret Service Records, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 30, 1920,
at 1; Governor Sees Crime Wave Due to 'Living Fast, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 20, 1922, at 1; Huge
Crime Drive Planned; Authorities Here Unite Forward on Underworld, LA. TIMES, Nov. 21,
1929, at Al; Judges Draft Bills To End Crime Wave; Measures Would Increase Penalties and
Deal with Bail of Past Offenders, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 22, 1920, at 2; Lawlessness: The Shame of
America 77 CURRENT OPINION 15, 15 (1924) ("America is the land of Laws and Lawlessness.
At the same time that our legislative factories are turning out innumerable laws making us
on paper the most perfect nation in the world, murderers and robbers are rendering our lives
and property more insecure than in any other civilized and most uncivilized countries.");
Mothers Blamed for Painted Faces and Daring Dress, WASH. POST, Oct. 29, 1924, at 3; Our
Criminals Are New Ones; National Crime Wave Due to Them, Says Pinkerton, L.A. TIMES, Jan.
6, 1920, at 115; Remedy for Rising Crime Wave Essential to National Welfare, Bar Inquiry
Shows, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 12, 1922, at 1 ("A committee of the American Bar Association
recently appointed to investigate the increase of crime in the United States has decided to
report to the annual meeting ... that a remedy for increasing lawlessness is essential to the
welfare of the country."); Simon Says Drugs Cause Crime Wave; Declares Prohibition Has
Driven Criminals from Whisky to Narcotics, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 19, 1920, at 2; 200 Police Chiefs
Meet; Crime Wave as By-Product'of War Cited by Convention Speaker, N.Y. TIMES, June 8,
1920, at 11; Editorial, War on Crime, WASH. POST, Dec. 25, 1928, at 6.
349. Harry Elmer Barnes, Reflections on the Crime Wave, BOOKMAN, Sept. 1926, at 44.
Often the crime wave was linked to the overproduction of statutory law. See, e.g., Adams,
supra note 261, at 2-5. The linkage was well expressed by a letter to the New York Times:
Lawlessness is rampant throughout the country today as never before ... and
it is no idle statement to say that America is the most lawless nation on earth.
Nowhere is there such utter disrespect and contempt of law as here, and the
question naturally arises, What is the cause of it?
It can be summed up briefly: Too much law by stupid legislation and a general
indifference and apathy by the people toward public officials. The adherents of
prohibition promised us a sort of millennium which was to follow the adoption
and enforcement of the Eighteenth Amendment. Results speak for themselves,
and instead of a utopian Sahara we have a land where crime and acts of violence
fill the first page of every daily newspaper.
Laws that cannot be enforced only breed contempt and hypocrisy, and should
be wiped off the statute books. Eliminate 50 per cent. of the existing laws and
give honest enforcement to the rest of them.
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General James M. Beck remarked "that the present wave of crime
had no parallel since the eighteenth century."35 A 1926 poll named
"[1]awlessness or disrespect for law" as "the greatest problem
confronting this country at this time."35' Herbert Hoover made
lawlessness a major theme of his new administration, announcing
in his Inaugural Address that "[c]rime is increasing. Confidence in
rigid and speedy justice is decreasing."352 Hoover pledged to meet
the challenge by appointing "a national commission for a searching
Henry Engleken, Letter to the Editor, Lawlessness, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 17, 1924, at 12; see
Editorial, Laws and More Laws, WASH. POST, June 19, 1928, at 6.
350. Beck on the Crime Wave; Suggests Application of the Venetian Code in Dealing with
Robbers, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 23, 1921, at 14; see MCADOO, supra note 99, at 41 ("The
transcendent problem before the country today is the problem of law and order.").
351. Vote Lawlessness Gravest Problem;Plurality of Leading Citizens in National Economic
League Rank It First, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 29, 1926, at 21. The poll was of the National Council
of the National Economic League:
mhe members of the council were asked if they believed an abnormal amount
of lawlessness and disrespect for law existed in this country at present, and 1489
answered in the affirmative and 105 in the negative. This question was then
propounded:
"If so, what in your opinion is most to blame...?"
These causes were given:
Im proper laws ..................................... 649
Lax enforcement ................................... 895
Condition of public sentiment ........................ 1,065
The question "If you think it is due, wholly or in part, to improper laws, what
specific laws in your opinion are most responsible?" brought the following
replies:
Prohibition laws, Volstead act, Eighteenth Amendment, 507; too many laws,
105; laws relating to personal liberty, 84; laws governing courts and criminal
procedure, 75.
Id.; see Lawlessness Our Greatest Problem, LITERARY DIG., Jan. 1, 1927, at 24; Richard Lee
Strout, Why Are We Lawless, WOMAN'S J., Dec. 1930, at 12, 12 ("An increasing number of
people ... considered" the problem of criminality "the most serious one before the American
nation. They read daily reports of lawlessness, of rampant crime, of police impotency, of
corruption in office, of alliance between and underworld, of men shot down in cold blood, of
no subsequent arrests.").
352. Hoover, supra note 336, at 76. According to Taft, this part of Hoover's inaugural was
"suggested and contributed" by Justice Stone, to whom Hoover was very close. Letter from
WHT to Samuel H. Fisher (May 2, 1929), microformed on TAFr PAPERS, supra note 9, Reel
311; MASON, supra note 269, at 271. In a speech that Taft believed "was largely the result of'
Hoover's "conference with Stone," Letter from WHT to Samuel H. Fisher, supra, Hoover
declared that "the enforcement and obedience to the laws of the United States, both Federal
and State" was "the dominant issue before the American people." Text of President Hoover's
Speech on Law Observance, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 23, 1929, at 2; see Hoover Demands Respect for
Law; Calls It Nation's 'Dominant Issue'in Speech Before Publishers Here, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 23,
1929, at 1.
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investigation of the whole structure of our Federal system of
jurisprudence" that would "make such recommendations for re-
organization of the administration of Federal laws and court
procedure as may be found desirable."3"3
353. Hoover, supra note 336, at 77. The commission eventually became the National
Commission on Law Observance and Enforcement. Hoover was "most anxious" to appoint
Stone to chair the Commission. Letter from WHT to Charles P. Taft, 2nd (Mar. 17, 1929),
microformed on TAFT PAPERS, supra note 9, Reel 309. Taft reports that Hoover "sent for me
to lunch with him" to discuss the matter. Letter from WHT to Mrs. Frederick J. Manning
(Mar. 17, 1929), microformed on TAFT PAPERS, supra note 9, Reel 309. Hoover wanted to put
Stone
on the Commission and still have him retain his place on the Court, and I told
him I did not think it possible. I have suggested that if he needs the Court ...
although we would hate to let them go, he could take members of the Court who
could retire. There are two of them at least he could take and who would make
very good members. The best man in the United States for the place is Willis
Van Devanter.... Another man who is entitled to retire is Brandeis. I told the
President that if he would take Van Devanter as Chairman and put Brandeis on
with him, he would lay a basis for a Commission noteworthy in the history of the
country and a Commission that would do something. I told him that Stone did
not have the qualities and that Stone would not retire, but he did not seem
convinced.
Letter from WHT to Robert A. Taft (Mar. 17, 1929), microformed on TAFT PAPERS, supra note
9, Reel 309. In Taft's view, Hoover was "daft in respect to the qualities" of Stone, "because he
has known him for a long time, and not being a lawyer has not had full opportunity to
understand and gauge his qualities in action." Id. Taft thought that Hoover was "quite
indisposed properly to weigh the limitations upon the Court's action." Letter from WHT to
Charles P. Taft, 2nd, supra. "We are not disposed to give up an active member of the Court
and retain him in the Court while he does work in another jurisdiction," Taft wrote to his son.
"We need all we have, because we can not very well render decisions in a number of cases, and
those most important, without a full Court." Letter from WHT to Charles P. Taft, 2nd (Mar.
31, 1929), microformed on TAFT PAPERS, supra note 9, Reel 310. "Moreover, there was a good
deal of grave doubt as to whether a member of our Court ought to be on the Commission and
then have to pass on questions arising out of the proposals of the new Code or whatever may
be developed." Letter from WHT to Samuel H. Fisher (May 2, 1929), microformed on TAFT
PAPERS, supra note 9, Reel 311.
Taft reported that Hoover "thinks that Stone is keen to get into the work. Stone tells me
he is not and wishes to be let alone in the Court." Letter from WHT to Robert A. Taft (Mar.
31, 1929), microformed on TAFt PAPERS, supra note 9, Reel 310. Hoover pressed the question,
however, and eventually Taft wrote Hoover that he would call a meeting of the full Court to
decide the question. The meeting was held on April 6, 1929, but before Taft could report its
outcome to the President, Hoover again wrote Taft "to express my anxiety that you will be
able to acquiesce in" the suggestion that Stone be permitted to chair the Commission without
retiring from the Court:
I realize the extra burden it imposes on the Court.... I also realize the desire
of the Court that its members should not, as in the past, head up commissions
in public matters. On the other hand, it seems to me that this is so closely
affiliated and so vital to the whole of the future of our judicial system that it
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would not comprise a precedent in your newly established custom.
I have again this week, with the assistance of several of our best members of
the Bar, traversed the personnel of the Bench and Bar of the whole country, and
I have not received a single suggestion of a man who, in the view of these
helpers, can adequately undertake the job with any hope of its successful
consummation and the necessary support of its conclusions by the public, except
Justice Stone.
I now realize that I should not have launched and pledged my administration
to this venture. Many of my advisers are strongly recommending that I should
abandon the major purpose of this inquiry until some future successor can find
himself in position to command the talent necessary to effectually carry it
through.
Letter from Herbert Hoover to WHT (Apr. 7, 1929), microformed on TAFT PAPERS, supra note
9, Reel 310. Taft grimly replied to Hoover:
[W]e had a meeting yesterday and confirmed the conclusion which by previous
personal conferences with all the members of the Court, I had found to be its
judgment. But in view of your letter, I shall ask the members to meet me in the
morning ... so that I may submit the question to them again for further
consideration.
Letter from WHT to Herbert Hoover (Apr. 7, 1929), microformed on TAFt PAPERS, supra note
9, Reel 310.
As good as his word, Taft circulated a suggestion for a meeting to the whole Court,
attaching the President's letter. Letter from WHT to the Court (Apr. 7, 1929) (Van Devanter
Papers). On April 8, Taft wrote once again to Hoover, saying that there had "been a
misunderstanding between us, which a visit from Mr. Justice Stone this morning makes
clear." Letter from WHT to Herbert Hoover (Apr. 8, 1929), microformed on TAFT PAPERS,
supra note 9, Reel 310. Taft reported that the decision of the initial conference had been
"taken upon a full understanding of your position in the matter," and that it was therefore
"unnecessary ... to call a second meeting of the Court." Id. To his son Robert, Taft expressed
exasperation and some suspicion of Stone's role:
I have been going through ... a trial with Hoover, in which he has attempted to
take from our Court, and still retain him on the Court, his favorite Stone. I
opposed it and made some other suggestions which did not suit him, and he
hammered at me through Stimson and through the Attorney General. But I
submitted the question to the whole Court and they stood by me, every one, so
that he had to come down. Stone presented the view that he would go but that
he was not in favor of it. I am not quite sure what his attitude is in respect to
that issue, because I think when he talked with Hoover, he took a little different
view from that which he took when he talked with me. However, it is settled ....
I rather think the best man they could get now would be George Wickersham,
but I don't think that Hoover's friends like him. I think Hoover himself is
disposed rather in that direction, but my impression is that Hoover is so much
under the Progressive influence that it would be enough to be against George on
account of his relation to me in the past, although I would think that George
could put the thing through rather more promptly and effectively than any of
them. Indeed I consider him a very much better man than Stone would be,
because of George's experience.
Letter from WHT to Robert A. Taft (Apr. 7, 1929), microformed on TAFT PAPERS, supra note
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Hoover was careful to stress that prohibition "was not the main
source of the lawlessness" afflicting the country." Although his plea
for legality was nevertheless interpreted "as an appeal to respect
the Volstead act,"'355 Hoover was correct in his perception that
Americans in the 1920s were anxious about the problem of lawless-
ness in registers that transcended prohibition. Apart from the
anxiety generated by what Taft called "[t]he great wave of crime
that we have been facing," which involved not merely liquor but also
an "increase of violence" like "murder and robbery,"35 the problem
9, Reel 310. A decade later, Stone wrote his sons that although Hoover was
very much enamored of the idea that I should head the Commission ... I was
equally desirous of not serving in that capacity.... I tried to convince him that
such a service on my part was incompatible with my position as a member of the
Supreme Court, both because it was too time-absorbing ... and because I felt that
discussions of my action as chairman ... might readily impair my public standing
as a member of the Court. I was not at all disposed to hazard such little
reputation and public standing as I had by monkeying with the prohibition
buzzsaw.
Letter from HFS to his sons (Nov. 3, 1929) (Stone Papers); see MASON, supra note 269, at 271-
74. Eventually Hoover chose George Wickersham to chair the Commission. Wickersham had
been Taft's Attorney General and was at that time the law partner of Taft's brother Henry.
354. Hoover Demands Respect for Law, supra note 352.
In order to dispel certain illusions in the public mind on this subject, let me
say at once that while violations of law have been increased by inclusion of
crimes under the Eighteenth Amendment and by the vast sums that are poured
into the hands of the criminal classes by the patronage of illicit liquor by
otherwise responsible citizens, yet this is only one segment of our problem. I
have purposely cited the extent of murder, burglary, robbery, forgery and
embezzlement, because only a small percentage of these can be attributed to the
Eighteenth Amendment. In fact, of the total number of convictions for felony last
year, less than 8 per cent came from that source. That is, therefore, but a sector
of the invasion of lawlessness.
What we are facing today is something far larger and far more
fundamental-the possibility that respect for law as law is fading from the
sensibilities of our people.
Text of President Hoover's Speech on Law Observance, supra note 352; see also Hoover, supra
note 336, at 76 ("The problem is much wider than [prohibition]."). Hoover's account of an
increase in crime distinct from prohibition was vigorously disputed. See Burnham, supra note
34, at 61 ("During the 1920's there was almost universal public belief that a 'crime wave'
existed in the United States.... [Tihere is no firm evidence of this supposed upsurge in
lawlessness."); Kirchwey, supra note 337.
355. Editorial, A Long Task, N.Y. TIMES, May 11, 1929, at 18. This was no doubt because,
as Senator George Wharton Pepper observed, "The question of law enforcement is popularly
thought of just now in connection with prohibition enforcement." 64 CONG. REC. 389 (1922).
356. Letter from WHT to Percy L. Edwards (Jan. 28, 1927), microformed on TAFT PAPERS,
supra note 9, Reel 288. Taft understood, as Richard Nixon later understood, that support for
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of 'law and order" in the 1920s was also associated with issues of
labor unrest,"' as well as with various forms of racial violence like
law enforcement could create a powerful political platform. Taft was concerned to transform
anxiety over crime into pressure "to stir up Legislatures to an effort to furnish machinery for
the better apprehension of criminals." Id. Like Nixon, who claimed to speak for the "silent
majority," Taft purported to speak for "the forgotten man, the victim of the murderer and
robber and the criminal." EIGHTY-THIRD ANNUAL REPORT OF THE PRISON ASSOCIATION OF NEW
YORK, reprinted in E.R. CASS, REVIEW OF NATIONAL CRIME COMMISSION CONFERENCE 9 (1928)
(quoting William Howard Taft). "[S]omebody or some organization," Taft argued, ought "to
look after the Forgotten Man-that is, society at large"-in order "to have an improvement
in the administration of the criminal law as we ought to have." American Law Institute Holds
Fifth Annual Meeting, 13 A.B.A. J. 243, 246 (1927). Taft's plea was received as "stirring."
National Clearing House of Criminal Statistics Urged, WASH. POST, Nov. 4, 1927, at 1. It was
said that Taft, "in a speech delivered recently, packed into a single phrase his criticism of
American justice as it is now directed. This phrase was: 'The forgotten man." Editorial, The
Forgotten Man, CHI. DAILY TRIB., Dec. 14, 1927, at 10.
Ever since 1905, when Taft had issued his famous challenge that "the administration of the
criminal law in all the states in the Union ... is a disgrace to our civilization," William Howard
Taft, TheAdministration of Criminal Law, 15 YALE L.J. 1, 11 (1905)-a challenge that became
the rallying cry for reform and that was deemed "one of the most beneficent utterances in
American history," What's Wrong with the Law?, WORLD, Nov. 11, 1926, at 14-Taft had
campaigned to rouse "the people to demand that an improvement be made in stiffening the
powers of criminal prosecution, in enlarging the police, and in giving the Judges in the Courts
more power to control the trials." Letter from WHT to George W. Burton (Aug. 4, 1925),
microformed on TAFT PAPERS, supra note 9, Reel 275. Taft believed that the best way to
diminish "crime ... is to make more efficient your laws for prosecuting it.... [W]e can not
abandon the police force in the thorough prosecution of crime as we find it, and hope that
general causes will then take the place of prosecution to restrain it. They won't do it." Letter
from WHT to Moses Strauss (Mar. 5, 1928), microformed on TAFT PAPERS, supra note 9, Reel
300. Taft displayed real violence of feeling on the subject, writing, for example, to his son
Charles who was a public prosecutor:
I don't agree with the opponents of capital punishment at all. I think that those
who commit crimes of violence in robbery are directly affected by the fear of
capital punishment, and that it leaves the public helpless to abolish that as the
extreme penalty....
... This man Darrow, who came very near being convicted of suborning
perjury, is a great advocate of the abolition of the death penalty. I can not
understand what the vogue is which makes him so popular a lecturer.... I think
the escape of those two young Jews who tortured that other young Jew to death
is one of the greatest miscarriages of justice that we have had, in that it did not
result in their execution.
Letter from WHT to Charles P. Taft, 2nd (July 9, 1927), microformed on TAFT PAPERS, supra
note 9, Reel 293; see infra note 408. As the decade progressed, Taft's campaign for efficient
law enforcement reached a crescendo. See, e.g., Basil Manly, Chief Justice Taft Replies to
Three Vital Questions, BOSTON GLOBE, Jan. 9, 1929, at 32; Oliver P. Newman, Stop Helping
the Criminal: An Authorized Interview with the Chief Justice William Howard Taft, COLLIER'S,
Jan. 22, 1927, at 8; WHT, Some Possible Reforms in Our Criminal Law, ST. LOUIS POST-
DISPATCH, Dec. 9, 1928 (Supplement), at 2.
357. Felix Frankfurter, Law and Order, 9 YALE REV. 225,226 (1920) ("Were the proverbial
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lynching358 and extralegal organizations like the Ku Klux Klan. 59
messenger from Mars to visit this country he would find ... a veritable devil's dance, with 'law
and order' emblazoned on the banners."). At the beginning of the 1920s the country was
rocked by coal and railway strikes that produced what Harding, in an address to Congress on
the industrial crisis, called "a state of lawlessness shocking to every conception of American
law and order.... In these strikes ... rights have been denied by assault and violence, by armed
lawlessness ... until liberty is a mockery and the law a matter of common contempt." The
President's Address to Congress on Industrial Crisis, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 19, 1922, at 2.
Harding's "remarks condemnatory of lawlessness growing out of the coal and railway strikes
were commended heartily by Democrats as well as Republicans." Harding's Stand on Strike;
Will Use All Power To Keep Roads Running and Let Men Work, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 19, 1922, at
1. It also received editorial approval. See Editorial, The President to Congress, N.Y. TIMES,
Aug. 19, 1922, at 10. Taft believed that "the lawlessness of the trades-unions must be
restrained." Letter from WHT to Mrs. Frederick J. Manning (Oct. 6, 1922), microformed on
TAFT PAPERS, supra note 9, Reel 246. Writing to George Harvey, United States Ambassador
to Great Britain, Taft observed:
The situation in the United States now is ... quite critical in respect to the coal
strike and the railway strike.... The war and general lawlessness everywhere
stimulate bloody, murderous violence on the part of the strikers and their
sympathizers, but that is not so much a dangerous symptom as it is a symptom
of the times.
Letter from WHT to George Harvey (July 21, 1922), microformed on TAFT PAPERS, supra note
9, Reel 244.
358. "The epidemic of lawlessness that has swept the United States in the last few years
is held by many influential southern papers to be a direct result of the lynching bees and the
fact that the participants in these go practically unpunished." Editorial, Law Breaking, L.A.
TIMES, Oct. 3, 1923, at 114. In Congress, debates over the Dwyer antilynching bill turned on
the need to combat "contempt for law and order." 62 CONG. REC. 547 (1921) (statement of Rep.
Ansorge). "Whenever anyone excuses an act that is not lawful, no matter what the provocation
may be, he invites the collapse of all authorized government. He is opening a door to
lawlessness, the extent of which no man can see." 62 CONG. REC. H543 (1921) (statement of
Rep. Fess). "[L]awlessness of this character allowed to go unchecked and unpunished will
eventually seek out as its victims any against whom there may be a local prejudice." 62 CONG.
REC. 1700 (1922) (statement of Rep. Mondell). Taft had been one of several prominent
Republicans who, at the request of the NAACP, had petitioned Senators for an investigation
of lynching and race riots. ARTHUR I. WASKOW, FROM RACE RIOT TO SIT-IN, 1919 AND THE
1960S, at 205 (1966). Taft publicly branded lynching as a cause of lawlessness equal to that
of organized crime:
[L]ynch law, prompted by the same lawlessness and a sense of cheapness of
human life, and often a real race cruelty, has been until very recently looked
upon as an outbreak not under control. It has rarely been made the subject of
investigation and prosecution because supported by neighborhood sympathy.
Newman, supra note 356 (quoting WHT).
359. The Klan was widely understood to be a symptom of "the penetration" into the North
of a "Southern spirit of lawlessness." Lawlessness as an American Tradition, 74 AM. REV.
REVS. 653, 654 (1926). It was also excoriated as a form of "organized lawlessness," Arthur
Sears Henning, Frown Would End Volstead Terror Reign, CHI. DAILY TRIB., Mar. 30, 1929, at
1, as an instrument "of terror, oppression, and violence." Knights of the Ku Klux Klan v.
Strayer, 26 F.2d 727, 728 (W.D. Pa. 1928). Ironically, the Klan was also regarded as "the
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Embedded in the atmosphere of this anxiety, the Taft Court was, as
historians have noted, "preoccupied" by 'law and order issues.""s
..We owe to Robert Cover the insight that the Taft Court managed
to achieve an "extraordinary area of consensus" about the need to
shock troops of the prohibition forces," because "many of its atrocities the klan commits in the
name of unofficial enforcement of the Volstead act." Henning, supra. Prohibition helped fuel
the revival of the Klan in the 1920s:
With prohibition came the bootlegger, and many anxious parents, seeing their
sons and daughters going in for "petting parties," all-night automobile escapades
and bad gin, sincerely thought the foundations of society were being undermined
by the vicious elements identified in their minds with the illegitimate traffic in
liquor. In town after town, all over the country, the first act of the newly formed
Klan was to horsewhip the proprietor of the most notorious local speak-easy, and
no inconsistency was felt because in the party which did so there might be men
who themselves drank.
The Rise and Fall of the KKK, 53 NEW REPUBLIC 33, 34 (1927). Taft himself believed that
"[tihe progress of the Klu Klux Klan [sic] in our country of course is a subject that should
cause us humiliation and arouse in us an earnest wish to suppress such lawlessness as it
evidently encourages." Letter from WHT to Mrs. Bellamy Storer (Sept. 20, 1923), microformed
on TAFT PAPERS, supra note 9, Reel 256; see Letter from WHT to Mrs. Bellamy Storer (Nov.
13, 1923), microformed on TAFTPAPERS, supra note 9, Reel 258 (predicting that the popularity
of the Klan would subside: "The absurdities and the extent of the lawlessness for which it is
responsible create opposition. It carries its own antidote ....").
The confluence of phenomena like prohibition, proliferation of legislation, labor unrest,
lynching, and the Klan, formed a witches' brew of anxiety over the rule of law. A typical
example is this editorial in the Newark Evening News:
That today in this country the fundamental principle underlying all Anglo-
Saxon political order, "the rule of law," is threatened is no idle foreboding. Forces
from without and within the law are at work with their undermining influences.
Legislators at both the National Capitol and at the state capitols have enacted
a mass of legislation which in complexity and volume is without parallel in the
ancient or modern world. They-have attempted to uplift society by the mere
passage of a statute.
The inevitable results in the fabric of society itself have made themselves felt.
Flagrant violations of the prohibition amendment, an integral part of the
supreme law of the land, furnish an incontrovertible evidence of the growing
disrespect for the rule of law. Growing forces of lawlessness are to be seen in the
advocates of direct action among the extremists in labor circles. Lynching
furnishes another conspicuous example. The misguided efforts of thousands of
well-meaning citizens in the Ku Klux Klan are employed to accomplish outside
the law results which in themselves and if effected by other than extra-legal
means would win the respect of their fellow citizens.
Editorial, Promise of Bettering Law and Legal Procedure, NEWARK EVENING NEWS, Feb. 26,
1923, at 8. For similar observations by Vice-President-to-be Charles G. Dawes, see Dawes
Turns Scorn on National Faults, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 23, 1923, at 5.
360. M. Browning Carrott, The Supreme Court and Law and Order in the 1920s, MD.
HISTORIAN, Fall/Winter 1985, at 12, 22. For Pierce Butler's long discussion of the dangers of
"the spirit of lawlessness that threatens now,"-see Butler, supra note 264, at 585-87.
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uphold the rule of law and eliminate "private violence." '' Although
the Court split deeply on the question of whether labor violence
should be regulated by courts or by legislatures, 3 62 and on the
question of the proper scope of labor pressure," it was nevertheless
united in its ambition to inaugurate "a new era in the effort to
extend the rule of law into the field of industrial controversy."' 6 In
decisions like American Steel Foundries v. Tri-City Central Trades
Council. 5 and United Mine Workers v. Coronado Coal Co.366 the
Court sought to substitute legal form for uncontrolled violence in
the context of labor disputes.367 In New York ex rel. Bryant v.
Zimmerman,3" the Court upheld a New York statute designed to
361. Robert M. Cover, The Left, the Right and the First Amendment- 1918-1928, 40 MD. L.
REv. 349, 352-54 (1981).
362. See, e.g., Truax v. Corrigan, 257 U.S. 312 (1921).
363. See, e.g., Bedford Cut Stone Co. v. Journeymen Stone Cutters' Ass'n, 274 U.S. 37
(1927).
364. Edward S. Corwin, Constitutional Law in 1921-1922, 16 AM. POL. Sci. REV. 612, 628
(1922).
365. 257 U.S. 184 (1921).
366. 259 U.S. 344 (1922).
367. For a discussion, see Cover, supra note 361, at 358-63; see also Dorchy v. Kansas, 272
U.S. 306 (1926); Pa. R.R. Co. v. U.S. R.R. Labor Bd., 261 U.S. 72 (1923).
368. 278 U.S. 63 (1928). Zimmerman arose in the context of a habeas petition challenging
the constitutionality of the New York statute under which the defendant had been
imprisoned. In dissent, McReynolds charged:
[O]ver and over again this Court has asserted that it will not permit habeas
corpus to perform the office of a writ of error.
It must now be accepted as settled doctrine in this Court that one is not
deprived of any federal right merely by being put on trial for violating a state
statute which conflicts with the Federal Constitution. Nor is one deprived of his
federal right solely because he may be imprisoned after conviction of violating
a state statute admittedly in conflict with the Federal Constitution.
It follows that when the petition for habeas corpus alleged that plaintiff in
error was imprisoned under a charge of violating a state statute said to be
unconstitutional and void, no real federal question was raised.
Id. at 83-84 (McReynolds, J., dissenting). There is an interesting note from Holmes to Van
Devanter, who authored Zimmerman, to the effect that Holmes agreed with McReynolds that
a habeas petition could not be used to "assail ... the constitutionality of the law upon which
the judgment was based. The judgment is no less valid when based on bad than when on good
law. This I think sound doctrine." Letter from OWH to WVD (Nov. 15, 1928) (Van Devanter
Papers). Holmes noted, however, that
if a State chooses to say that the validity of the judgment shall depend on the
validity of their statute or for any other reason that the constitutional question
may be raised by habeas corpus, the state has power to do so, and the question
will be raised and we shall have to deal with it. That I understand is the case in
New York, and it seems to me something to the above effect should be said.
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clamp down on the Ku Klux Klan, an organization that was "taking
into its own hands the punishment of what some of its members
conceived to be crimes," '69 by requiring the Klan to disclose the
identity of its members." ' In Moore v. Dempsey"v ' the Court sought
to bring federal authority to bear in controlling lynching and race
violence. Essentially overruling the recent precedent of Frank v.
Mangum,72 Moore held that federal courts could use their power
under habeas corpus to review state trials that had been rendered
lawless by a mob. 3 ' In effect the Court declared "lynch law as little
valid when practiced by a regularly drawn jury as when adminis-
tered by one elected by a mob intent on death." '4
Id. According to Stone's docket book, Taft had at conference initially voted with McReynolds
to reverse the judgment below.
369. Zimmerman, 278 U.S. at 77. Zimmerman should be read in light of Taft Court
decisions upholding state efforts to crack down on left-wing incendiary speech. See, e.g.,
Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357 (1927); Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652 (1925).
370. On the controversial origins of the New York statute, see The Klan Defies a State,
LITERARY DIG., June 9, 1923, at 12-13. On the sordid details of the case before the Court, see
DAVID M. CHALMERS, HOODED AMERIcANISM; THE HISTORY OF THE Ku KLUX KLAN 258-59 (2d
ed. 1981). Zimmerman was authored by Van Devanter, who later remarked to a confidante:
Personally I should be very loathe to stigmatize the general membership of the
old Klan and equally loathe to stigmatize the general membership of the present
order. Indeed, I have some near relatives who were members of the former Klan
and for whom I entertain a high and affectionate regard.
Letter from WVD to Joseph M. Hill (Nov. 29, 1928) (Van Devanter Papers).
371. 261 U.S. 86 (1923). For a recent discussion of Moore, see Eric M. Freedman, Milestones
in Habeas Corpus: Part II-Leo Frank Lives: Untangling the Historical Roots of Meaningful
Federal Habeas Corpus Review of State Conviction, 51 ALA. L. REV. 1467, 1497-530 (2000).
372. 237 U.S. 309 (1915). The opinion for the Court in Moore was by Holmes, who had
dissented in Mangum. The Court in Mangum had basically stood for the proposition "that a
man is entitled only to the justice which the community gives him and that the federal
government cannot undertake the task of civilizing the whole country in spite of the wishes
of the local communities." Legal Lynching and the Constitution, 34 NEw REPUBLIC 84, 85
(1923). Consistent with their opposition to prohibition on the ground of community sentiment,
McReynolds and Sutherland dissented in Moore's effective overruling of Mangum. Moore, 261
U.S. at 92-102 (McReynolds and Sutherland, JJ., dissenting).
373. Cover attributes the reversal of Frank to the personal influence of Taft. See Cover,
supra note 361, at 355-57. Taft himself said of the Moore opinion that
I would have written the opinion in a different way and would have dwelt more
on our hesitation at interfering with the state court's decision and the state rule
that subsequently discovered evidence is not receivable as a basis for a
rehearing etc. But I doubt whether the opinion as now framed will make an
uncomfortable precedent. No state officers will ever again be fools enough to let
the defendants make an uncontestable case by affidavits and then demur.
Letter from WHT to WVD (Feb. 13, 1923) (Van Devanter Papers).
374. Mangum, 237 U.S. at 350 (Holmes, J., dissenting). T.R. Powell summarized the lesson
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The Taft Court maintained this commitment to legality even in
the context of prohibition. In Tumey v. Ohio,7 5 the Court sought to
define, as it had in Moore, the "content of the concept of the fair trial
required by due process of law." '76 Ohio had by statute authorized
tiny villages to create small magistrate courts, popularly known as
"liquor court[s] ,,,377 in which the judge, who might also be the village
mayor, would receive as supplementary income a percentage of the
fees and costs that a convicted defendant was required to pay. 8
Ohio law also authorized villages to receive one-half of all fines
assessed by its liquor court.379 This allocation of funds cleverly
created powerful incentives for villages to enforce prohibition in an
entrepreneurial fashion, for the jurisdiction of liquor courts ran to
the entire county in which a village was situated.
The facts of Tumey perfectly illustrate these incentives. Thmey
involved the small village of North College Hill, which had a
population of 1,104 but which was situated in Hamilton County
near the "very 'wet' city"3 0 of Cincinnati. The liquor court of North
College Hill could thus generate significant income for the village,
as well as significant personal income for the North College Hill
mayor who presided over its liquor court, by prosecuting and fining
Cincinnati residents.381' To sustain such prosecutions, North College
Hill provided by ordinance that one half of the income generated by
its liquor court would be reinvested in a "Secret Service Fund to be
of Moore to be that "in criminal proceedings a court must behave like a court and not like a
vigilance committee." Thomas Reed Powell, The Supreme Court and State Police Power, 1922-
1930-VIII, 18 VA. L. REv. 481, 505 (1932).
375. 273 U.S. 510 (1927).
376. James L. Magrish, Note, Due Process of Law and a Fair Trial: The Tumey Case, 1 U.
CIN. L. REv. 338, 339-41 (1927).
377. Thmey, 273 U.S. at 521.
378. Tumey involved an appeal from a village that had authorized its mayor to receive $12
in costs for each conviction. Id. at 523.
379. Fines for the violation of Ohio's prohibition statute were between $100 and $1000 for
the first offense, between $300 and $2000 for the second offense, and for a third and each
subsequent offense between $500 and $2000, as well as a year's imprisonment. Id. at 516.
380. Letter from WHT to James R. Angell (Dec. 12, 1927), microformed on TAFr PAPERS,
supra note 9, Reel 297.
381. Between May 11, 1923, and December 31, 1923, the liquor court of the tiny village of
North College Hill had assessed "upwards of $20,000" in fines, from which the village had
received a little more than half. The mayor, who was the chief executive of the village and
responsible for its budget, had also received for his personal income $696.35 from the "fees
and costs" of convicted liquor defendants. Tumey, 273 U.S. at 521-22.
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used for the purpose of securing the enforcement of any prohibition
law." 2 In this way Ohio created a "reign of terror"3 3 in which dry
villages used their liquor courts to fund self-sustaining squads that
would earn income for villages by raiding adjacent wet cities to
enforce prohibition legislation.'
In Tumey, Taft, writing for a unanimous Court, held that the
Ohio statute was unconstitutional, because it "vested the judicial
power in one who by reason of his interest, both as an individual
and as chief executive of the village, is disqualified to exercise it in
the trial of the defendant."'  Taft knew that Tumey was "a very
382. Id. at 518. The village used the income to fund marshals, inspectors, and detectives.
Id.
383. Dry League's Pet Measure in Ohio Faces Disaster, CHI. DAILY TRIB., Oct. 17, 1927, at
4.
384. See Editorial, Outrageous, CLEV. PLAIN DEALER, Nov. 8, 1926, at 10 ("It would be
difficult to imagine a more deplorable perversion of justice than the Ohio law which gives
county wide jurisdiction to township justices of the peace.... A township justice who is elected
by a mere handful of votes is, under the Ohio law, given authority to carry on liquor raiding
operations in any part of a county having a population of over a million.... Under this
provision the country justices establish permanent raiding squads.... It is, of course, wholly
needless to remark that many of these agents are in no degree interested in the enforcement
of the prohibition laws. It is seldom that this type goes after bootleggers or rum runners. Its
activities are largely confined to violent raids on private dwellings, preferably in districts
inhabited by foreign-born residents. Unfortunate victims are dragged before venal justices,
heavy fines imposed, and the money thus obtained so split that the raiders themselves obtain
greater remuneration than they could possibly hope for in any respectable bread-winning
activity. In some cases villages and townships are enriched; in most cases the rural
magistrates are rewarded with copious fees. In every case fees depend upon convictions, a
condition so obviously unsound as to warrant no discussion.").
385. Tumey, 273 U.S. at 535. Tumey was regarded as "a case of considerable significance,"
Robert E. Cushman, Constitutional Law in 1926-1927, 22 AM. POL. Sci. REV. 70, 101 (1928),
because it shook "the very foundation upon which rests the Justice of the Peace system in the
United States." Note, Constitutional Law-Officers Acting in Judicial Capacity Are
Disqualified by Interest in Controversy--Due Process of Law, 13 VA. L. REV. 584, 585 (1927);
see Editorial, Justice--Above and Below, 13 A.B.A. J. 266 (1927); John M. Pfiffner, The
Mayor's Court and Due Process, 12 IOWA L. REV. 393, 393-403 (1927); Comment, The
Constitutionality of Fee Compensations for Courts, 36 YALE L.J. 1171 (1927). In Dugan v. Ohio,
277 US. 61 (1928), Taft, also writing for a unanimous court, upheld a magistrate court in a
different Ohio village, because, although the mayor presided as judge, he was paid a salary
from the general fund that was independent of the outcome of particular cases, and because
the mayor had judicial functions but no executive functions. Id. at 65. For modern
development of the Tumey doctrine, see Ward v. Village of Monroeville, 409 U.S. 57 (1972);
Note, Safeguarding the Litigant's Constitutional Right to a Fair and Impartial Forum: A Due
Process Approach to Improprieties Arising from Judicial Campaign Contributions from
Lawyers, 86 MICH. L. REV. 382, 392-96 (1987).
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important" '  decision that would "rejoice the hearts of the anti-
prohibitionists,""7 but his first fidelity was to the rule of law.3 'The
fact is that the prohibitionists controlling the Legislature of Ohio
have been so fierce that they have transgressed the Constitution of
the United States, and we have to say so."" Taft was "very anxious
that it shall not interfere with the efficient enforcement of law, but
it does not help to enforce law by methods involved in the procedure
which we condemned."3" "The rejoicing of violators of the law over
386. Letter from WHT to Horace D. Taft (Mar. 7, 1927), microformed on TAFT PAPERS,
supra note 9, Reel 289.
387. Letter from WHT to Mrs. Frederick J. Manning (Mar. 6, 1927), microformed on TAFT
PAPERS, supra note 9, Reel 289.
388. Taft hoped that Tumey
will not greatly embarrass the Legislature of Ohio.... They will have to spend
some more money to pay the compensation of their justices of the peace and
inferior judges, and they will have to separate the office of mayor of a village
from that of the judge in prohibition cases where the fines are permitted.
Letter from WHT to Moses Strauss (Mar. 8, 1927), microformed on TAFT PAPERS, supra note
9, Reel 289. Taft sadly noted:
We could not avoid declaring the law in respect to such trials to be contrary to
due process. It is one of those instances in which an enthusiastic Attorney
General anxious to secure the proper enforcement of the prohibition law forgot
the rights of individual defendants as secured by the Constitution.
Id.
389. Letter from WHT to Mrs. Frederick J. Manning (Mar. 6, 1917), microformed on TAFr
PAPERS, supra note 9, Reel 289. Taft noted that "Wayne Wheeler was counsel in the case, but
we have to distribute our favors equally and justly." Id. In fact the powerful Anti-Saloon
League, which Wheeler effectively ran, had originated in Ohio and did not take Tumey lightly.
It immediately caused the Ohio Legislature to submit to Ohio voters a substitute act, known
as the Marshall Bill, which would maintain the financial incentive for village courts to try
prohibition cases, but which would compensate magistrates only for time actually spent in
court. The bill was soundly defeated by a two-to-one vote, and it constituted the first major
legislative setback for the Anti-Saloon League. See Ohio Kills the "Kangaroo Courts,"
LITERARY DIG., Nov. 19, 1927, at 12; W.C. Howell, Project To Revive J.P. Fee Courts Defeated
in Supposed Strongholds, CLEV. PLAIN DEALER, Nov. 9, 1927, at 1. The Cleveland Plain Dealer
opined:
Defeat of the Marshall bill Tuesday by the amazing margin of more than
450,000 votes is not a defeat for prohibition. It is merely a defeat for an
organization which crammed the measure down the throat of a none too willing
Legislature and then sought to justify the enactment on the ground that it was
a dry measure and essential to successful liquor enforcement.
The very emphatic result should teach the much-needed lesson that Ohio
stands unequivocally for decency and justice in prohibition enforcement.
Editorial, The Marshall Bill, CLEV. PLAIN DEALER, Nov. 10, 1927, at 20.
390. Letter from WHT to Moses Strauss (Mar. 21, 1927), microformed on TAFT PAPERS,
supra note 9, Reel 290.
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our decision ... gives me some concern," Taft wrote his son, "but I
hope it will all be straightened out so that the effect of our decision
will be seen to'be just what it is and not to mean a general jail
delivery." '391
Tumey lay at the intersection of Taft's desire effectively to enforce
prohibition and his equal desire to maintain the forms of legality
essential to the rule of law. Taft wished to maintain the distinction
between legal state violence and mere official lawlessness. This
tension was most conspicuously and persistently played out in the
Taft Court's lively and developing Fourth Amendment jurisprudence
of search and seizure. Because prohibition had flooded the federal
courts with criminal defendants, because many of these were
wealthy enough to afford lawyers,392 because most prohibition
prosecutions required the production of evidence of liquor seized by
law enforcement officials,"93 and because the Taft Court was
391. Letter from WHT to Charles P. Taft, 2nd (Mar. 24, 1927), microformed on TAFT
PAPERS, supra note 9, Reel 290. Fear that the opinion might be misinterpreted was a major
theme in Taft's correspondence:
I hope it will do good and will make the Legislature of Ohio understand that
when they establish a court, they shall see to it that the Judge is a man who will
be indifferent between the parties and do justice without a motive for doing
injustice. I fear that the approval of our opinion grows more out of the feeling
against prohibition than it does against the maintenance of an unjust system.
That is the difficulty when you get to the liquor question-it is very hard to find
anybody who does not become a partisan.
Letter from WHT to Charles P. Taft, 2nd (Mar. 20, 1927), microformed on TAFT PAPERS, supra
note 9, Reel 290.
392. Glenn Roberts, for example, writing from "the practical standpoint of a prosecuting
official" trying to enforce prohibition, noted that those he sought to investigate "were
generally reasonably well off as a result of their unlawful activities, and they resisted our
efforts to destroy their business to the very limit. Counsel was employed to take advantage
of every single defense that was available, and scarcely a single search warrant went
unchallenged." Glenn D. Roberts, Does the Search and Seizure Clause Hinder the Proper
Administration of the Criminal Justice?, 5 Wis. L. REV. 195, 195, 197 (1929). Roberts
attributed the explosion of Fourth Amendment law in the 1920s to the presence of well-paid
counsel willing and able to contest searches. Id. at 202-03.
393. John B. Wilson, Attempts To Nullify the Fourth and Fifth Amendments to the
Constitution, 32 W. VA. L.Q. 128, 128 (1926). In Wilson's view:
Until the "National Prohibition Act" came into effect, the average citizen had,
if any, a very hazy conception of his rights under the fourth amendment. And...
many lawyers were in the same fix because of the infrequent use of the Federal
search and seizure warrant.... But, with the coming of prohibition, the situation
has changed, and the fourth has come to the front with a rush, and search and
seizure has become the almost universal means of enforcing the law, and
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committed to the exclusionary rule as a means of enforcing the
Fourth Amendment,394 prohibition sparked a virtual "doctrinal
explosion"395 of Fourth Amendment jurisprudence. 39
especially the prohibition law.
Id.
394. See generally Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914). Zechariah Chafee believed
that "[t]he Fourth Amendment would be a dead letter if the United States Supreme Court had
not since the decision in Weeks v. United States adopted the exclusion theory." Zechariah
Chafee, Jr., The Progress of the Law, 1919-1922: Evidence, 35 HARv. L. REV. 673, 695 (1922)
(footnote omitted). In 1920 only one state, Michigan, agreed with Weeks that constitutional
restrictions against unreasonable searches and seizures should be enforced by an exclusionary
rule, but by 1928 there could
be counted in support of the federal rule eighteen states, in opposition nineteen,
non-committal six, the remaining five not having reviewed the new rule but
having approved the old. It can no longer be said that there is weight of
authority against the federal rule, especially in view of the fact that in many of
the cases opposing the rule the question was not necessary to the decision and
often the result depended on one judge's vote.
Osmond K. Fraenkel, Recent Developments in the Law of Search and Seizure, 13 MINN. L. REV.
1, 6 (1928); cf. ASHER L. CORNELIUS, THE LAW OF SEARCH AND SEIZURE § 7 (2d ed. 1930);
Roberts, supra note 392, at 204. John Wigmore was a famous opponent of the exclusionary
rule. See, e.g., 4 JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, A TREATISE ON THE SYSTEM OF EVIDENCE IN TRIALS
AT COMMON LAW §§ 2183-2184, 2264 (2d ed. 1923); John H. Wigmore, Using Evidence
Obtained by Illegal Search and Seizure, 8 A.B.A. J. 479, 479-84 (1922). His witty attack-
"justice tampered with mercy"-was commonly cited in the 1920s. 3 JOHN HENRY WIGMORE,
A TREATISE ON THE SYSTEM OF EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW § 2251 (1st ed. 1904); see
Chafee, supra, at 699; Note, Search, Seizure, and the Fourth and Fifth Amendments, 31 YALE
L.J. 518, 522 (1922).
It was said that state courts began adopting the exclusionary rule in the 1920s because of
"the personal reaction of judges to the prohibition law." Note, Search and Seizure-Wire
Tapping-Judicial Method, 27 MICH. L. REV. 78, 81 (1929); see Margaret Lybolt Rosenzweig,
The Law of Wire Tapping, 32 CORNELL L.Q. 514, 525 (1947) ("The indiscriminate raids of the
prohibition agents and the fact that many defendants were erstwhile law-abiding citizens
rather than hardened criminals led court after court to adopt the rule of the Weeks case.").
395. MURCHISON, supra note 110, at 47, 71. This was the contemporary perception. See
CORNELIUS, supra note 394, at iii ("The wide-spread violations of the state and national
prohibition laws and the increasing use of the raid as a means of procuring evidence by police
officers; the frequent arrests and holding of suspected persons for 'investigation,' and the
incidental searches in connection with such arrests have caused the subject of search and
seizure to assume an importance scarcely dreamed of a few years ago. Legal problems
involving search and seizure are now presented before the courts with astonishing
frequency."); see also Morgan Cloud, The Fourth Amendment During the Lochner Era: Privacy,
Property, and Liberty in Constitutional Theory, 48 STAN. L. REV. 555, 602 n.218 (1996); Orin
S. Kerr, The Fourth Amendment and New Technologies: Constitutional Myths and the Case
for Caution, 102 MICH. L. REV. 801, 842-43 (2004) ('CThe National Prohibition Act of 1919
changed everything.... The federal courts began to hear a regular run of Fourth Amendment
cases as federal agents investigated illegal alcohol schemes.").
396. See John P. Bullington, Note, Constitutional Law-Searches and Seizures-A New
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IThe perceived difficulty of enforcing prohibition within the
constitutional restraints of the Fourth Amendment397 led some to
Interpretation of the Fourth Amendment, 3 TEX. L. REV. 460, 461 (1925). Bullington concluded
that although since Boyd
relatively few cases have reached the Supreme Court involving the Fourth
Amendment.... the adoption of the Eighteenth Amendment and the passing of
statutes directed towards enforcing the provisions of that amendment elevated
the Fourth Amendment to a place of prime importance, and presented the lower
federal courts with problems which have resulted in considerable diversity of
opinion.
Id. One student comment observed that before prohibition "[c] ases in which evidence had been
procured by unconstitutional searches and seizures were relatively infrequent.... But an
entirely different situation prevails today. The courts in jurisdictions" with an exclusionary
rule "are crowded with prohibition cases and the most popular mode of defense is to seek the
suppression of evidence on the ground that it was unreasonably seized." Comment, The
Meaning of the Federal Rule on Evidence Illegally Obtained, 36 YALE L.J. 536, 537 (1927). The
student comment counted approximately 575 reported opinions dealing with the admissibility
of illegally obtained evidence in prohibition cases in the period since 1920, of which 490 were
in federal court. Id. at 537 n.2; see MCBAIN, supra note 17, at 81-82. A federal magistrate
writing in 1924 remarked on how utterly prohibition had changed the constitutional
landscape:
The century-old formulas about inviolable homes and persons against searches
and seizures began to be cherished-though largely by men who two years
before could not have quoted one of them accurately. The entire aspect of the
dockets of the criminal magistrates changed. I served nearly twenty years in
Boston as a Federal criminal magistrate and was then made familiar with
substantially all that was done in the Federal repression of crime and the
application of the Federal Constitution. I had practically nothing to do with the
Fourth Amendment against unreasonable searches and seizures and against
general warrants. It was as strange to me as the Second Amendment about the
right to keep and bear arms would be to a liquor magistrate of to-day.
Richard W. Hale, Liberty and Liquor, 48 WORLD'S WORK 417, 421 (1924). By 1930 a federal
commissioner could observe "that eighty per cent of the United States Commissioner's
business is liquor work, and of this, by far the greater number of cases begin with a search
warrant as a foundation." Robert H. Alcorn, Search Warrants and Prohibition Enforcement,
3 DAKOrAL. REV. 171,171 (1930). The Fourth Amendment problems posed by prohibition bear
a notable resemblance to those that would later arise in the "war on drugs." See Craig S.
Lerner, The Reasonableness of Probable Cause, 81 TEX. L. REV. 951, 986 (2003); Thomas
Regnier, The "Loyal Foot Soldier. Can the Fourth Amendment Survive the Supreme Court's
War on Drugs?, 72 UMKC L. REV. 631, 631 (2004).
397.
Great natural difficulties oppose the possibility of enforcement in a manner
compatible with constitutional guarantees. Violations are widespread and
difficult of detection, for a chemical analysis is necessary for the recognition of
intoxicating liquor. And yet an arrest or search to be lawful must be based on
facts, not unfounded -suspicion.
Comment, Legal Search and Arrest Under the Eighteenth Amendment, 32 YALE L.J. 490, 494
(1923). "Hence it follows that in certain jurisdictions the federal authorities rely almost wholly
on state discoverers. This is not legal theory; it is fact. In more than one jurisdiction it is the
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advocate that the Supreme Court "recognize frankly that the 4th
Amendment is inconsistent with the 18th" and "that the 4th
Amendment has actually been repealed, where enforcement of the
Volstead Act is concerned."398 At least one federal court reasoned
that
[t]he Eighteenth Amendment must be considered in determining
the question of what is an unreasonable search and seizure as
prescribed by the Fourth Amendment. If there were no Eigh-
teenth Amendment to the Constitution to be enforced, the court
might have an entirely different idea of what is an unreasonable
399search or seizure ....
The Taft Court, however, was not tempted by this path. Instead it
sought to maintain the form of legality by affirming its commitment
to both the Fourth Amendment and the exclusionary rule,4°° while
daily practice." See MCBAIN, supra note 17, at 98.
398. Frederic A. Johnson, Some Constitutional Aspects of Prohibition Enforcement, 97
CENT. L.J. 113, 122-23 (1924).
399. United States v. Bateman, 278 F. 231, 233 (S.D. Cal. 1922). The court added:
If an automobile, a suit case, satchel, tin container, jug, or bottle could not be
searched and seized without a search warrant, they could not be seized at all,
as a search warrant, under the law, can only be obtained upon affidavit showing
that such automobile or other container had intoxicating liquor in it....
Under those circumstances the Eighteenth Amendment would have been
stillborn. The act of more than two-thirds of the House of Representatives, more
than two-thirds of the United States Senate, in passing such Eighteenth
Amendment, and all the states of the Union, with the exception of the two
smallest, in approving the Eighteenth Amendment, would have been utterly
futile, and would have brought about only chaos and confusion.
Id. at 234; see Milam v. United States, 296 F. 629, 631 (4th Cir. 1924) ("The constitutional
expression, 'unreasonable searches,' is not fixed and absolute in meaning. The meaning in
some degree must change with changing social, economic and legal conditions. The obligation
to enforce the Eighteenth Amendment is no less solemn than that to give effect to the Fourth
and Fifth Amendments.").
400. The intrusive and pervasive character of prohibition enforcement might actually have
reinforced the Court's dedication to the exclusionary rule. In the context of prohibition, illegal
searches would not involve
an occasional blundering constable. The state rule positively invites illegal
searches. The searching officer knows that he is relatively safe .... He knows that
he can do a lot of searching on mere suspicion. And he does. And whenever he
turns up evidence it is used, whether he had the legal right to turn it up or not.
He is not blundering. He is following the line pointed to him by the courts.
MCBAIN, supra note 17, at 97. Because everyone understood that remitting those subject to
illegal search to a civil remedy in damages or to criminal prosecution of the offending police
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at the same time vigorously reinterpreting search and seizure law
so as to render it compatible with the "many situations of prohibi-
tion enforcement. ' 0°
The Taft Court decision that most exemplifies this approach,
and that has had the most 'lasting influence,"4 °s is unques-
tionably Carroll v. United States.0 a  Carroll addressed the
officer was to offer "remedies so remote as practically not to threaten or restrain at all," id.
at 96, the only way citizens, including influential and "earstwhile law-abiding citizens,"
Rosenzweig, supra note 394, at 525, could actually be protected from systematic illegal search
was by an exclusionary rule.
401. Comment, supra note 396, at 542. "It is only natural to find that some courts desirous
of enforcing prohibition efficiently, should seek to deny, distinguish or limit the" exclusionary
rule of Weeks. Thomas E. Atkinson, Prohibition and the Doctrine of the Weeks Case, 23 MICH.
L. REv. 748,748 (1925). The upshot was that Fourth Amendment jurisprudence emerged from
the prohibition era in what has now become its familiar "highly chaotic state." MCBAIN, supra
note 17, at 82. As one student commentator complained,
[t]he generalization in the Boyd case has been found incompatible with
prohibition enforcement. In an attempt to adapt it to the new conditions courts
have lost sight of its function as a constitutional safeguard.... So frequently are
courts shaping exceptions to the rule, so rapidly is an unwieldy mass of
precedent growing, that an exact definition of the rule no longer is possible. The
original federal rule against illegally seized evidence has been broken down;
confusion and uncertainty remain.
Comment, supra note 396, at 542.
402. Lerner, supra note 396, at 987.
403. 267 U.S. 132 (1925). Other Fourth Amendment decisions involving prohibition decided
by the Taft Court include Dumbra v. United States, 268 U.S. 435 (1925), in which the Court
in a unanimous opinion by Stone held that the application for a warrant alleging personal
experience of an illegal sale of liquor met constitutional standards even though the application
failed to disclose that the target of the warrant was legally licensed to produce religious wine.
Id. at 437-38, 440-41. In the original draft of his opinion, Stone had written that the
circumstances disclosed by the affidavits
gave rise to a reasonable suspicion that the liquors possessed on the suspected
premises were possessed for the purpose and with the intent of selling them
unlawfully to casual purchasers. Absence of a well-grounded suspicion that such
was the fact could be ascribed only to a lack of intelligence or a singular lack of
practical experience on the part of the officer.
(Stone Papers) (emphasis added). Brandeis wrote to Stone: "Would it not be desirable to avoid
misapprehension that the word 'suspicion'... be deleted. Its presence will, I fear, lead officials
to assume that well grounded suspicion is enough-despite what you say" elsewhere. (Stone
Papers). Brandeis suggested that the word "belief" be substituted, which Stone did. In the
original draft of his opinion, Stone had also written that
the resort to the summary procedure of search and seizure, without disclosing,
in the affidavit submitted to the judge issuing the warrant, that a permit had
been granted authorizing the possession of wine on the premises was, to say the
least, dangerous, and would seem to have been a harsh and unnecessary
exercise of governmental power by the officials concerned.
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(Stone Papers) (emphasis added). Butler suggested removing the italicized words, and
substituting the word "disingenuous" for the word "dangerous," changes which Stone made.
Stone had also originally written that
[u]nder such circumstances search and seizure are not unauthorized or
unconstitutional and under the law, holders of Government permits must rely for
protection from the harsh and unreasonable resort to that procedure, on the self
restraint and sense of moral responsibility of law enforcement officers rather than
on constitutional limitations.
(Stone Papers) (emphasis added). Butler starred the italicized words and suggested their
removal: "Does not this tend to assure such officers that their own self restraint is the limit?
Can't we avoid that? Disingenuousness in some circumstances might evidence malice, want
of probable cause, and the like." Id. Stone obligingly removed the offending language.
In 1927 the Court decided Byars v. United States, 273 U.S. 28 (1927), which featured a
unanimous opinion by Sutherland holding that a search warrant based upon mere belief did
not meet the standards of probable cause. Id. at 29. Byars also held that the requirements of
the Fourth Amendment would apply to a search conducted by state police if a federal official
had participated in the search "under color of his federal office and ... the search in substance
and effect was a joint operation of the local and federal officers." Id. at 33. This holding later
became the basis for the so-called "silver platter" doctrine. Lustig v. United States, 338 U.S.
74, 78-79 (1949) (opinion of Frankfurter, J.); see Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 211
(1960). Justice Stone's docket book indicates that at conference Taft, Holmes, and McReynolds
had initially voted in Byars to affirm the defendant's conviction.
In 1927 the Court also decided Marron v. United States, 275 U.S. 192 (1927), which nicely
illustrates the Taft Court's complex effort both to maintain fidelity to Fourth Amendment
standards and to allow ample room for prohibition enforcement. Marron was a unanimous
opinion by Butler. On the one hand it held that a warrant authorizing the seizure of liquor
could not constitutionally justify the seizure of books and ledgers used in a bootlegger's
business: 'The requirement that warrants shall particularly describe the things to be seized
makes general searches under them impossible and prevents the seizure of one thing under
a warrant describing another. As to what is to be taken, nothing is left to the discretion of the
officer executing the warrant." Id. at 196; cf. Steele v. United States, 267 U.S. 498 (1925)
(upholding ambiguous warrant). But Marron also held, on the other hand, that the books and
ledgers could nevertheless constitutionally be introduced into evidence because they had been
seized as an incident to a lawful arrest, having been discovered by prohibition agents when
entering the defendants' premises and witnessing an ongoing illegal enterprise for the sale
of liquor. Marron, 275 U.S. at 199.
The officers were authorized to arrest for crime being committed in their
presence .... They had a right without a warrant contemporaneously to search
the place in order to find and seize the things used to carry on the criminal
enterprise. The closet in which liquor and the ledger were found was used as a
part of the saloon. And, if the ledger was not as essential to the maintenance of
the establishment as were bottles, liquors and glasses, it was none the less a
part of the outfit or equipment actually used to commit the offense. And, while
it was not on [the defendant's] person at the time of his arrest, it was in his
immediate possession and control. The authority of officers to search and seize
the things by which the nuisance was being maintained, extended to all parts
of the premises used for the unlawful purpose.
Id. at 198-99 (citations omitted). The authority of police to search without warrant incident
to a valid arrest was not a new rule invented by the Taft Court. It had been strongly
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question of whether prohibition agents could constitutionally
conduct a warrantless search of an automobile that they suspected
was carrying illegal liquor.4 4 The issue of automobile searches
involved "one of the most important practical difficulties in the
enforcement of prohibition," because
the passage of automobiles in pleasant weather with their tops
and curtains closed and of trucks apparently loaded with
furniture or other harmless freight is now so common on certain
main roads in some parts of the country as to excite little
comment, and the procuring of a search warrant to stop such
traffic is manifestly impossible. If the officers cannot stop and
search vehicles which they strongly suspect of illegal transporta-
tion they cannot stop the traffic at all and the law will be made
nugatory. °5
reaffirmed in Weeks, which asserted that "the right on the part of the Government ... to search
the person of the accused when legally arrested to discover and seize the fruits or evidences
of crime ... has been uniformly maintained in many cases." Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S.
383, 392 (1914). But Marron interpreted that authority in an extremely generous way that
more than compensated for its strict interpretation of the requirements for a formal search
warrant.
404. Carroll, 267 U.S. at 134.
405. ARTHURW. BLAKEMORE, NATIONAL PROHIBITION § 25 (2d ed. 1925). The conclusion was
a common one. See, e.g., Milam v. United States, 296 F. 629, 631 (4th Cir. 1924) ("In view of
the difficulties of enforcing the mandate of the Eighteenth Amendment and the statutes
passed in pursuance of it, we cannot shut our eyes to the fact known to everybody that the
traffic in intoxicating liquors is carried on chiefly by professional criminals in motor cars.
Robberies and other crimes are committed, and criminals escape by their use. To hold that
such motor cars must never be stopped or searched without a search warrant would be a long
step by the courts in aid of the traffic outlawed by the Constitution.... Objections to such
searches made by officers with due courtesy and judgment generally come, not from citizens
interested in the observance of the law, but from criminals who invoke the Constitution as a
means of concealment of crime."); see also United States v. Bateman, 278 F. 231, 234 (S.D.
Cal. 1922) ("There is now and has been ever since this amendment went into effect almost a
continuous stream of automobiles from at or near the Mexican border to Los Angeles and
other parts of the country. If these automobiles could not be stopped and searched without a
search warrant, the country, of course, would be flooded with intoxicating liquors, unlawfully
imported."); People v. Case, 190 N.W. 289, 292 (Mich. 1922) ("The automobile is a swift and
powerful vehicle of recent development, which has multiplied by quantity production and
taken possession of our highways in battalions, until the slower, animal-drawn vehicles, with
their easily noted individuality, are rare. Constructed as covered vehicles to standard form
in immense quantities, and with a capacity for speed rivaling express trains, they furnish for
successful commission of crime a disguising means of silent approach and swift escape
unknown in the history of the world before their advent. The question of their police control
and reasonable search on highways or other public places is a serious question .... The baffling
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The Court's opinion in Carroll was authored by Taft;
McReynolds wrote a dissenting opinion joined by Sutherland.4 °6
extent to which they are successfully utilized to facilitate commission of crime of all degrees,
from those against morality, chastity, and decency to robbery, rape, burglary, and murder, is
a matter of common knowledge. Upon that problem a condition and not a theory confronts
proper administration of our criminal laws.").
406. Carroll, 267 U.S. at 143, 163. Carroll was originally argued on December 4, 1923. Id.
at 132. It was reargued on March 14, 1924, and not decided until March 2, 1925. Id. We know
that the Court had first voted to affirm the judgment below admitting the evidence seized
without a warrant. Taft had assigned the opinion to McReynolds, who "in the course of writing
the opinion ... changed his mind and concluded that the judgment should be reversed." C.
Dickerman Williams, The 1924 Term: Recollections of Chief Justice Taft's Law Clerk, in
YEARBOOK 1989, at 47 (Supreme Court Historical Soc'y ed., 1989). McReynold's change of
mind evidently caused the case to be reargued. Butler's docket book for the 1923 Term shows
a vote taken in the Carroll case, most likely for the conference of March 29, 1924, after
reargument, in which McReynolds, Sutherland, Butler, and Sanford voted for reversal,
against the votes of Taft, McKenna, Holmes, Van Devanter, and Brandeis to affirm. Butler's
docket book contains some tantalizing clues about the discussion at conference: "O.W.H.
Different principles. W.H.T. suggests auto-mobile differs from house." "Common law right of
peace officer to arrest. [Park v. United States, 294 F. 776 (1st Cir. 1924)][.] What are
reasonable grounds for belief of present commission. Must have ascertained facts. 'In presence
of-immediate knowledge.' O.W.H. 'Probable cause to surmise.' There is an ambiguous
reference to Brandeis:
L.D.B. Court could find business
Stopping & Arrest misdemeanor on suspicion.
Whether the second line refers to Brandeis's comments is not clear.
It is probable that after this conference Taft reassigned the opinion to himself. Almost a
year later he wrote to his brother:
I have had ready for delivery an important opinion in respect to the right of Govt
officers to seize automobiles which they have reasonable ground for thinking
contain unlawful liquor. We have had the case for two years. I gave the case to
McReynolds. He brought it back saying he could not write for the validity of the
seizure. On a vote we lost once but McKenna came over so that I was able to
assign it to myself. I have been working on the thing since October. I brought in
an opinion the last of the year. I succeeded in winning over all but McR and
Sutherland. McR has written a dissent and a strong one. I don't know whether
Sutherland will go with him or not. Van Devanter thinks not. At any rate we
carry the day and I am rejoiced because I think it important to establish the
correct principle in respect to the search of this instrument of evil the
automobile.
Letter from WHT to Horace D. Taft (Mar. 1, 1925), microformed on TAFT PAPERS, supra note
9, Reel 272; see Letter from WHT to Robert A. Taft (Mar. 8, 1925), microformed on TAFT
PAPERS, supra note 9, Reel 272 ("I am especially interested in the opinion with reference to
seizure of liquor in automobiles. I was once outvoted in the Conference, but by dint of
argument and opinion writing I got all votes but two.").
The date of McKenna's switch is of some importance, because his mental deterioration by
the 1924 Term was such that on November 9, 1924, eight Justices of the Court voted formally
not to "decide any case in which there were four on one side and four on the other, with Mr.
Justice McKenna's casting the deciding vote." Memorandum from WHT, Nov. 10, 1924,
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microformed on TAFr PAPERS, supra note 9, Reel 639, reprinted in WALTER MURPHY & C.
HERMAN PRITCHETT, COURTS, JUDGES, AND POLITICs: AN INTRODUCTION TO THE JUDICIAL
PROCESS 199-201 (3d ed. 1979). The published opinion of Carroll states, most unusually, "Mr.
Justice McKenna, before his retirement, concurred in this opinion." 267 U.S. at 163. Six weeks
after November 9, however, Taft was still apparently unsure of his majority. On December
22, 1924, Taft wrote his son Robert,
I have got a case in which the Court is not agreed, and I am very doubtful of my
majority after I get the opinion written. I am not at all sure that I can hold it,
a result that entitles one to no credit so far as the known work of the Court is
concerned.
Letter from WHT to Robert A. Taft (Dec. 22, 1924), microformed on TAFr PAPERS, supra note
9, Reel 270; see also Letter from WHT to Charles P. Taft, 2nd (Dec. 22, 1924), microformed on
TAFr PAPERS, supra note 9, Reel 270 ("[I am] preparing myself to write an opinion in a case
in which I may not succeed in winning the majority after I have got it written, although we
have a vote of that kind. It is a most important case, and I am greatly interested, but I don't
know that I shall succeed. It is a good deal easier to write an opinion when the Court is all
with you than where the distinctions are narrow, the record is badly made and some rather
new principle is tobe[sic] established against a vigorous opposition."). In December 1924 Taft
was corresponding with Van Devanter about Carroll. On December 22, 1924, Van Devanter
sent Taft a dictated memorandum on how the opinion could be drafted, together with "some
suggestions of things to avoid." Letter from WVD to WHT (Dec. 22, 1924), microformed on
TAFr PAPERS, supra note 9, Reel 270. Van Devanter wrote:
I ... am still of opinion that our vote was right.... I really think Beck's substituted
brief a good one.... That it has not had a better effect is to be regretted.... I am
at a loss to understand why its better parts have not carried conviction to others.
The more I think of the case the more I think the view we entertain is right and
that the other view would be productive of harmful results in many ways.
Id. Taft replied that he had already "blocked out an opinion" which "noted the very distinction,
which you emphasize, between the searching of houses and the searching of ships." Letter
from WHT to WVD (Dec. 23, 1924), microformed on TAFr PAPERS, supra note 9, Reel 270.
Apparently Taft learned from Van Devanter's memorandum, which does not now survive,
about the Acts of May 1822 and June 1834, dealing with searches and seizures of liquor in
Indian territory. See Carroll, 267 U.S. at 152-53. Van Devanter was an expert in Indian law.
Most importantly, Taft's letter to Van Devanter suggested something of Taft's strategy to
convince Butler to join the majority opinion: "I note what you say about brother Butler," Taft
wrote Van Devanter, "and I shall try to steer away from the suggestion that we are
introducing any new law and new principle of constitutional construction, but are only
adapting old principles and applying them to new conditions created by the change in the
National policy which the 18th Amendment represents." Letter from WHT to WVD, supra.
In a letter to his son Charles the day before, by contrast, Taft had himself referred to his
Carroll opinion as having to establish "some rather new principle." Letter from WHT to
Charles P. Taft, 2nd (Dec. 22, 1924), microformed on TAFT PAPERS, supra note 9, Reel 270; see
infra note 409.
It is possible that the wavering fifth vote in Carroll in December 1924 was not McKenna,
but Brandeis, for on December 26, 1924, Taft wrote to his brother Horace:
I have been working for nearly ten days on an opinion of much importance, upon
which the Court is divided, and with which I have had a good deal of trouble. I
sent the opinion to the printer to-day, and hope to get back the first copy this
evening. I would like to get a majority of the Court because of the importance of
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The case presented a new and exceedingly difficult problem
that was "most important," °7 because there was a pressing need
to control criminal deployment of that "instrument of evil the
automobile."40 8 In its supplemental brief the federal government
the principle, but I don't know that I shall. Brandeis was with me strongly
before the summer vacation, but he went up to Cambridge and must have
communed with Frankfurther [sic] and that crowd, and he came back with a
notice to me that he was going to change his vote. Brandeis tries as hard as he
can to be a good fellow, and in many respects he is, but when he gets into the
field of politics and political economics, his judgment is all awry and his methods
are not above criticism.
Letter from WHT to Horace D. Taft (Dec. 26, 1924), microformed on TAFr PAPERS, supra note
9, Reel 270. We do not know the grounds of Brandeis's dissatisfaction, but see Letter from
LDB to WHT (Jan. 15, 1925), microformed on TAFT PAPERS, supra note 9, Reel 270. It does
appear, however, that at least by December 28 Taft no longer regarded the vote in Carroll as
five-to-four. At that time he wrote his son Charles:
I have finished one opinion. It took me a full two weeks to prepare and write
it. It is on a very important phase of the National Prohibition Act. Our Court is
going to be divided, but I am quite hopeful that I may command six of the Court.
It is a case that came over from last year and has given me a great deal of
trouble, so that I feel somewhat relieved for getting as far as I have with it,
although I shall probably encounter considerable discussion tomorrow when we
hold our Conference. It would seem as if more feeling could be engendered over
the Prohibition Act than almost any other subject that we have in the Court,
unless it be the technical questions of jurisdiction, the excited feelings over
which among the members of the Court amaze me.
Letter from WHT to Charles P. Taft, 2nd (Dec. 28, 1924), microformed on TAFT PAPERS, supra
note 9, Reel 270.
407. Letter from WHT to Charles P. Taft, 2nd (Dec. 22, 1924), microformed on TAFT
PAPERS, supra note 9, Reel 270.
408. Letter from WHT to Horace D. Taft (Mar. 1, 1925), microformed on TAFT PAPERS,
supra note 9, Reel 272. As early as 1923 Taft was convinced that "the automobile is the
greatest instrument for promoting immunity of crimes of violence that I know of in the history
of civilization." Letter from WHT to Francis Peabody (July 12, 1923), microformed on TAFT
PAPERS, supra note 9, Reel 255. Four months later Taft repeated the observation:
The statistics of crime are I agree most disheartening, and yet a large
percentage of the increase, so far as crimes of larceny and robbery are concerned,
is due to the automobile. That is the greatest instrument to promote immunity
from punishment for crime that we have had introduced in many, many years,
and we haven't as yet neutralized its effect. Whether we can do so or not is a
question for men engaged in the detection of crime. When we see how much
crime there is, and with what immunity criminals commit murder in order to
further their crimes of robbery, it makes one gag with indignation to think of the
milk and water people who with their philanthropies are engaged in trying to
make our penitentiaries sweet homes for the luxurious betterment of murderers
and robbers.
Letter from WHT to Horace D. Taft (Nov. 16, 1923), microformed on TAFT PAPERS, supra note
9, Reel 258. In 1927 Taft gave an authorized interview in which he remarked that
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had argued that "the invention, the rapid development, and the
general use of automobiles" had so disturbed the "proper balance
between the necessities of public authority, on the one hand, and the
demands of personal liberty, on the other," that the Court had to act
in order to end "the unprecedented 'crime wave."""
The fundamental difficulty was that received constitutional
doctrine did not seem adequate to cope with the challenge of the
automobile. The transportation of stolen liquor in cars could not be
intercepted if searches required warrants, because cars would
disappear by the time any warrant could be obtained. It was
generally assumed that warrantless searches were constitutional
only if they were incident to a legitimate arrest.41 The legitimacy of
an arrest was determined by reference to common law, which was
understood to allow a police officer to arrest a suspect without
warrant only if there was probable cause that the suspect had
committed a felony, or if the suspect had, in the presence of the
officer, committed a misdemeanor amounting to a breach of the
peace.4 '
[t]here is the greatest incentive to crime in the automobile and the fine roads
that we build, because of the immunity from punishment achieved by the
quickness with which crime can be committed and escape be had, making
detection most difficult. This not only increases crime in the city, because
criminals may escape to the country, but it also gives opportunity to city
criminals to enlarge their sphere of action and much increases crime in the
country, which, in times past, was largely immune.
Newman, supra note 356, at 9.
409. Substituted Brief for the United States on Reargument, at 20-21, Carroll v. United
States, 267 U.S. 132 (1925). The brief was submitted by Solicitor General James M. Beck. The
government frankly conceded "the novelty of the question" presented by Carroll. Id. at 21. For
Beck's view on the crime wave, see supra note 350 and accompanying text.
410. CORNELIUS, supra note 394, § 35; JACOB W. LANDYNSKI, SEARCH AND SEIZURE AND THE
SUPREME COURT: A STUDY IN CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION 87 (1966); H.C. UNDERHILL,
A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CRIMINAL EVIDENCE § 746 (3d ed. 1923) ("The right to seize
intoxicating liquor without a warrant is coextensive with the right to arrest without a
warrant."); Hugh E. Willis, Unreasonable Searches and Seizures, 4 IND. L.J. 311, 313-15
(1929). For arguments challenging this assumption, see AKHIL REED AMAR, THE BILL OF
RIGHTS: CREATION AND RECONSTRUCTION 64-77 (1998); TELFORD TAYLOR, TWO STUDIES IN
CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION: SEARCH, SEIZURE AND SURVEILLANCE AND FAIR TRIAL AND
FREE PRESS (1969).
411. Carroll, 267 U.S. at 155-56; see Snyder v. United States, 285 F. 1 (4th Cir. 1922);
WILLIAM E. MIKELL, HANDBOOK OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 8 (2d ed. 1918); 1 FRANCIS
WHARTON, A TREATISE ON CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 69-77 (10th ed. 1918); 1 ELIJAH N. ZOLINE,
FEDERAL CRIMINAL LAW AND PROCEDURE §§ 19-24 (1921).
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The Volstead Act made transportation of illegal liquor a misde-
meanor, unless the accused had been guilty of two previous
violations of the Act, in which case he was guilty of a felony.412
Because the concealed transportation of liquor in a car was neither
a "breach of the peace" committed "in the presence" of an officer, nor
was it in most cases a felony, it did not seem possible to justify the
search of a car as incident to a lawful arrest, even if there was
probable cause to believe that the car contained unlawful liquor. Yet
"the impossibility of enforcing the Eighteenth Amendment"413 was
the obvious consequence of failing to find some constitutional way
to allow effective searches of automobiles.4"4 Lower courts splintered
badly on how to handle this problem.41
412. Carroll, 267 U.S. at 154. The Volstead Act provided that offenders were to be punished
by a fine of not more than $500 for the first offense, by a fine of not more than $1000 or by not
more than 90 days' imprisonment for the second offense, and "by a fine of $500 or more and
by not more than 2 years' imprisonment for the third offense." Id. Thus an offender "is to be
arrested for a misdemeanor for his first and second offenses and for a felony if he offends a
third time." Id. In 1929, in an effort to ratchet up prohibition enforcement, these penalties
were changed by the Jones Act, which provided that the penalty for a first violation of the
National Prohibition Act
shall be a fine not to exceed $10,000 or imprisonment not to exceed five years,
or both: Provided, That it is the intent of Congress that the court, in imposing
sentence hereunder, should discriminate between casual or slight violations and
habitual sales of intoxicating liquor, or attempts to commercialize violations of
the law.
Jones Act, ch. 473, § 1, 45 Stat. 1446 (1929).
413. United States v. Hilsinger, 284 F. 585, 588 (S.D. Ohio 1922).
414. "If the Eighteenth Amendment is to be enforced at all, the courts should be permitted
to consider the practical necessities of the particular situations." Note, Search and Seizure:
Constitutional Prohibition Applied to Transportation of Contraband Liquor in Automobile, 12
VA. L. REG. (N.S.) 236, 238-39 (1926).
415. BLAKEMORE, supra note 405, at 476; Note, Search of Automobile Without
Warrant-When Reasonable, 23 MICH. L. REV. 891, 894-97 (1925). Some courts held that old
understandings of the Fourth Amendment would have to bend because courts were "under the
duty of deciding what is an unreasonable search of motor cars, in the light of the mandate of
the Constitution that intoxicating liquors shall not be manufactured, sold, or transported for
beverage purposes." Milam v. United States, 296 F. 629,631 (4th Cir. 1924); see United States
v. Bateman, 278 F. 231 (S.D. Cal. 1922). Others held that it was "a breach of the peace to
transport intoxicating liquors." Hughes v. State, 238 S.W. 588, 596 (Tenn. 1922). Other courts
effaced the common law distinction between felonies and misdemeanors. See, e.g., United
States v. Vatune, 292 F. 497, 499 (N.D. Cal. 1923) ("In these days of widespread violation of
the law, due to large temptation, big profits, and unrestrained appetites, together with the
facile employment of the automobile in aid of successful consummation thereof, an officer
ought not to be censured nor society penalized by a meticulous refusal to support a
prosecution, if the officer, even in the absence of a warrant, and even with respect to a mere
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Taft constructed a solution that turned fundamentally on
recognizing the authority of positive statutory law to modify
traditional common law understandings. Taft began with the
premise that "the main purpose" of the Volstead Act was "to reach
and destroy the forbidden liquor in transportation";411 "provisions for
forfeiture of the vehicle and the arrest of the transporter were
incidental." '417 It did not matter whether the transporter was guilty
of a misdemeanor (for his first two offenses), or of a felony (for his
third offense), because the object of federal intervention was "to
forfeit and suppress the liquor, the arrest of the individual being
only incidental. 4  The validity of the seizure, therefore, depended
misdemeanor, acting upon the appearances, determines that the law may be maintained only
by the "immediate apprehension" of the offender, providing, always, of course, that the officer
acts in good faith and upon reasonable grounds of suspicion." (citation omitted)); see also
Lambert v. United States, 282 F. 413, 417 (9th Cir. 1922). Other courts expanded the concept
of "in the presence of," so that police officers could search automobiles if they had (in effect)
probable cause to believe that illegal liquor was being transported. See Park v. United States,
294 F. 776, 783 (lst Cir. 1924); Hilsinger, 284 F. at 588-89 ('The federal courts seem generally
to have recognized the right to apprehend, search, and seize an automobile truck in transit
with contraband liquor, when the officers have reasonable and probable cause...."). Still other
courts held that because liquor was contraband, which was forfeit and in which there was no
right of private property, a defendant had "no right to return of the property, nor to object to
its use in evidence." United States v. Fenton, 268 F. 221, 222 (D. Mont. 1920); see also Boyd
v. United States, 286 F. 930 (4th Cir. 1923). This last rationale provoked particular outrage,
for it seemed to imply that no remedy would lie whenever a search, however illegal, turned
up contraband:
[I]t is not and cannot be the law in criminal cases that an illegal arrest or search
could be legalized by the finding of evidence that a crime had been committed,
for a search or arrest illegal to begin with remains illegal, and no injury should
be allowed to flow to the defendant by reason of his submission to it.
United States v. Rembert, 284 F. 996, 1003-04 (S.D. Tex. 1922). The holding in Fenton was
described as a fine example
of precisely what the law is not .... Forfeiture proceedings are necessary to
determine the disposition of things seized as contraband. For a seizure for
forfeiture is not in itself a complete proceeding. It must be followed by judicial
proceedings, wherein the government must prove its title to forfeiture.
Moreover, the legality of the arrest of search must be determined by the facts
as they were known to the officer at the moment the arrest was made or the
search instituted, and can never be justified by what has been found. A search
that is unlawful when it begins is not made lawful when it ends by the discovery
and seizure of liquor.
WILLIAM J. MCFADDEN, THE LAW OF PROHIBITION 226-27 (1925).
416. Carroll, 267 U.S. 154-55.
417. Id. at 155.
418. Id. at 157.
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upon constitutional limits on congressional authorizations of
"seizure and forfeiture" of illegal liquor.419 Taft rejected the theory,
advanced by the defendants, that the "validity of the seizure"
depended "wholly on the validity of the arrest without a seizure,"42 °
holding instead that "[t]he right to search and the validity of the
seizure"42' depended upon "[tlhe rule for determining what may be
required before a seizure may be made by a competent seizing
official. 4 22
To determine the nature of that rule, Taft turned to a string of
federal statutes beginning in the first Congress in 1789 that
authorized searches of ships and other vehicles for contraband
goods.42 Taft argued that these statutes implied
that the guaranty of freedom from unreasonable searches and
seizures by the Fourth Amendment has been construed,
practically since the beginning of the Government, as recogniz-
ing a necessary difference between a search of a store, dwelling
house or other structure in respect of which a proper official
warrant readily may be obtained, and a search of a ship, motor
boat, wagon or automobile, for contraband goods, where it is not
practicable to secure a warrant because the vehicle can be
quickly moved out of the locality or jurisdiction in which the
warrant must be sought.4 4
Recognizing that it "would be intolerable and unreasonable if a
prohibition agent were authorized to stop every automobile on the
chance of finding liquor and thus subject all persons lawfully using
419. Id. at 158.
420. Id.
421. Id.
422. Id. at 155, That rule, said Taft, was "not to be determined by the character of the
penalty to which the transporter may be subjected," id., nor was it to be determined by the
common law "right to arrest." Id. at 158. "The character of the offense for which, after the
contraband liquor is found and seized, the driver can be prosecuted does not affect the validity
of the seizure." Id. at 159.
423. Taft's use of the earliest of these statutes has been criticized as seriously
misconstruing the history of the Fourth Amendment. See generally LANDYNSKI, supra note
410, at 90; Thomas Y. Davies, Recovering the Original Fourth Amendment, 98 MICH. L. REv.
547 (1999).
424. Carroll, 267 U.S. at 153.
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the highways to the inconvenience and indignity of such a search, 425
Taft read the Volstead Act to authorize only seizures in which "the
seizing officer shall have reasonable or probable cause for believing
that the automobile which he stops and seizes has contraband liquor
therein which is being illegally transported.426
Sliding easily from the statute to the Constitution, Taft moved to
the conclusion that under the Fourth Amendment
the true rule is that if the search and seizure without a warrant
are made upon probable cause, that is, upon a belief, reasonably
arising out of circumstances known to the seizing officer, that an
automobile or other vehicle contains that which by law is subject
to seizure and destruction, the search and seizure are valid.427
Taft self-consciously reached this interpretation of the Fourth
Amendment "in the light of what was deemed an unreasonable
search and seizure when it was adopted, and in a manner which will
conserve public interests as well as the interests and rights of
individual citizens."428 Taft's heroic effort to reinterpret Fourth
Amendment doctrine in light of the pragmatic needs of law enforce-
ment,429 balanced against the interests of citizens to be free from
425. Id. at 153-54. "Travelers may be so stopped in crossing an international boundary
because of national self protection reasonably requiring one entering the country to identify
himself as entitled to come in, and his belongings as effects which may be lawfully brought
in." Id. at 154.
426. Id. at 156. Taft reached this conclusion by noting that the Volstead Act referred to
Section 970 of the revised statutes, which immunized seizing officers from damage suits if
"there was reasonable cause of seizure." Id. at 155. Taft assimilated the statutory standard
of "reasonable cause" to the common law standard of "probable cause," which determined the
legality of "arrests without warrant for past felonies, and in malicious prosecution and false
imprisonment cases." Id. at 161.
427. Id. at 149. Taft's careful statement of the rule seemed to imply that the constitutional
legitimacy of warrantless searches and seizures required a "law" that made goods "subject to
seizure and destruction." Id.
428. Id. One commentator deemed the outcome "a very practical desirable result [that]
gives vitality to the eighteenth amendment and its enforcement while still staying within and
complying with the spirit and requirements of the fourth amendment." Note, supra note 415,
at 898. "The decision and reasoning in the Carroll case represent a sensible interpretation of
the Fourth Amendment, and should enable federal prohibition officers to do their duty
without undue risk and hindrance." James Parker Hall, Comment, Constitutional
Law--Search and Seizure---Contraband Liquor in Automobile, 20 ILL. L. REV. 162, 165 (1925).
429. Carroll has been termed "the leading Lochner era example" of"pragmatist reasoning."
Cloud, supra note 395, at 602.
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arbitrary interference, essentially set the framework for modern
search and seizure jurisprudence.430
In order to sustain his resolution of the case, Taft was forced to
offer a very strained reading of the Volstead Act. Unlike the
historical statutes upon which Taft based his discussion, which
explicitly authorized officials to search for contraband if they had
reasonable cause,43' the Volstead Act provided merely that
[w]hen the commissioner, his assistants, inspectors, or any
officer of the law shall discover any person in the act of trans-
porting in violation of the law, intoxicating liquors in any wagon,
buggy, automobile, water or air craft, or other vehicle, it shall be
his duty to seize any and all intoxicating liquors found therein
being transported contrary to law.4 2
Taft was thus put in the awkward position of reading the term
"shall discover" to mean "shall have probable cause to believe."433
This was precisely the point at which McReynolds, joined by
Sutherland, aimed his forceful dissent.4 4 Objecting strenuously that
"[c]riminal statutes must be strictly construed and applied, in
harmony with rules of the common law,"4 5 McReynolds argued that
Certain it is that the Carroll Case presented the court with a balance of
interests of unusual importance. On the one hand, to hold that the Fourth
Amendment inhibited the search of an automobile without a search warrant,
unless circumstances warranting a common-law arrest existed, would have
seriously crippled the enforcement of the Eighteenth Amendment; while on the
other hand, the old conservative opinions of the court had to be gotten rid of, and
a burden of unknown weight be put upon the individual for the benefit of a
newly appended amendment.
Bullington, supra note 396, at 469.
430. Davies, supra note 423, at 733-34.
431. Carroll, 267 U.S. at 150-53.
432, Id. at 144.
433. See, e.g., id. at 158.
434. At the announcement of the case,
McReynolds delivered himself without reference to his written opinion in such
a way that Holmes remarked (as Holmes told me) to our new member Stone that
there were some people who could be most unmannerly in their dissenting
opinions, but as I had seven-two, I was not particularly affected by McReynolds'
appeal to the galleries.
Letter from WHT to Robert A. Taft (Mar. 8, 1925), microformed on TAF PAPERS, supra note
9, Reel 272.
435. Carroll, 267 U.S. at 164 (McReynolds, J., dissenting).
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"[t]he Volstead Act contains no provision which annuls the accepted
common law rule or discloses definite intent to authorize arrests
without warrant for misdemeanors not committed in the officer's
presence.'43 "Certainly, in a criminal statute, always to be strictly
construed, the words 'shall discover ... in the act of transporting
in violation of the law,"' McReynolds contended, "cannot mean, shall
have reasonable cause to suspect or believe that such transporta-
tion is being carried on. To discover and to suspect are wholly
different things. 4 7 The Court ought to be extraordinarily cautious,
McReynolds urged, before inferring that "Congress intended to
remove ancient restrictions" that circumscribed the discretion of
police to arrest for misdemeanors.438
In the absence of congressional authorization, the defendants'
arrest was undoubtedly illegal under common law principles, and
because "the seizure followed an unlawful arrest, and therefore
became itself unlawful,' McReynolds concluded that the evidence
436. Id. at 165-66.
437. Id. at 166.
Since the beginning apt words have been used when Congress intended that
arrests for misdemeanors or seizures might be made upon suspicion. It has
studiously refrained from making a felony of the offense here charged; and it did
not undertake by any apt words to enlarge the power to arrest. It was not
ignorant of the established rule on the subject, and well understood how this
could be abrogated ....
Id.
438. Id. at 168.
439. Id. This point also struck at a vulnerability in Taft's opinion. Taft argued that the
Volstead Act itself contemplated that "It]he seizure ... comes before the arrest." Id. at 159
(majority opinion). But this was an obvious non-sequitur. It did not follow that because
Congress authorized a seizure without warrant that it either could or did also authorize an
arrest without warrant. Taft's argument, if accepted, established only that the Volstead Act
rendered constitutional seizures justified by probable cause in the absence of a warrant. This
conclusion would certainly justify seizure of liquor without warrant in circumstances where
there was no need to arrest, as for example, from an unoccupied car. In Carroll, by contrast,
prohibition agents could not search the defendants' vehicle until they had first stopped a
moving car and placed the drivers "into custody under and by virtue of the authority of the
law," JOHN G. HAWLEY, THE LAW OF ARREST ON CRIMINAL CHARGES 13 (3d ed. 1919), which
is to say that they could not seize until they had, in the understanding of the time, first
arrested a vehicle's driver. See Henry v. United States, 361 U.S. 98, 103 (1959) (stopping of
car deemed an "arrest"); Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160 (1949) (stopping of car
deemed an "arrest"); Forrest R. Black, A Critique of the Carroll Case, 29 COLUM. L. REV. 1068,
1077-87 (1929); Note, Constitutional Law-Search and Seizure-Search of Automobile for
Intoxicating Liquor, 4 NEB. L. BuLL. 171, 172-73 (1925); Note, Scope of the Government's
Privilege of Search and Seizure Without a Warrant, 27 COLUM. L. REV. 300, 306 n.38 (1927);
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ought to be suppressed. "If an officer, upon mere suspicion of a
misdemeanor, may stop one on the public highway, take articles
away from him and thereafter use them as evidence to convict him
of crime," McReynolds asked, "what becomes of the Fourth and Fifth
Amendments?"'4 4
cf. Robert Meisenholder, Note, Arrest-Stopping and Questioning as an Arrest-Reasonable
Suspicion from Facts Disclosed by Questioning as Justification, 37 MICH. L. REV. 311, 311-13
(1938). That is why McReynolds forcefully argued that the defendants "were first brought
within the officers' power, and, while therein, the seizure took place." Carroll, 276 U.S. at 169
(McReynolds, J., dissenting). In the face of McReynold's challenge, Taft's bland assertion that
the arrest came "after" the seizure simply assumes what needed to be demonstrated.
Taft might have argued that the search and seizure were valid, because legislatively
authorized, even if the arrest of the defendants' was illegal. An "illegal arrest" was not
thought to have any "effect on the evidence or upon the jurisdiction of the court in a criminal
case." Thomas E. Atkinson, What Is an Unreasonable Search?, 24 MICH. L. REV. 277, 280
(1926). In such circumstances, however, the defendants "would have at least a technical right
to recover damages for the illegal arrest, even though the subsequent search be held valid."
Id. at 279. Atkinson was the attorney of record for the defendants in the Carroll case. Carroll,
267 U.S. at 136.
Taft might alternatively have argued that stopping a moving vehicle was not equivalent to
arresting its occupants. But he did not make this argument, and I can find no contemporary
author who adopted that view. See, e.g., Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 16 (1968) ("It must be
recognized that whenever a police officer accosts an individual and restrains his freedom to
walk away, he has 'seized' that person."). Taft might also have argued that a statutory
authorization to seize without warrant was also a statutory authorization to arrest without
warrant. Brandeis came close to advancing this logic in United States v. Lee, 274 U.S. 559
(1927), which involved the authority of the Coast Guard to seize and search vessels suspected
of violating revenue laws. Brandeis argued that
[o]fficers of the Coast Guard are authorized, by virtue of Revised Statutes,
§ 3072, to seize on the high seas ... an American vessel subject to forfeiture for
violation of any law respecting revenue. From that power it is fairly to be
inferred that they are likewise authorized to board and search such vessels
when there is probable cause to believe them subject to seizure for violation of
revenue laws, and to arrest persons thereon engaged in such violation.
Id. at 562 (citation omitted). If the Coast Guard had probable cause to suspect illegal liquor,
Brandeis wrote, "search and seizure of the vessel, and arrest of the persons thereon ... is
lawful, as like search and seizure of an automobile, and arrest of the persons therein, by
prohibition officers on land is lawful. Compare Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 149."
Id. at 563. Brandeis does not quite claim that arrest of persons before the discovery of the
contraband is lawful, but he comes very close, and his argument appears to contemplate what
would be warrantless arrests on the basis of probable cause. There is a memorandum to
Brandeis from his clerk stating that the opinion in Lee could be written to argue that "without
a search, there was plainly enough to excite suspicion. The cases show that is sufficient to
justify an arrest, and a search following an arrest, of a boat within the U.S., or of an auto."
Memorandum from R.G.P. to LDB (Apr. 3, 1927), microformed on BRANDEIS PAPERS, supra
note 119, Reel 35. In Carroll, however, Taft made no such argument. He simply blurred the
relationship between the search and the arrest.
440. Carroll, 267 U.S. at 169 (McReynolds, J., dissenting). Note that in this rhetorical
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The disagreement between Taft and the dissent turned most
fundamentally on the generosity with which the Court was willing
to interpret legislative revisions of the common law, 441 which
McReynolds associated with "ancient" customs believed to mark
significant constitutional values. Using an early version of an
explicit statement rule, McReynolds plainly understood that his
judicial obligation was to conserve these values to the extent
possible from the predations of merely positive legislation.442 Taft,
question McReynolds slides from the proposition that Congress has not in fact authorized
seizures on probable cause, to the intimation that .Congress cannot, consistent with the
Fourth and Fifth Amendments, do so.
441. Taft's opinion was constructed on the premise that the Volstead Act authorized
searches and seizures made with probable cause although without warrant, and that this
statutory authorization did not contravene the Fourth Amendment. See supra note 427 and
accompanying text. He did not reach or address the question of whether warrantless searches
and seizures with probable cause would also be constitutional in the absence of statutory
authorization. See Brinegar, 338 U.S. at 183 (1949) (Jackson, J., dissenting); United States
v. Di Re, 332 U.S. 581, 584-87 (1948);.Eldon D. Wedlock, Jr., Car 54-How Dare You!: Toward
a Unified Theory of Warrantless Automobile Searches, 75 MARQ. L. REV. 79, 86 (1991) ("[I]n
Brinegar v. United States, the statutory limits of the Carroll rule were surpassed for the first
time."). Two years after Carroll, in Maul v. United States, 274 U.S. 501 (1927), the Court
explicitly refused to accept a proposed opinion circulated by Brandeis concluding that the
Coast Guard could constitutionally conduct searches and seizures on the high seas without
warrants and without statutory authorization. The Court instead chose to affirm an
alternative opinion drafted by Van Devanter holding that warrantless searches and seizures
by the Coast Guard on the high seas were authorized by statute. See infra note 451.
442. Butler was apparently induced to join the majority opinion on the ground that the
opinion was faithful to original common law principles. See supra note 406. It is noteworthy
that seven months after Carroll, Butler authored the Court's unanimous opinion in Agnello
v. United States, 269 U.S. 20 (1925), which reversed a lower court judgment admitting
evidence seized in a defendant's house. It is also noteworthy that Butler's docket book shows
that at conference Holmes and Taft had voted to affirm. Agnello, which concerned cocaine
rather than liquor, squarely held for the first time that "It]he search of a private dwelling
without a warrant is in itself unreasonable and abhorrent to our laws." Id. at 32. Butler
wrote:
Save in certain cases as incident to arrest, there is no sanction in the decisions
of the courts, federal or state, for the search of a private dwelling house without
a warrant.... Belief, however well founded, that an article sought is concealed in
a dwelling house furnishes no justification for a search of that place without a
warrant. And such searches are held unlawful notwithstanding facts
unquestionably showing probable cause.
Id. at 33. Butler also held in Agnello that a search of a defendant's dwelling that was "several
blocks distant" from the site of an arrest, and which was searched when "the conspiracy was
ended and the defendants were under arrest and in custody elsewhere," could not "be
sustained as an incident of the arrests." Id. at 31. Agnello was read as showing "clearly that
the Supreme Court considers the problem of the search of vehicles to be an exceptional one,
and that it intends no relaxation of the strict protection, under the Fourth Amendment, of
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by contrast, was willing to give prohibition the benefit of every
doubt, so as to uphold the forces of law enforcement that were, in his
eyes, struggling so valiantly to maintain the legitimacy of the legal
order.
To sustain the convictions in Carroll, Taft was required to find
that the arresting prohibition officers had had probable cause to
stop defendants' automobile. Essentially the only evidence of
probable cause was that the defendants had offered to sell illegal
liquor to the officers, and that three months later these same
officers saw the defendants, driving in the same car in which they
had offered to sell liquor, traveling from Detroit to Grand Rapids.
The officers knew that Detroit was "one of the most active centers
for introducing illegally into this country spirituous liquors for
distribution into the interior." '443 From this, Taft concluded: 'That
the officers when they saw the defendants believed that they were
carrying liquor we can have no doubt, and we think it is equally
clear that they had reasonable cause for thinking so."444
This was, to say the least, a "very loose definition of 'probable
cause."'445 In dissent McReynolds could only sputter: "Has it come
about that merely because a man once agreed to deliver whisky, but
did not, he may be arrested whenever thereafter he ventures to
drive an automobile on the road to Detroit!"446 To which the answer,
according to the political scientist Robert Cushman, was "that it
certainly has, and ... most of us are not sensitive enough to feel that
such a result violates the requirements either of justice or of
common sense."
447
Carroll seemed to imply "that a common reputation in the
community of being a 'bootlegger' would justify prohibition agents
dwellings and buildings from unreasonable searches." Sterling C. Holloway, Note, Search and
Seizure-The Carroll Case Viewed in the Light of Later Decisions, 4 TEX. L. REV. 241, 241
(1926); see Note, The Exclusion of Evidence Illegally Obtained, 2 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 196, 201
(1928) ("[Carroll], it is believed, represents the widest departure from the Weeks case thus far
attempted. Whatever doubts may have been raised by the Carroll case were shortly dispelled
by Agnello v. United States.").
443. Carroll, 267 U.S. at 160.
444. Id.
445. Regnier, supra note 396, at 645; see Lerner, supra note 396, at 987.
446. Carroll, 267 U.S. at 174 (McReynolds, J., dissenting).
447. Robert E. Cushman, Constitutional Law in 1924-1925, 20 AM. POL. Sci. REV. 80, 89
(1926) ("lIt is submitted that the court's decision is a sensible one if the prohibition law is to
be enforced, and does not involve any essential injustice.").
20061
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in stopping and searching automobiles driven by persons thus
suspected by their neighbors.""44 It appeared to award "discretionary
carte blanche" to prohibition officers to stop and search
automobiles,449 and it was therefore attacked in the press as placing
the highways
in the power of reckless prohibition agents.
A moral bad effect will be to encourage the attitude of mental
lawlessness already spreading through the country like a
plague.
The further we go with the eighteenth amendment and the
Volstead act, the deeper we get into the jungle of danger and
lawlessness."
It is difficult to say, because the historical record is sparse, why
liberal justices like Holmes and Brandeis joined Taft's opinion, but
the most plausible account is that offered by Zechariah Chafee.
Chafee believed that Holmes and Brandeis "probably thought that
the wise course for the Court was not to hamper prohibition but to
give it almost every chance for effective operation which the
government officials wished. Then if the Eighteenth Amendment
failed, it would fail because of its inherent defects and not because
448. Hall, supra note 428, at 165.
Does not the Court fail to distinguish between believing upon a basis of
specific facts and merely suspecting upon a basis of general facts? The Volstead
Act as differentiated from the ordinary revenue act does not permit seizure or
arrest on suspicion. The officers knew not a single specific fact upon which they
could base actual belief. It was mere suspicion.... Does [Carroll] mean that the
officers had a general license to stop the defendants every time they 'vere on the
road? Such a general license would be more atrocious than the use of the general
or blanket warrant against which James Otis made his impassioned protest.
Black, supra note 439, at 1088.
449. Comment, Search and Seizure: Constitutional Prohibition Applied to Transportation
of Contraband Liquor in Automobiles, 13 CAL. L. REV. 351, 352 (1925).
As a practical matter, it is very probable that the power given by this rule to the
police may be abused and every automobile stopped, under the theory that the
end justifies the means employed. It is obvious that one law should not be
broken in order to help enforce another. The probable cause may be "meagre."
Note, Search and Seizure Without a Warrant, 73 U. PA. L. REV. 413, 418 (1925) (footnotes
omitted).
450. Press Comment: The More Volstead, the Less Law, WASH. POST, Mar. 9, 1925, at 6
(quoting from the Baltimore Sun).
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of judicial hamstringing."45' Chafee's speculation is consistent with
the commitment of pre-New Deal liberalism to accord enlarged
scope to legislative innovation and experimentation.
VII
The great exception to Chafee's hypothesis is Olmstead v. United
States,452 "[t]he last major Supreme Court decision concerning
451. Chafee, supra note 294, at 949. The breathtaking intensity of Brandeis's commitment
to upholding prohibition and federal enforcement authority can perhaps best be seen in
United States v. Katz, 271 U.S. 354 (1926), in which the Court was called upon to decide
whether section 10 of the Volstead Act, which required persons who manufactured and sold
liquor to keep detailed and readily available records, applied only to those authorized by the
Volstead Act legally to manufacture and sell liquor (for religious and other purposes); or
whether it applied instead to all persons, so that bootleggers who failed to document their
sales committed the independent crime of violating section 10 by failing to keep records of
their illegal transactions. The latter interpretation would be most far-reaching and unusual.
At the oral argument of the case,
Justice Holmes observed that it seemed the prohibition act was designed to
permit the use of every weapon by the prosecution, even to the extent of poison
and entrapment, in enforcing the law, and also remarked that defense counsel
was attributing to the law a sportsman-like character which it did not possess.
Plea To Punish Liquor Buyers Heard by Court, WASH. POST, Mar. 12, 1926, at 4. In the end,
in an opinion authored by Stone, the Court interpreted section 10 to apply only to those
authorized by the Volstead Act to manufacture and sell liquor:
General terms descriptive of a class of persons made subject to a criminal
statute may and should be limited where the literal application of the statute
would lead to extreme or absurd results, and where the legislative purpose
gathered from the whole Act would be satisfied by a more limited interpretation.
Katz, 271 U.S. at 362. Brandeis alone dissented from this ruling. Id. at 364.
Brandeis would later rely on Carroll for the (very) broad proposition that
It]here is no limitation upon the right of the sovereign to seize without a
warrant vessels registered under its laws, similar to that imposed by the
common law and the Constitution upon the arrest of persons and upon the
seizure of "papers and effects." See Carroll v. United States, 267 U. S. 132, 151-
53.
Maul v. United States, 274 U.S. 501, 524-25 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring). Brandeis had
originally been assigned the opinion in Maul, but the Court rejected his far-reaching
justification for upholding the Coast Guard's seizure of a liquor-laden vessel on the high seas.
The Court preferred to accept Van Devanter's rationale that the seizure had been authorized
by statute. See Letter from HFS to WVD (May 13, 1927) (Van Devanter Papers); Letter from
WHT to LDB (Apr. 5, 1927), microformed on TAFT PAPERS, supra note 9, Reel 290; Letter from
WHT to the Justices of the Court (Apr. 22, 1927), microformed on TAFr PAPERS, supra note
9, Reel 291; Letter from WVD to WHT (May-June 1927), microformed on TAFT PAPERS, supra
note 9, Reel 292; Letter from WHT to WVD (May 3, 1927), microformed on TAFT PAPERS,
supra note 9, Reel 291. The original draft of Brandeis's opinion may be found in his papers.
452. 277 U.S. 438 (1928).
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prohibition enforcement" and "in many ways' the most controversial
and significant."45 Olmstead held in 1928 that wiretapping did not
constitute a search or seizure under the Fourth Amendment, and
that the exclusionary rule would not apply to evidence illegally
obtained, as distinct from unconstitutionally obtained. 41 "Led by
Chief Justice Taft ... whose crusade for stricter enforcement of
prohibition reached its zenith in this case,"45 the Court in Olmstead
split violently five-to-four, with Taft writing a majority opinion
joined by Van Devanter, McReynolds, Sutherland, and Sanford.4
Holmes, Brandeis, Butler, and Stone each dissented separately.45 v
Why would McReynolds and Sutherland, who detested prohibi-
tion, join Taft in this controversial decision, and why would Holmes
and Brandeis, who had all along supported vigorous prohibition
enforcement, dissent? The puzzle deepens because both Holmes and
Brandeis had, earlier in the decade, authored opinions that would
seem to sustain Taft's position. In Hester v. United States,458 Holmes
had held for a unanimous court that the seizure of liquor in plain
view in a defendant's open fields after police had trespassed onto a
defendant's land did not constitute a search or seizure for purposes
of the Fourth Amendment. And in United States v. Lee459 Brandeis
had drawn on Hester to hold that the use by the Coast Guard of a
searchlight to examine the decks of a ship seized on the high seas
did not constitute a search.4"
453. KYVIG, supra note 130, at 34.
454. Olmstead, 277 U.S. at 464-69.
455. KYVIG, supra note 130, at 34.
456. Olmstead, 277 U.S. at 455.
457. Id. at 469, 471, 485, 488.
458. 265 U.S. 57 (1924).
459. 274 U.S. 559 (1927).
460. "Such use of a searchlight is comparable to the use of a marine glass or a field glass.
It is not prohibited by the Constitution. Compare Hester v. United States." Id. at 563.
Ironically, the original draft of Brandeis's opinion in Lee had excited some concern over its
broad claims about the searchlight. In its original form, Brandeis's opinion had read:
The testimony of the boatswain shows that he examined the motor-boat by
means of a searchlight. It does not appear that there was any exploration below
decks or under hatches.... To pry into the secrets of a motor-boat by means of a
searchlight is not prohibited by the Constitution. Compare Hester v. United
States ....
BRANDEIS PAPERS, supra note 119, Reel 32. To this language Van Devanter had explicitly
objected: "Please note me as concurring in the result. I am not prepared to accept the full
statement as to what may be done with searchlight [sic], nor do I feel sure that it is not
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Everything about Olmstead was dramatic and riveting.46' The
defendant in the case, Roy Olmstead, was in 1920 the youngest and
most charismatic lieutenant in the Seattle police department, who
quit his day job to develop a huge and sophisticated smuggling
operation that imported Canadian liquor into Washington.4"2 Known
as the "king of the rumrunners,"' he was a popular hero in Seattle
because
necessary in this case." Return from WVD to LDB, microformed on BRANDEIS PAPERS, supra
note 119, Reel 33. Brandeis's clerk commented on Van Devanter's objection:
I see no possibility of omitting a statement as to what can be done with the
searchlight.... If the evidence is admissible though obtained by a trespass as in
the Hester case, it certainly ought to be admissible though obtained by turning
a searchlight upon a boat, which is very doubtful legal wrong if any [sic]; I
should hate to attempt to persuade your court that damages could be recoverable
for it.
... The Carroll case is conclusive against the contention that there is any
constitutional limitation upon the right to look, for there was certainly probable
cause for suspicion.
Memorandum to LDB (Apr. 14, 1927), microformed on BRANDEIS PAPERS, supra note 119, Reel
32. Justice Stone's docket book shows that at conference Butler had voted in Lee to affirm the
judgment below that the evidence seized should be suppressed. Taft wrote Brandeis, "I am
going to acquiesce although I have qualms." Return from WHT to LDB, microformed on
BRANDEIS PAPERS, supra note 119, Reel 33. Taft's opinion in Olmstead cites and relies on both
Hester and Lee. Olmstead, 277 U.S. at 465. David Currie describes Taft's use of these opinions
by Holmes and Brandeis as the chickens coming "home to roost." Currie, supra note 234, at
105.
461. The decision has received excellent book-length treatment. See MURPHY, supra note
89.
462. Olmstead's story is well told in NORMAN H. CLARK, THE DRY YEARS: PROHIBITION AND
SOCIAL CHANGE IN WASHINGTON 161-78, 218-19 (1965). Clark reports that during his time in
prison Olmstead became converted to Christian Science and "to the proposition that liquor
is bad for man and society." Id. at 218.
463. Id. at 161. He was also called in the newspapers "the booze baron,' or 'the good
bootlegger' who 'had served a social purpose.'" Id. Olmstead's
organization had some fifty employees-salesmen, telephone operators,
watchmen, warehousemen, deliverymen, truck drivers, bookkeepers, a lawyer,
and even an official fixer, though Olmstead himself remained on intimate terms
with some of his old police colleagues. The liquor was brought from England to
Vancouver in three small ocean-going freighters which Olmstead chartered.
These ships would stay well outside of American territorial waters and would
be met by one or more of Olmstead's three fast motorboats.... The list of
customers was long and impressive.... The organization might move as many as
200 cases a day, and gross receipts usually ran between $150,000 and $200,000
a month, with a net profit of about $4,000. With his share of the proceeds
Olmstead lived in a huge house which reporters were later to describe as
"palatial."
MURPHY, supra note 89, at 16-17.
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[h]e never corrupted his merchandise. People could trust it. He
never allowed his employees to arm themselves, lecturing to
them sternly that no amount of money was worth a human life.
His business arrangements were conducted with a firm integ-
rity, for he was, in his own way, a moralist. Because Olmstead
was so attractive personally and because he scrupulously
avoided the sordid behavior of others in the same business-no
murder, no narcotics, no rings of prostitution or gambling-
many people could not regard him as an authentic criminal.4
Olmstead had been convicted in federal court in 1925 largely on
the basis of evidence gathered by wiretaps. 46 5 At the time wire-
tapping was a misdemeanor under the laws of the State of
Washington.46 In 1924 Attorney General Harlan Stone was said to
have sent "a directive to the newly formed Federal Bureau of
Investigation" which announced, "under the heading 'Unethical
Tactics,' that 'Wiretapping ... will not be tolerated."' 4 " But this
464. CLARK, supra note 462, at 166.
465. Olmstead, 277 U.S. at 456-57.
466. "Every person ... who shall intercept, read or in any manner interrupt or delay the
sending of a message over any telegraph or telephone line ... shall be guilty of a
misdemeanor." Id. at 468 (quoting REMINGTON COMPILED STAT. § 2656-18 (1922)). At least
twenty-five other states had similar statutes. See id. at 479 n.13 (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
Apparently Olmstead knew that he was being wiretapped by federal agents; "a free-lance wire
tapper" hired by the prohibition bureau had offered to sell him the transcript of his
conversations. CLARK, supra note 462, at 168. But Olmstead "replied that he knew something
about the rules of evidence, that such a transcript could never be used in court against him,
that wire tapping was against state law, and that [the wire tapper] could go to hell." Id.
Brashly, Olmstead took only minimal precautions. Id.
467. William S. Fairfield & Charles Clift, The Wiretappers, REPORTER, Vol.7 (Dec. 23,
1952), 8-22, at 10. "For 'many years' prior to 1929" the "FBI's Manual of Rules and
Regulations, under the heading 'unethical tactics,' banned wire-tapping and provided for the
dismissal of anybody who engaged in it." ALEXANDER CHARNS, CLOAK AND GAVEL: FBI
WIRETAPS, BUGS, INFORMERS, AND THE SUPREME COURT 20 (1992). I have been unable to locate
an original copy of this directive or manual in Justice Department files, but it is clear that
wiretapping was forbidden within the Stone Justice Department. See MURPHY, supra note
89, at 13; WILLIAM ALLEN WHITE, A PURITAN IN BABYLON, THE STORY OF CALVIN COOLIDGE 274
(1938); Richard C. Donnelly, Comments and Caveats on the Wire Tapping Controversy, 63
YALE L.J. 799,799-800 (1954); Justice Department Bans Wire Tapping; Jackson Acts on Hoover
Recommendation, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 18, 1940, at 1; 86 CONG. REC. app. 1471-72 (1940).
On August 7, 1924, Roger Baldwin recorded a memorandum describing his interview with
Attorney General Stone and J. Edgar Hoover three days before. Memorandum of an Interview
between Roger Baldwin and Harlan Fiske Stone and J. Edgar Hoover, Aug. 7, 1924,
microformed on ACLU ARCHIVES: THE ROGER BALDWIN YEARS: 1917-1950, Vol. 272. Baldwin
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directive would have had no effect on the Treasury Department,
where prohibition enforcement was located, so that wire tapping
was "the principal method used ... to catch [prohibition]
offenders."4 The upshot was that although wiretapping raised
issues of law enforcement that were of general applicability, at the
wrote:
Both the Attorney General and Mr. Hoover say that any illegal methods of
getting evidence would result in disciplinary measures against agents using
them, Mr. Hoover going so far as saying that they could be fired without a
hearing, upon proof that such methods have been used. He referred specifically
to tapping telephones, placing dictagraphs in offices and homes, opening mail
without warrants, engaging in provocative work and employing third-degree
methods.... He furthermore said that the control of expenditures of local offices
were so close and in his hands personally, that it would be impossible to put in
telephone-tapping devices without his knowing it. He says the Department
welcomes any information tending to show that any agent has violated these
instructions and that such agents will be dismissed at once. The Attorney
General says the same thing, asking us for specific evidence on which to base
any further instructions to the men.
Id.
In 1928 Stone's 1924 policy was apparently reaffirmed under Attorney General Sargent.
See Wire Tapping in Law Enforcement: Hearings Before the H. Comm. on Expenditures in the
Exec. Departments, 71st Cong. 2 (1931) (Statement of William D. Mitchell, Att'y Gen. of the
United States); David M. Helfeld, A Study of Justice Department Policies on Wire Tapping,
9 LAW. GUILD REV. 57, 59 (1949). On December 2, 1929, J. Edgar Hoover testified before a
Subcommittee of the House Appropriations Committee that "[w]e have a very definite rule
in the bureau that any employee engaging in wire tapping will be dismissed from the service
of the bureau." Department of Justice Appropriation Bill for 1931: Hearing Before the H.
Subcomm. of the H. Comm. on Appropriations, 71st Cong. 63 (1929) (statement of J. Edgar
Hoover). Hoover contended that "government agents had 'no ethical right' to tap, even though
the Olmstead ruling had given them that right." CHARNS, supra, at 20.
468. LANDYNSIU, supra note 410, at 200 (internal quotation marks omitted). The tension
between prohibition enforcement and other forms of law enforcement continued even after the
Bureau of Prohibition was transferred to the Justice Department in 1930. On January 19,
1931, Attorney General Mitchell entered a new directive, because "(t]he present condition in
the department can not continue. We can not have one bureau in which wire-tapping is
allowed and another in which it is prohibited. The same regulations must apply to all." Wire
Tapping in Law Enforcement: Hearings Before the H. Comm. on Expenditures in the Exec.
Departments, 71st Cong. 2 (1931) (statement of William D. Mitchell, Att'y Gen. of the United
States). Essentially Mitchell's new regulations allowed wiretapping if approved by a chief of
a bureau in consultation with an assistant attorney general. Id. In 1933, for a single year,
Congress added a proviso to an appropriations bill for the Department of Justice to the effect
that "no part of this appropriation shall be used for or in connection with 'wire tapping' to
produce evidence of violations of the National Prohibition Act, as amended and
supplemented." Act of March 1, 1933, ch. 144, 47 Stat. 1381; see Louis Fisher, Congress and
the Fourth Amendment, 21 GA. L. REV. 107, 128-29 (1986).
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federal level the use of wiretapping was associated almost exclu-
sively with the enforcement of prohibition.4" 9
Olmstead challenged the admissibility of the wiretapping
evidence. At first the Taft Court refused to grant a writ of certiorari
to review his conviction,47 ° but it later reversed itself and granted
certiorari in a manner that limited "consideration ... to the question
whether the use of evidence of private telephone conversations,
between the defendants and others, intercepted by means of wire
tapping, is a violation of the Fourth and Fifth Amendments and,
therefore, not permissible in the federal courts."471 After the grant
of certiorari Assistant Attorney General Mabel Walker Willebrandt,
who was in charge of prohibition enforcement at the Justice
Department, withdrew from the case in protest at what she
regarded as the unethical use of wiretapping.
472
During the two weeks before the case was argued on February 20,
1928, Brandeis, who was vehement on the question of preserving
the integrity of law enforcement practices and who had been the
only Justice to vote for certiorari in Olmstead's original petition,473
prepared a memorandum that would eventually become his
469. And of course at the state level wiretapping was prohibited to all law enforcement in
about half the states. See supra note 466.
470. Olmstead v. United States, 19 F.2d 842, (9th Cir. 1927), cert. denied, 275 U.S. 557
(1927). According to Stone's docket book, the only Justice who voted for certiorari at that time
was Brandeis. Stone Docket Book 343, 84-85.
471. Olmstead, 19 F.2d 842, cert. granted, 276 U.S. 609, 609-10 (1928). Although it is a
little uncertain, it seems from Stone's docket book that Van Devanter, Brandeis, Butler, and
Stone voted to grant certiorari. Stone Docket Book 343, 84-85. Van Devanter's vote in this
regard is puzzling. He might have been considering the national importance of the question,
or he might have had the same concerns as those he expressed to Brandeis in United States
v. Lee. See supra note 460. Given that Holmes would eventually refuse to reach the Fourth
Amendment question, expressing some sympathy for Taft's resolution of the constitutional
issue, Holmes's failure to vote for certiorari is not surprising.
472. Mabel Walker Willebrandt, The Inside of Prohibition: Chapter 15-An Unusual
Prohibition Victory, N.Y. TIMEs, Aug. 19, 1929, at 21 ("I certainly approved of apprehending
Olmstead ... but didn't approve the way the prohibition agents obtained their evidence.
Practically all their testimony consisted of things they overheard on tapped telephone wires.
Now, I thoroughly disapprove of the practice of tapping telephone wires. Irrespective of its
legality, I believe it a dangerous and unwarrantable policy to follow in enforcing law. Many
of the States of the Union have State laws against it.... I indicated to the Solicitor General
my unwillingness to argue the case and try to justify the prohibition agents' wire-tapping
tactics when I so thoroughly disapproved of them. Consequently, Mr. Mitchell employed
distinguished counsel, a man formerly associated with his firm in Minnesota."); see
WILLEBRANDT, supra note 89, at 231-37.
473. See supra note 470; infra note 531.
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dissent.474 In' its earliest versions, the memorandum began with the
argument that courts ought not to admit evidence illegally procured,
because courts ought not to grant redress to one who has "unclean
hands."'475 This argument, as Brandeis explicitly recognized, was
distinct from the constitutional question of whether wiretapping
was a search or seizure for purposes of the Fourth and Fifth
Amendments.476 The Court met in conference on February 25, and
voted along the lines of its eventual opinion. Taft assigned the
opinion to himself.477
474. LEWIS J. PAPER, BRANDEIS 307-14 (1983).
475. BRANDEIS PAPERS, supra note 119, Reel 36; see Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S.
438, 483 (1927) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
476. Brandeis's memorandum began to assume a form roughly similar to that of the
published dissent by February 17. On February 23, three days after oral argument, Brandeis
circulated the memorandum to Holmes for comment. At that time the memorandum
addressed, first, the question of whether a wiretap was a search or seizure for purposes of the
Fourth Amendment, and then, second, the question of whether the federal government ought
to admit evidence secured by criminal conduct. Holmes replied:
I think this is a fine discourse. I agree with the last point. I still wobble on the
illegal search and regrettably but categorically disagree with the notion that the
use of the knowledge gained by wiretapping is contra Am. V. I fear that your
early stated zeal for privacy carries you too far.
BRANDEIS PAPERS, supra note 119, Reel 36. Alongside the sentence "Can it be that the
Constitution affords no protection against such invasions of individual security?", which
appears at page 474 of Brandeis's published dissent, Holmes commented, "This would not be
invasions of personal liberty in any sense that I can understand. It is the personal liberty of
the other fellow that you want to restrict." Alongside the sentence in which Brandeis observed
that Boyd "reviewed the history that lay behind the Fourth and Fifth Amendments,"
Olmstead, 277 U.S. at 474 (Brandeis, J., dissenting), Holmes commented: "My impression was
that Wigmore had thrashed the history" set forth in Boyd. When Brandeis wrote, "[t]here is,
in essence, no difference between the sealed letter and the private telephone message,"
Olmstead, 277 U.S. at 475, Holmes noted in the margin, "I think there is a good deal of
difference." And when Brandeis said that any use of material obtained through "unjustified"
wiretaps in a criminal proceeding "must be deemed a violation of the Fourth Amendment,"
Olmstead, 277 U.S. at 478, Holmes wrote, "I think this wrong," as he also did next to
Brandeis's sentence, "[a]nd the use, as evidence in a criminal proceeding, of facts ascertained
by such intrusion must be deemed a violation of the Fifth." Olmstead, 277 U.S. at 478-79.
Holmes's comments are contained in the draft of the memorandum that is located in the
Brandeis Papers. BRANDEIS PAPERS, supra note 119, Reel 36.
477. Taft noted that he did not look forward to drafting the opinion "with great pleasure."
Letter from WHT to Robert A. Taft (Feb. 26, 1928), microformed on TAlr PAPERS, supra note
9, Reel 299. In truth Taft had just been through a difficult personal situation that, given his
increasingly violent feelings about the need for strict law enforcement, see supra note 356,
must have made Olmstead an especially trying case. Taft's younger son Charles was at that
time a prosecuting attorney for Cincinnati, Taft's home town. During the entire fall and early
winter of 1927-28, Charles was involved in a notorious prosecution of George Remus, the "king
of the bootleggers," who was on trial for the murder of his estranged wife. Remus had shot his
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wife in plain daylight as she was driving to court to divorce him. He was an ex-lawyer who
chose to defend himself, pleading temporary insanity because, while he was in prison serving
time for prohibition offenses, his wife had cuckolded him with Franklin Dodge, an ace federal
prohibition investigator. Remus alleged that Dodge and Remus's wife had become lovers and
robbed him of all his assets while he was in prison. See Orville Dwyer, Remus Good or Remus
Bad Next Move in Trial Darrow, Landis May be Character Witnesses, CHI. DAILY TRIB., Dec.
6, 1927, at 13; Remus Tells Why He Shot Wife to Death; Had Moral Right To Kill Her, He
Says, CHI. DAILY TRIB., Oct. 7, 1927, at 1. During the trial Charles and Remus nearly came
to blows on several occasions. When Charles alleged that Remus had been disbarred for
reasons other than his prohibition conviction, Remus returned:
"A nice statement to make by the son of the Chief Justice of the United States,
if the Court pleases....
He knows that in no court of justice that kind of treatment would be taken for
granted. He knows that the only record admissible in this court of law, or any
other court of law, not only in this county but in the Supreme Court of which
this young man's father is the lord high Chief Justice.
It has been the pleasure of this defendant to appear before that high Chief
Justice, but the specimen as given by this offshoot of that great renowned
character is pitiful ....
... Five hundred judges and members of the Chicago bar have volunteered to
come down here as character witnesses, and just because the son of the Chief
Justice in this wonderful United States makes that kind of an assertion-man,
if I had you in the corridor I would wreck you physically. I will tell you the
truth--"
Mr. Taft's cheeks were red as he listened. Remus had stamped his way over
to the State's Attorney's table and was shaking his fist under Mr. Taft's nose.
Remus Near Blows with Prosecutors, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 19, 1927, at 19; see Orville Dwyer,
Judge Warns Remus To Abide by Court Rules, CHI. DAILY TRIB., Nov. 18, 1927, at 8; Remus
Tells Jury He Defended Home, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 20, 1927, at 13 (reporting that Remus
declared to the jury that "[t]his defendant ... started in life at $5 a month ... we could not all
be born with a golden spoon in our mouths like Charles P. Taft the second"). After
deliberating for only thirty minutes, Remus was acquitted on grounds of insanity. Orville
Dwyer, Remus Free if Found Sane, CHI. DAILY TRIB., Dec. 21, 1927, at 1. Remus painted
himself as a "martyr" to the "awful mistake" of prohibition, Orville Dwyer, Remus Paints Self
to Jury as Home Defender, CHI. DAILY TRIB., Dec. 20, 1927, at 12, which in his view had
created a corps of corrupt officials like Dodge. He was suffering, as F.H. La Guardia said, of
"dementia Volsteadia." La Guardia Believes Remus Is Victim of Dementia Volsteadia, CH.
DAILY TRIB., Oct. 16, 1927, at 3. Dodge was in fact eventually convicted on perjury charges.
Dodge, Foe of Remus, Is Given Prison Sentence, CHI. DAILY TRIB., Oct. 27, 1931, at 20. The
connection between Taft and his son excited public commentary. See Editorial, Father Taft
Must Think Much About Remus Case, NEWARK EVENING NEWS, Nov. 25, 1927.
During the trial William Howard Taft received word that Remus "was looking for a weapon
to use it on Charlie." Letter from WHT to Robert A. Taft (Dec. 11, 1927), microformed on TAFT
PAPERS, supra note 9, Reel 297. "We seem to be surrounded by bootlegging atmospheres," he
wrote his brother Horace. Letter from WHT to Horace D. Taft (Dec. 12, 1927), microformed
on TAFr PAPERS, supra note 9, Reel 297. "Remus is a bad man and I rather think a dangerous
man. The bootlegging seems to develop an indifference to murder and to make people think
that murder can be committed with immunity." Id. The thought that Remus "was seeking a
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On March 21, Brandeis circulated to the Court the part of the
memorandum that dealt with the admission of illegally obtained
evidence, together with a note:
In this case, the non-constitutional ground for reversal, which I
suggested, was not discussed at the conference. Several of the
brethren stated that they had not considered it. For this reason
it seems to me appropriate that I should circulate now this
memorandum in which I have stated somewhat fully the reasons
of the view expressed.478
Sutherland, who had been sick with colitis throughout most of
the fall of 1927,479 sailed for Europe on May 18 in order to recuper
weapon in order to attack Charlie and kill him," id., made Taft "anxious and concerned."
Letter from WHT to James R. Angell (Dec. 12,1927), microformed on TAFTPAPERS, supra note
9, Reel 297. He wrote his son to take extra precautions in the courtroom. Letter from WHT
to Robert A. Taft, supra. Taft despaired of the
sympathetic feeling for Remus throughout the community. The desperation of
these wets is such that mere murder seems not a matter for comment, especially
if it grows out of bootlegging.... However, there must be somebody to fight for the
people and for society, and if Charlie is doing his work well, as I hope he is, and
suffers in the doing of it, it is a sacrifice that must be made in the discharge of
his duty.
Letter from WHT to Horace D. Taft, supra. These circumstances could not but affect Taft's
perspective on the prosecution of bootleggers in February 1928.
478. BRANDEIS PAPERS, supra note 119, Reel 36. Brandeis wrote to Holmes: "Don't spend
time on this. It is part of what you have already seen. The others have not." To this Holmes
replied, "Count me in." Id. Stone responded to Brandeis's circulation with a short letter:
I quite agree with you that we should lay it down as a rule to be applied in the
federal courts that evidence procured by violations of the criminal law should be
excluded. I would not, however, be inclined to place this result on the analogy
to ratification or to the maxim that equity will not aid one who comes into court
with unclean hands, applicable in the field of private law. I don't think that
those analogies really apply to the acts of government agents.
I would say that the evidence should be placed on broad grounds of public
policy similar, if not identical, to those which have led the court to exclude
evidence procured in violation of constitutional provisions. It seems to me quite
as offensive to policy and morals for the federal government to secure convictions
through its sending its agents into the state and there violating the state law by
its officers [as] to secure convictions through the violation of its own
constitution.
Letter from HFS to LDB (Mar. 22, 1928) (Stone Papers).
479. Letter from Thomas R. Brown to WHT (Dec. 22, 1927), microformed on TAFr PAPERS,
supra note 9, Reel 297 (stating that Sutherland was suffering from "chronic colitis, associated
with some disturbance in his gastric and pancreatic secretions, and very much affected by the
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ate.4 s He left behind a memorandum for Taft concerning his views
of the undecided cases. About Olmstead he said:
This is the wire tapping case in which there probably will be a
vigorous dissent. In a general way my view is that the conversa-
tions which were heard as a result of the wire tapping did not
relate to a past crime but were part of a crime then being
committed. The question is whether there was an unlawful
search and seizure; and plainly there was not. Neither papers
nor information was surrendered under any form of compulsion.
Consequently, the evidence was admissible however we may
condemn the manner of obtaining it. I am inclined to think the
opinion should squarely meet the proposition that there was
probably a violation of the state law which we do not in any way
condition of his nervous apparatus, so that worry, strain and fatigue manifest themselves
rather strikingly in this portion of his body"). According to Dr. Brown, Sutherland could start
work the first of the year if he can be spared some of the routine wear and tear
.... I feel, however, he should have this summer a long holiday, preferably
beginning about the middle of May so that he can not only consolidate his gain,
but markedly improve his condition so that there may be a complete freedom
from his symptoms by the fall.
Id.; see also Letter from WHT to Thomas R. Brown (Dec. 26, 1927), microformed on TAFT
PAPERS, supra note 9, Reel 297 ("I can save him some of the usual work, and I shall do it
conscientiously.").
480. Letter from WHT to Robert A. Taft (Apr. 15, 1928), microformed on TAFT PAPERS,
supra note 9, Reel 301 ("Sutherland is going abroad for his health on the 18th of May, and the
Court is very anxious to get through."); see Letter from WHT to GS (May 17, 1928)
(Sutherland Papers) ("I have been delighted to see how strong you are now and how much
work you have done of the hard kind of opinion writing that consumes thinking energy. I am
looking forward with satisfaction to greeting you both in the full bloom of youthful health. And
what pleasure you will have in the consciousness that you are not a slave to a lot of opinions
the thought of which would continue to cloud your summer. I felicitate you. But don't try to
do too much.... Practice the Italian saying 'Dolce fier nient.' I don't think it is always sweet to
do nothing. But under the beautiful Italian skies you can show that some times it applies and
add to the sweetness the recurring thought of the hard useful work you have done and leave
behind. There is nothing quite so satisfying as that thought. And then know too you carry
with you the loving thoughts and hopes of all your colleagues. They are real and sincere and
awaken fervor."); see also Letter from GS to WHT (May 18, 1928), microformed on TAFT
PAPERS, supra note 9, Reel 302 ("That was a very sweet going away letter and Mrs.
Sutherland and I appreciate it beyond expression. I shall think of you always as my good
Chief for whom my admiration and affection run a close race."). While in Europe Sutherland
wrote Taft occasional letters about his travels. See, e.g., Letter from GS to WHT (July 3,
1928), microformed on TAFT PAPERS, supra note 9, Reel 303 ("Italy has every appearance of
prosperity. Mussolini has done marvelous things. He has made the strike a thing of the past
and has almost gotten rid of the beggar and the petty thief-though it is still well to insure
your trunks.").
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attemptto excuse. That however is a matter for the state, and
the federal courts cannot refuse to receive evidence plainly
relevant and material because the state law may have been
violated in obtaining it. The point made, that there was an
unlawful search and seizure, being negatived, that is the end of
the matter so far as we are concerned.481
On May 25 Taft sent a first draft of his opinion to Van Devanter
and Sanford, seeking suggestions.4 2 He noted that "I have talked
over this case a good deal with Justice Sutherland, and he has left
authority with me to consent to what I shall write."4"3 On May 31
Taft sent the draft of his opinion to McReynolds, stressing that "I
have adopted all of your suggestions."4 Apparently Butler had
complained about Brandeis's discussion of questions not encom-
passed within the narrow grant of certiorari, and Taft asked
McReynolds how the majority should respond. Should it abide by
the restrictions in the grant of certiorari and leave Brandeis's attack
unanswered, or should the majority itself go beyond the limitations
in the grant of certiorari and discuss the question of illegally
procured evidence?
The question has now arisen whether we ought .to allow
Brandeis, after consenting to a limitation on the discussion to be
had under the certiorari, to introduce the question of the
Washington statute and his own ethical view. I think that Pierce
Butler thinks we ought not to allow it, but I am rather inclined
to let it go as it is. Butler thinks that if we let this in, we ought
481. Memorandum from GS to WHT (May 15, 1928) (Sutherland Papers).
482. Letter from WHT to Edward Terry Sanford (ETS) (May 25, 1928), microformed on
TAFT PAPERS, supra note 9, Reel 302; Letter from WHT to WVD (May 25, 1928), microformed
on TAFT PAPERS, supra note 9, Reel 302.
483. Id. On May 30, Taft wrote to McReynolds and Van Devanter asking if Taft could insert
this sentence into the opinion: "The Gouled case is an extreme case, was not elaborately
considered, and is not to be extended beyond its own facts by implication." Letter from WHT
to James Clark McReynolds (JCM) (May 30, 1928), microformed on TAFT PAPERS, supra note
9, Reel 302; Letter from WHT to WVD (May 30, 1928), microformed on TAFT PAPERS, supra
note 9, Reel 302. "I ought to say," Taft added, "that I talked the matter over with Justice
Sutherland before he left, and he approved exactly such a reference to the Gouled case." Id.
484. Letter from WHT to JCM (May 31, 1928), microformed on TAFT PAPERS, supra note
9, Reel 302. "[E]xcept," Taft added, "that I left out a part of the written portion of your
memorandum, not because I did not approve it, but because it seemed wiser to make it a little
shorter." Id.
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also to take in the discussion on the question whether the
evidence of the intercepted conversations was properly admissi-
ble under the general rules of evidence. But we did distinctly
agree that that should not be taken up, and it was strenuously
argued in Conference that the interception of messages was
contrary to law. Indeed it was on that ground that Holmes
changed his vote. I feel, therefore, that we ought to let it go as it
is and not raise the question now as to the limitation of the
discussion of certioraris."
Olmstead came down on June 4, the last day of the Term. In his
opinion Taft addressed first the constitutional question of the search
and seizure. He began with the claim that "[tihe well known
485. Id. Taft invited Van Devanter, McReynolds, and Sanford to his home on Friday, June
1, for a conference to "settle" the question of the limits of the grant of certiorari. Id. Aware of
the tension between McReynolds and Brandeis, Taft was a good deal less discrete in venting
his exasperation at Brandeis in his letter of May 31 to Sanford:
Pierce Butler wants to confine our discussion in the wire tapping case to the
constitutional questions that were specially reserved, and I would be quite
content to do that but my recollection is that we did discuss very vigorously in
Conference the question whether the fact that Washington had a criminal
statute making intercepting of telephone messages a misdemeanor should not
prevent the admission of such messages thus overheard. I agree that there was
a specific limitation in the certiorari and that Brandeis in writing his first
opinion violated the limitation, but as Holmes bases his dissent not on the
unconstitutional feature but on the crime, as he calls it, we can not very well
throw those two men out. I concede that where we make a limitation we ought
to stick to it, and I think anyone would have done so but the lawless member of
our Court. Nevertheless, I think we might as well meet the issue as it is, and
provide hereafter for making people shinny on their own side.
Letter from WHT to ETS (May 31, 1928), microformed on TAFT PAPERS, supra note 9, Reel
302. Apparently the Friday conference did not produce much change, for on June 1 Taft
recirculated his opinion to the whole Court, saying:
I think there is nothing of substance that has been changed, except an added
comment on the Gouled case and a more elaborate explanation of the discussion
of the question of the alleged unethical conduct of the Government witnesses in
intercepting the messages, and the effect of the Washington statute.
Letter from WHT to the Members of the Court (June 1, 1928), microformed on TAFT PAPERS,
supra note 9, Reel 302.
We don't have the date on which Brandeis circulated his full dissenting opinion to the
Court, but we do know that Holmes replied, "I agree on the last ground-I am not quite ready
to accept the constitutional one although I agree that the policy established by a law is not
to be confined to the words. Gooch v. Oregon Short Line R.R. Co. 258 U.S. 22, 24." BRANDEIS
PAPERS, supra note 119, Reel 36. Conversely, Stone wrote Brandeis, "I am with you in the
constitutional point.... I have some doubts about your second ground but will let you know."
Id.; cf. supra note 478.
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historical purpose of the Fourth Amendment ... was to prevent the
use of governmental force to search a man's house, his person, his
papers and his effects; and to prevent their seizure against his
will. '486 The Fourth Amendment, therefore, attached only to
"material things-the person, the house, his papers or his effects."48 7
Because the wiretapping in this case did not involve "trespass upon
any property of the defendants,"4s because the government did not
appropriate any thing or effect of the defendants, as for example
their letters, the Fourth Amendment "does not forbid what was done
here. There was no searching. There was no seizure. The evidence
was secured by the use of the sense of hearing and that only. There
was no entry of the houses or offices of the defendants."4 9
Taft denied that the defendants owned or controlled the "tele-
phone wires reaching to the whole world from the defendant's house
or office."4"
The reasonable view is that one who installs in his house a
telephone instrument with connecting wires intends to project
his voice to those quite outside, and that the wires beyond his
house and messages while passing over them are not within the
protection of the Fourth Amendment. Here those who inter-
cepted the projected voices were not in the house of either party
to the conversation.4 1
Congress could of course ban the use of wiretap evidence by
statute,492 "[b]ut the courts may not adopt such a policy by attribut-
ing an enlarged and unusual meaning to the Fourth Amendment. ' 49
486. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 463 (1927).
487. Id. at 464.
488. Id. at 457. The wiretapping occurred because of the insertion of wires "in the streets
near the houses." Id.
489. Id. at 464. The maxim that the Fourth Amendment was "to be liberally construed to
effect the purpose of the framers of the Constitution in the interest of liberty" could not
'Justify enlargement of the language employed beyond the possible practical meaning of
houses, persons, papers, and effects, or so to apply the words search and seizure as to forbid
hearing or sight." Id. at 465. In justifying this point, Taft made good use of Holmes's opinion
in Hester and Brandeis's opinion in Lee. See supra text accompanying notes 458-60.
490. Olmstead, 277 U.S. at 465. "The intervening wires are not part of his house or office
any more than are the highways along which they are stretched." Id.
491. Id. at 466.
492. Id. at 465-66.
493. Id. at 466.
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Taft's argument deployed two metaphors: appropriation and
trespass. Fourth Amendment protection could be triggered by the
appropriation-the forceful taking--of some thing. Appropriation
was constitutionally suspect because it interfered with a person's
control over things that belonged to him. The taking, or seizure, of
a person's property without consent was constitutionally worrisome.
In Olmstead Taft seemed to argue that the eye does not appropriate
what it sees, nor does the ear appropriate what it hears. That is the
significance of Taft's observation that wiretapping involved "hearing
and that only."494
The second metaphor used by Taft's opinion was that of trespass.
Constitutionally cognizable searches and seizures involved tres-
pass--or unlawful entry-into some property owned by a person.
Invasion of a property right in order to search was constitutionally
worrisome because it violated the exclusive dominion required by
property, even if government intrusion did not actually take or seize
the property. It is for this reason that Taft repeatedly stressed that
the government had never entered the defendants' houses, nor did
the defendants own the telephone wires in which the wiretaps were
inserted.
Either appropriation or trespass might constitute an independ-
ently sufficient ground to justify Fourth Amendment protection.
Fourth Amendment protection could be triggered by an appro-
priation without a trespass, as for example if the government
were to inspect mail that is within its own custody.495 Or Fourth
Amendment protection could be triggered by a trespass without an
appropriation, as for example if government officials were to break
into a house and use their eyes to search its contents. 49 But in
Olmstead's case there was neither appropriation nor trespass; there
494. Id. at 464.
495. Id. ("It is plainly within the words of the Amendment to say that the unlawful rifling
by a government agent of a sealed letter is a search and seizure of the sender's papers or
effects. The letter is a paper, an effect, and in the custody of a Government that forbids
carriage except under its protection.").
496. Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505, 509-11 (1961) ("Eavesdropping
accomplished by means of ... a physical intrusion is beyond the pale of even those decisions
in which a closely divided Court has held that eavesdropping accomplished by other electronic
means did not amount to an invasion of Fourth Amendment rights.... The absence of a
physical invasion of the petitioner's premises was ... a vital factor in the Court's decision in
Olmstead.").
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was neither a seizure nor a search.497 This suggests why Sutherland
and McReynolds were willing to join Taft's opinion, because it
was constructed entirely in terms of constitutional concepts
with which they were sympathetic, like consent and property.498
As his memorandum to Taft indicates, Sutherland imagined the
protections of the Fourth Amendment to turn on issues of "compul-
sion."49
One could, of course, construct a rationale for excluding the
wiretap evidence in Olmstead within the paradigm of appropriation
and trespass. That is exactly the basis of Pierce Butler's dissent.'
Butler argued:
The communications belong to the parties between whom they
pass. During their transmission the exclusive use of the wire
belongs to the persons served by it. Wire tapping involves
interference with the wire while being used. Tapping the wires
497. This is perhaps why Holmes refused to find that wiretapping constituted a search and
seizure under the Fourth Amendment. In his dissent he said only that,
[w]hile I do not deny it, I am not prepared to say that the penumbra of the
Fourth and Fifth Amendments covers the defendant, although I fully agree that
Courts are apt to err by sticking too closely to the words of a law where those
words import a policy that goes beyond them. Gooch v. Oregon Short Line R. R.
Co., 258 U. S. 22, 24.
Olmstead, 277 U.S. at 469 (Holmes, J., dissenting); cf. supra text accompanying note 281.
498. That neither Sutherland nor McReynolds conceived the issue in Olmstead as a
prohibition question is suggested by Nardone v. United States, 302 U.S. 379 (1937), in which
long after prohibition the Court construed chapter 652, section 605 of the Communications
Act of 1934, 48 Stat. 1064, 1103 (codified as amended at 47 U.S.C. § 151), which prohibited
"any person" from intercepting telephone messages, as applying to federal law enforcement
officials. Both Sutherland and McReynolds dissented. Nardone, 302 U.S. at 385-87.
499. See supra text accompanying note 481. Sutherland would later write to Taft that his
Olmstead opinion
will stand as good law and good sense. My only regret is that Pierce Butler
dissented, though he did not go along with Brandeis, which helps some. My
secretary sent me a copy of the opinion and I read it with care. It is as clear as
crystal and in no way met by the dissenting opinions. To me it seems so entirely
obvious that I marvel that the question could be seriously considered from the
opposite point of view.
Letter from GS to WHT (Sept. 2, 1928), microformed on TAFr PAPERS, supra note 9, Reel 304.
500. Because "[t]he order allowing the writs of certiorari operated to limit arguments of
counsel to the constitutional question," Butler refused to "participate in the controversy that
has arisen here as to whether the evidence is inadmissible because the mode of obtaining it
was unethical and a misdemeanor under state law. (He preferred] to say nothing concerning
those questions because they are not within the jurisdiction taken by the order." Olmstead,
277 U.S. at 486 (Butler, J., dissenting).
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and listening in by the officers literally constituted a search for
evidence.4"
Butler thus invoked the metaphor of trespass, of unwarranted
intrusion into a domain under the rightful control of a person, to
justify the conclusion that wiretapping constituted a search
triggering Fourth Amendment protection.5 2 Butler could make
this move only by using the metaphor of trespass in ways that
transcended the strict confines of positive property law.5"3
In his opinion for the Court, Taft never explained why he did not
choose to employ this more expansive notion of trespass. 0 4 To justify
why the Court restricted the reach of the Fourth Amendment to "the
possible practical meaning of houses, persons, papers, and
effects, " '° he only quoted, cryptically and without elaboration, the
crucial premise of his Carroll opinion: "The Fourth Amendment is
to be construed in the light of what was deemed an unreasonable
search and seizure when it was adopted and in a manner which will
501. Id. at 487.
502. This was also the perspective of Frederick Pollock, who wrote Holmes:
The point of substance, apart from any question of construction, is whether
tapping telephone messages is mere eavesdropping, or on the same footing as
intercepting and reading a closed letter. Common sense appears to favour the
latter view.
Was it ever doubted that a telegram follows the analogy of a letter in this
respect?...
As to the Fourth Amendment, it seems that even if you are bound to the
letter, effects is a word of large import and may well be held to cover interests
not falling within any recognized denomination of property.
Letter from Frederick Pollock to OWH (July 2, 1928), in 2 HOLMES-POLLOCK
CORRESPONDENCE, supra note 294, at 225.
503. In Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505 (1961), the Court chose to make exactly
this move:
mhe officers overheard the petitioners' conversations only by usurping part of
the petitioners' house or office-a heating system which was an integral part of
the premises occupied by the petitioners, a usurpation that was effected without
their knowledge and without their consent. In these circumstances we need not
pause to consider whether or not there was a technical trespass under the local
property law relating to party walls. Inherent Fourth Amendment rights are not
inevitably measurable in terms of ancient niceties of tort or real property law.
Id. at 511 (footnotes omitted).
504. Brandeis later wrote to Frankfurter: "I suppose some reviewer of the wire tapping
decision will discern that in favor of property the Constitution is liberally construed-in favor
of liberty, strictly." Letter from LDB to Felix Frankfurter (June 15, 1928), in BRANDEIS-
FRANKFURTER LETTERS, supra note 152, at 333 (footnote omitted).
505. Olmstead, 277 U.S. at 465.
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conserve public interests as well as the interests and rights of
individual citizens. '0 6
Taft had written this passage in Carroll to reference the practical
necessity of warrantless searches of automobiles,0" but in Olmstead
he did not elect publicly to offer an analogous justification for the
necessity of wiretapping.5 That was left to Sutherland in an
opinion a decade later. In a dissent from a decision holding that the
Communications Act of 1934509 had prohibited all wiretapping by
federal law enforcement officials, Sutherland made the utilitarian
argument explicit:
The decision just made will necessarily have the effect of
enabling the most depraved criminals to further their criminal
plans over the telephone, in the secure knowledge that even if
these plans involve kidnapping and murder, their telephone
conversations can never be intercepted by officers of the law and
revealed in court....
My abhorrence of the odious practices of the town gossip, the
Peeping Tom, and the private eavesdropper is quite as strong as
that of my brethren. But to put the sworn officers of the law,
engaged in the detection and apprehension of organized gangs
of criminals, in the same category, is to lose all sense of propor-
tion. 5
10
A difficulty with the framework of appropriation and trespass
that underlay Taft's opinion was that it could not explain rele-
vant precedents, even those cited in Taft's opinion. In Hester v.
506. Id. (quoting Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 149 (1925)).
507. See supra text accompanying notes 424, 427-30.
508. In his private correspondence, however, Taft was more explicit:
The truth is we have to face the problem presented by new inventions. Many of
them are most useful to the criminals in their war against society and are at
once availed of, and these idealistic gentlemen urge a conclusion which
facilitates the crime by their use and furnishes immunity from conviction by
seeking to bring its use by government officers within the obstruction of the bill
of rights and the 4th amendment.
Letter from WHT to Horace D. Taft (June 12, 1928), microformed on TAFr PAPERS, supra note
9, Reel 302.
509. Ch. 652, 48 Stat. 1064 (codified as amended at 47 U.S.C. § 151).
510. Nardone v. United States, 302 U.S. 379, 385, 387 (1937) (Sutherland, J., dissenting).
Sutherland's dissent was joined by McReynolds. Id. at 387.
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United States,5" for example, the Court had held that the Fourth
Amendment did not apply to liquor found in a defendant's open
fields as a result of an official trespass onto the defendant's land.
Holmes had held for the Court that "the special protection accorded
by the Fourth Amendment to the people in their 'persons, houses,
papers, and effects,' is not extended to the open fields. The distinc-
tion between the latter and the house is as old as the common
law."512 But if it is asked why the Fourth Amendment ignores a
trespass onto open fields, but not into a house, the answer cannot be
given by the concept of trespass itself. The answer requires instead
a theory of what the concept of trespass is meant to protect, which
presumably would explain why the word "houses" in the Fourth
Amendment ought not to be interpreted to include the open fields
that surround a house.
Brandeis's dissent in Olmstead would prove to be a profound and
generative source of law because it offered just such a theory of the
"underlying purpose" of the Fourth Amendment."1 3 'The makers of
our Constitution," argued Brandeis, "undertook to secure'conditions
favorable to the pursuit of happiness. They recognized the signifi-
cance of man's spiritual nature, of his feelings and of his intellect.
They knew that only a part of the pain, pleasure and satisfactions
of life are to be found in material things."5" They therefore
sought to protect Americans in their beliefs, their thoughts, their
emotions and their sensations. They conferred, as against the
Government, the right to be let alone-the most comprehensive
of rights and the right most valued by civilized men. To protect
that right, every unjustifiable intrusion by the Government upon
the privacy of the individual, whatever the means employed,
must be deemed a violation of the Fourth Amendment.515
Brandeis thus attributed to the Fourth Amendment a purpose
that nearly four decades previously he had attributed to the
common law in his famous and influential article on The Right to
Privacy:
511. 265 U.S. 57 (1924).
512. Id. at 59.
513. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 476 (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
514. Id. at 478.
515. Id.
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The intense intellectual and emotional life, and the heightening
of sensations which came with the advance of civilization, made
it clear to men that only a part of the pain, pleasure, and profit
of life lay in physical things. Thoughts, emotions, and sensations
demanded legal recognition, and the beautiful capacity for
growth which characterizes the common law enabled judges to
afford the requisite protection, without the interposition of the
legislature.
Recent inventions and business methods call attention to the
next step which must be taken for the protection of the person,
and for securing to the individual what Judge Cooley calls the
right "to be let alone." Instantaneous photographs and newspa-
per enterprise have invaded the sacred precincts of private and
domestic life; and numerous mechanical devices threaten to
make good the prediction that "what is whispered in the closet
shall be proclaimed from the house-tops.".... [The question
whether our law will recognize and protect the right to privacy
in this and in other respects must soon come before our courts
for consideration.. 6
The reason why the Fourth Amendment protects a house against
trespass, but not open fields, is because the purpose of the Fourth
Amendment is to protect "the privacy of the individual," and there
is no privacy interest in open fields, regardless of ownership.517 It
would take thirty-nine years, but eventually in Katz v. United
516. Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193,
195-96 (1890). Compare Brandeis's Olmstead dissent: "Subtler and more far-reaching means
of invading privacy have become available to the Government. Discovery and invention have
made it possible for the Government, by means far more effective than stretching upon the
rack, to obtain disclosure in court of what is whispered in the closet." 277 U.S. at 473
(Brandeis, J., dissenting). The connection between Brandeis's Olmstead dissent and his earlier
article has been widely noted. See, e.g., Ken Gormley, One Hundred Years of Privacy, 1992
WIs. L. Rzv. 1335, 1360-69 (1992); Daniel J. Solove, Conceptualizing Privacy, 90 CAL. L. REV.
1087, 1099-102 (2002); Silas J. Wasserstrom & Louis Michael Seidman, The Fourth
Amendment as Constitutional Theory, 77 GEO. L.J. 19, 63-66 (1988).
517. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring)
('[C]onversations in the open would not be protected against being overheard, for the
expectation of privacy under the circumstances would be unreasonable. Cf. Hester v. United
States, supra.").
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States5 18 the Court would overrule Olmstead and adopt the theory
of Brandeis's dissent. 519
We may ask, however, why "the privacy of the individual" should
for a liberal like Brandeis, trump the demands of the administrative
state. What exactly was the constitutional status of privacy? When
post-New Deal liberalism began to theorize the kinds of civil rights
and civil liberties that courts could use to circumscribe the discre-
tion of the administrative state, it turned naturally to a theory of
democracy, because democracy was necessary to underwrite the
legitimacy of the administrative state. That was essentially the
approach of the 1938 pivot-point between pre- and post-New Deal
liberalism: footnote four of Stone's opinion in United States v.
Carolene Products Co.5 0 Ultimately this justification for civil rights
and civil liberties traces back to Brandeis's magnificent concurring
opinion in Whitney v. California,"' in which Brandeis grounded
First Amendment rights in the democratic deliberation necessary to
legitimate the exercise of state power. But the right to privacy
Brandeis invoked in Olmstead could not be explained in this way.
Its origins lay in common law values, not in the need to vindicate
democracy.
Brandeis's Olmstead dissent points toward a strand of post-New
Deal liberalism that virtually disappeared after 1938 and that did
not revive until the 1960s and decisions like Katz. The roots of this
form of liberalism lay in the horror with which progressives in the
1920s witnessed the demoralizing and ineffectual efforts of the
federal government to enforce prohibition. The fiasco of prohibition
enforcement caused many liberals to recognize that the "moral
authority of the government does not rest [merely] on its legal right
518. 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
519. The Court stated:
We conclude that the underpinnings of Olmstead ... have been so eroded by
our subsequent decisions that the "trespass" doctrine there enunciated can no
longer be regarded as controlling. The Government's activities in electronically
listening to and recording the petitioner's words violated the privacy upon which
he justifiably relied while using the telephone booth and thus constituted a
"search and seizure" within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.
Id. at 353.
520. 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938). See generally JOHN HART ELY, DEMocRAcYAND DISTRUST
(1980).
521. 274 U.S. 357, 372-80 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring).
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to issue commands," '522 but rather also on "the collective conscience
of the community in its effort to make for more and better human
life. ' 528 In 1890 in The Right to Privacy, Brandeis had sought to
demonstrate how the common law could become an instrument for
the expression and formation of that collective conscience. In 1928,
under the relentless pressure of prohibition, Brandeis sought to
make the Fourth Amendment also an instrument for the expression
and formation of that collective conscience. He would in that way
pioneer the appeal to social custom and value as a progressive limit
to the administrative state.524
Brandeis's posture in Olmstead was structurally analogous to
the judicial conservatism of Sutherland in Adkins v. Children's
Hospital,525 or Butler in Jay Burns Baking Co. v. Bryan,526 or
McReynolds in Pierce v. Society of Sisters.52' No less than they,
Brandeis in Olmstead sought to appeal to fundamental social
norms as a ground from which judges could discipline positive law.
The distinction between Brandeis and his three conservative
colleagues lay not so much in the form of judicial authority to which
each laid claim, as in the content of the social values that each
sought to enforce. Brandeis aspired to identify and define values
that could not be encompassed by traditional ideals of autonomy,
consent, and property. In the context of the Fourth Amendment,
Brandeis feared that "[t]he progress of science" would furnish "the
Government with means of espionage" that were hitherto unimagin-
able.528 The conservative wing of the Taft Court, by contrast, was
522. The Progressive Attitude Towards Prohibition?, supra note 52, at 167.
523. Id. at 166.
524. Particularly noteworthy in this regard is that by 1926 Brandeis had come to stress
the limits of the mala prohibited, as distinguished from the mala in se. It seems
to me we were rather presumptuous in brushing away the distinction-another
bit of really shallow rationalization; that there is, moreover, an essential
difference between a crime and a delict; & that there are few acts or omissions
which ought to be treated as crimes which do not arouse righteous indignation.
For these some other solution should be found than existing penalties.
Letter from LDB to Felix Frankfurter (July 2, 1926), in BRANDEIs-FRANKFURTER LETTERS,
supra note 152, at 245-46 (footnotes omitted).
525. 261 U.S. 525 (1923).
526. 264 U.S. 504 (1924).
527. 268 U.S. 510 (1925). For a discussion of the relationship between these cases and
fundamental social values, see generally Post, Defending the Lifeworld, supra note 290.
528. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 474 (Brandeis, J., dissenting). Recall in this
context that The Right to Privacy was also a massive (and successful) effort to transform the
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primarily concerned with the potential of "new inventions" to
become a "Frankenstein" that would generate innovative and
threatening forms of criminal activity.5"
Brandeis did not explain why he chose to invoke the value of
privacy to limit the administrative state in the context of wiretap-
ping rather than of warrantless searches of automobiles. From
a biographical. perspective the explanation would no doubt lie in
the violent, almost visceral disgust that Brandeis felt at the
"espionage"53 ° of wiretapping.531 The question of which social values
common law so that it might protect traditional values against new threats posed by "[r]ecent
inventions and business methods." Warren & Brandeis, supra note 516, at 195.
529. See supra note 508; infra note 560.
530. "As a means of espionage, writs of assistance and general warrants are but puny
instruments of tyranny and oppression when compared with wire-tapping." Olmstead, 277
U.S. at 476 (Brandeis, J., dissenting). Many years later, in debates on the banning of
wiretapping in the context of prohibition enforcement, Brandeis's dissent in Olmstead would
be quoted in Congress in support of a statutory ban on the "despicable system of espionage
under the wire-tapping practice." 76 CONG. REc. 2691 (1933) (statement of Rep. Charles John
Schafer); see Act of March 1, 1933, ch. 144, 47 Stat. 1381; 76 CONG. REC. 2693 (1933)
(statement of Rep. George Holden Tinkham) (referring to the "flaming language" of Brandeis's
Olmstead dissent, "the language of the spirit of America against espionage").
531. In 1920 Brandeis had written Frankfurter:
I told Charles Merz the other day that the N[ew] R[epublic] ought to take up
a continuous campaign against espionage ....
... [I]t seems to me important that the attack on espionage be not confined to
industrial espionage. That is merely one bad application of a practice. The
fundamental objection to espionage is (1) that espionage demoralizes every
human being who participates in or uses the results of espionage; (2) that it
takes sweetness & confidence out of life; (3) that it takes away the special manly
qualities of honor & generosity which were marked in Americans.
It is like the tipping system an import from Continental Europe & the Near
East only a thousand times worse.... [Tihe immorality, the ungentlemanliness,
should be made the keynote, & not the industrial wrong or infringement of
liberty as in the Red Campaign.
It is unAmerican. It is nasty. It is nauseating.
Letter from LDB to Felix Frankfurter (Nov. 26, 1920), in BRANDEIS-FRANKFURTER LE'rERs,
supra note 152, at 48 (footnotes omitted). Several years later Brandeis urged the New
Republic's Herbert Croly to "struggle to uproot the detective system root and branch-in
government and in industry." Letter from LDB to Felix Frankfurter (Mar. 15, 1924), in
BRANDEIS-FRANKFURTER LErrERS, supra note 152, at 161. Brandeis proclaimed: "Let him vow
to strive without ceasing until the system is driven out or his own death release him. If the
detective system lives, our ideals cannot survive. If I were dictator, I should abolish the
system today without reserve, in every department of life and take all chances." Id. (footnote
omitted). In 1927 Brandeis was still seeking to instigate a "needed investigation of the
government prostitutes-sometimes called spies, and euphemistically known as detectives,
inspectors, special agents & intelligence officers." Letter from LDB to Felix Frankfurter (Feb.
4, 1927), in BRANDEIS-FRANKFURTER LETrERS, supra note 152, at 272. In 1926, upon learning
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should be so fundamental as to warrant constitutional protection
would of course ultimately prove to be a central problem of post-New
Deal liberal constitutionalism." 2 Brandeis's Olmstead dissent
neither anticipates nor contributes to that question. But its
demonstration that a progressive jurisprudence could root itself in
social norms and speak from their authority did point the way
toward forms of communitarian liberalism that would ultimately
flower in decisions like Katz and Griswold v. Connecticut.533
VIII
During the 1920s the trope of lawlessness was highly volatile and
unstable. It applied not merely to those who defied prohibition,
but also, with great vehemence, to prohibition officials who broke
the law in their efforts to enforce it. By the end of the decade it
was commonplace to remark on "the curious lawlessness which
of Frankfurter's plan to conduct a survey of the effectiveness of the criminal law in Boston,
Brandeis wrote:
I suggest that, as an incident of the current survey, special care be taken to
ascertain and record:
(a) The character (ethical) of the evidence through which it is sought to
obtain a conviction--e.g. to what extent it is of the character held legal in
Burdeau v McDowell 256 U.S. 465, & the many cases where fed crimes
were prosecuted in U.S. courts with evidence illegally procured by state
officials.
I have grave doubt whether we shall ever be able to effect more than
superficial betterment unless we undertake to deal fundamentally with the
intangibles; and succeed in infusing a sense (A) of the dignity of the law among
a free, self-governing people and (B) of the solemnity of the function of
administering justice. Among the essentials is that the government must, in its
methods, & means, & instruments, be ever the gentleman. Also we must
recognize the fallacy ... that the main function of Courts is to settle
controversies. This view seems to me a bit of that finite 19th century wisdom of
the Militarians which has brought so much evil as well as good. There are times
of ease & prosperity when the pressing danger is somnolence rather than
litigiousness.
Letter from LDB to Felix Frankfurter (July 2, 1926), in BRANDEIs-FRANKFURTER LETTERS,
supra note 152, at 245 (footnote omitted). Stone was also inclined to stress the necessity of
government acting "in a gentlemanly way." See infra note 551.
532. See, e.g., Post, supra note 13, at 85-111.
533. 381 U.S. 479, 494 (1965) (Goldberg, J., concurring); see also Bowers v. Hardwick, 478
U.S. 186, 199 (1986) (Blackmun, J., dissenting); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453 (1972).
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prohibition breeds in its official bosom."53 4 Prohibition was said to
have created "a new crime, unusual in America ... it is the crime of
official lawlessness."535 "[Tihe disregard of law by enforcement
officials has been increasing alarmingly in recent months in an
effort to prevent the illegal sale of alcoholic liquors."'536 It was said
that
[h]omes and places of business are invaded by officials without
search warrants or with warrants improperly issued and served.
Property is seized or destroyed without warrant of law. Persons
are assaulted on the barest suspicion of guilt or are arrested and
booked at police headquarters for "investigation"-a charge for
which there exits no lawful authority.... Suspects are held
incommunicado from relatives and lawyers. The "third degree"
is familiar to all. 37
534. Editorial, More Prohibition Zeal, N.Y. TIMES, May 3, 1928, at 19.
535. 71 CONG. REC. 3141 (1929) (statement of Sen. Harry Hawes).
536. Austin Haines, The Crimes of Law Enforcement, 33 NEW REPUBIC 316, 317 (1923).
537. Id. at 316. It should be noted that in an opinion by Butler, with Sutherland and
Sanford dissenting, the Taft Court came down hard on corrupt prohibition officials. See
Donnelley v. United States, 276 U.S. 505 (1928). According to Stone's docket book, the case
was voted on three times in conference. Originally Holmes was assigned to write an opinion
for Sutherland, Brandeis, McReynolds, and Sanford reversing the conviction of the prohibition
agent, but eventually Butler persuaded the Court to hold that the Volstead Act made it a
crime for prohibition agents intentionally to fail to report the illegal transportation of liquor.
In Ziang Sung Wan v. United States, 266 U.S. 1, 14-17 (1924), the Taft Court, in an
unanimous opinion by Brandeis, found that the use of the "third degree" rendered a confession
involuntary and hence inadmissible. On the day of the argument, Taft wrote his wife that he
had just submitted an
important ... murder case. One Chinaman is charged with killing three others
at an educational mission here in Washington and the question we have to
decide is whether the method by which his confession was secured was such that
it ought not to have been admitted in evidence. There are several members of
the Court perhaps a majority thinking the confession should not have been
admitted ... If the confession goes out it is doubtful whether he could be
convicted a second time. There has been unreasonable delay in the trial. The
murder was committed in 1919. I am inclined to think that the defendant was
guilty.
Letter from WHT to Helen Taft (Apr. 8, 1924), microformed on TAFT PAPERS, supra note 9,
Reel 28. Butler's docket book shows that at conference McKenna, Van Devanter, and
Sutherland had originally voted to admit the confession. Taft wrote Brandeis about his
opinion, "I concur. I think this case as you conclusively show is so exceptional that it can not
return to plague us in other cases where confessions are most useful evidence." Holmes wrote,
"Yes siree. I suppose you are right not to show disgust or wrath. I don't know whether I could
have held in." McReynolds, who had equivocated in conference, wrote, "I shall not oppose."
Sutherland said, "This is well done. I voted the other way but probably shall acquiesce." Van
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On the floor of the Senate "[flederal officers involved in dry.
law killings and other attacks were scathingly arraigned by
Senators Copeland of New York, Hawes of Missouri and Tydings of
Maryland." '38 If prohibitionists charged those who disobeyed the
Devanter returned, "I shall assent." BRANDEIS PAPERS, supra note 119.
About the "third degree" Brandeis later wrote Frankfurter, "[o]ur police practices--and the
attitude of most prosecutors & the bar thereto carry us back to the age of torture on the
continent." Letter from LDB to Felix Frankfurter (Nov. 4, 1928), in BRANDEIS-FRANKFURTER
LETTERS, supra note 152, at 350. Brandeis believed that "few tasks in connection with the
Criminal Law are so important as a thorough enquiry into, & exposition of, the practices of
the police in connection not only with 3rd degree, but generally re the interrogation of persons
arrested." Letter from LDB to Felix Frankfurter (Sept. 28, 1927), in BRANDEIS-FRANKFURTER
LETTERS, supra note 152, at 308-09. On reaction to Ziang Sung Wan, see, for example, Justice
Brandeis, The Third Degree, 40 NEW REPUBLIC 272 (1924); Zechariah Chafee, Jr., Compulsory
Confessions, 40 NEw REPUBLIC 266, 267 (1924) ('The Supreme Court's opinion forcibly proves
the need of a thorough-going investigation of the extent to which the 'third degree' prevails
in American cities, and a careful consideration of the circumstances under which interrogation
of the accused by government officials should be permitted, if at all."); Editorial, Torture Is
Again Condemned, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 15, 1924, at 22 ("There will be general approval-which
Supreme Court decisions do not always get-with the decision in which the Justices this week
condemned a conviction for murder based on a confession obtained by what they call duress.").
The Nation strongly affirmed the Court's opinion:
In a decision which ought to strike at the roots of police terrorism the United
States Supreme Court has just granted Ziang Sung Wan a new trial, on the
ground that the alleged confession was extorted.... It is time that something was
done to make police officials remember that they too are required to obey the
law. Doubtless it is true, as they allege, that some valid confessions are extorted
by the third degree; doubtless the inquisitors of the middle ages, too, could point
to some honest successes of their methods. But the defense is not justification.
Editorial, Unto the Least of These, 119 NATION 459, 459 (Oct. 29, 1924). The Outlook opined:
Here is a clearer decision from a higher authority than has appeared before
holding the "third degree" to be in violation not merely of American statute law
but of the whole spirit of Anglo-Saxon judicature. It ought to have the effect of
ending definitely and for all time this barbaric practice. But unaided it will not.
Editorial, Police Take Notice, 138 OUTLOOK 318, 319 (Oct. 29, 1924). Concern with the "third
degree" became so great that the Wickersham Commission decided to devote an entire volume
to the subject. See NAT'L COMM'N ON LAW OBSERVANCE AND ENFORCEMENT, REPORT ON
LAWLESSNESS IN LAW ENFORCEMENT (1931).
538. Glass Charges President "Submerges" Prohibition; Senate Clash on Killings, N.Y.
TIMES, June 20, 1929, at 1; see Dry Agents'Bullets Make Big Casualty List of U.S. Citizens,
CHI. DAILY TRIB., Sept. 25, 1927, at 6; Senate Rebels at Dry Slaughter; Blocks Hoover Plan To
Help Enforcement; Copeland Asks Law To Stop Killings, CHI. DAILY TRIB., June 20, 1929, at
1; James W. Wadsworth, Jr., The Death Toll of Enforcement, 229 N. AM. REV. 257, 257, 261-62
(1930); Oswald Garrison Villard, Official Lawlessness: The Third Degree and the Crime Wave,
155 HARPER'S MAG. 605, 605 (1927) ("[Ihe most dangerous criminals we have in America are
the officials who in growing number openly disregard or violate the laws."). The Wickersham
Commission dryly remarked on "the attempt to enforce the National Prohibition Act as
something on another plane from the law generally; an assumption that it was of paramount
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Eighteenth Amendment with lawlessness, the epithet was returned
with interest by those who were appalled by "the utter disregard for
law and personal rights which has become the almost invariable
accompaniment of the efforts on the part of our enforcement officers
to compel compliance" with prohibition. 39 "[N]othing," it was said,
"breeds disrespect for all law so much as its violation by those
charged with upholding it."54
Apart from the question of whether wiretapping was a search and
seizure under the Fourth Amendment, Olmstead contained a second
issue, which was not constitutional, and which had been specifically
excluded by the limited grant of certiorari. It was the issue,
however, that from the very beginning most concerned Brandeis, 4'
and that had roused Holmes to a dissenting opinion.542 It was the
issue of official lawlessness, and the question was whether federal
courts ought to admit evidence procured in violation of the law.
Wiretapping was a misdemeanor under Washington law, and so
the evidence that had convicted Olmstead was secured through
what was, literally, a crime. In a short but pungent opinion,
Holmes argued that the Court was not "bound" by any "body of
precedents," '43 and that therefore it had "to choose, and for my part
I think it a less evil that some criminals should escape than that the
importance and that constitutional guarantees and legal limitations on agencies of law
enforcement and on administration must yield to the exigencies or convenience of enforcing
it." NAT'L COMM'N ON LAW OBSERVANCE AND ENFORCEMENT, supra note 537, at 81-82.
Some advocates of the law have constantly urged and are still urging disregard
or abrogation of the guarantees of liberty and of sanctity of the home which had
been deemed fundamental in our policy.... High-handed methods, shootings and
killings, even where justified, alienated thoughtful citizens, believers in law and
order. Unfortunate public expressions by advocates of the law, approving killings
and promiscuous shootings and lawless raids and seizures and deprecating the
constitutional guarantees involved, aggravated this effect. Pressure for lawless
enforcement, encouragement of bad methods and agencies of obtaining evidence,
and crude methods of investigation and seizure on the part of incompetent or
badly chosen agents started a current of adverse public opinion in many parts
of the land.
Id. at 82.
539. Henry Hasley, Note, Criminal Law-searches and Seizures-Tapping of Telephone
Wires-Admissibility of Evidence, 4 NOTRE DAME LAW. 202, 205 (1928).
540. Haines, supra note 536, at 318.
541. See supra text accompanying notes 473-76.
542. See supra text accompanying note 485, infra note 547.
543. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438,470 (Holmes, J., dissenting). For a discussion
of relevant precedents, see infra note 555.
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Government should play an ignoble part."5 44 Breaking the law by'
wiretapping was a "dirty business"54 and federal courts ought not
"to allow such iniquities to succeed. 546
Brandeis made the same point, although more elaborately and to
more brilliant rhetorical effect.547 He argued that by ratifying the
crimes of its agents the government and its judiciary had itself
544. Olmstead, 277 U.S. at 470 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
545. Id. Holmes's law clerk, Arthur E. Sutherland, recalls: "I sat in the courtroom and
heard the old man read his dissent. His words and voice and manner were disdainful. It
seemed as though he were obliged to hold something unpleasant in his hands. I can still hear
his careful voice speaking of 'this dirty business'." David M. O'Brien, Sutherland's
Recollections of Justice Holmes, in YEARBOOK 1988, at 18, 25 (Supreme Court Historical Soc'y
ed., 1988).
546. Olmstead, 277 U.S. at 470 (Holmes, J., dissenting). "[Ilt makes no difference," Holmes
argued,
that in this case wire tapping is made a crime by the law of the State, not by the
law of the United States. It is true that a State cannot make rules of evidence
for Courts of the United States, but the State has authority over the conduct in
question, and I hardly think that the United States would appear to greater
advantage when paying for an odious crime against State law than when
inciting to the disregard of its own. I am aware of the often repeated statement
that in a criminal proceeding the Court will not take notice of the manner in
which papers offered in evidence have been obtained. But that somewhat
rudimentary mode of disposing of the question has been overthrown by Weeks
v. United States, 232 U. S. 383 and the cases that have followed it.
Id. at 470-71.
Holmes's stance infuriated Taft, who regarded it as nasty. See infra note 547. Van Devanter
would later send Taft a clipping from the Baltimore Evening Sun praising Holmes, with an
angry, snide note that exactly identified the division between pre-New Deal conservatism and
liberalism:
It seems strange to see one who believes and often says that the Constitution
does not stand in the way of experiments which have the approval of a dominant
sentiment, and who has no abiding moral principles, characterized as a protector
of the imperiled minority and as unalterably adhering to high moral principles.
Letter from WVD to WHT (June 20, 1928), microformed on TAFT PAPERS, supra note 9, Reel
302.
547. Taft later wrote his brother:
Holmes has written the nastiest opinion in dissent and Brandeis is fuller of
eloquence and idealism.... The truth is that Holmes voted the other way till
Brandeis got after him and induced him to change on the ground that the state
law in Washington forbade wiretapping. Holmes in his opinion really admits
that the 4th Amendment does not cover wiretapping. If it does not, then the law
is all against his conclusion on which he rests his case but he is a law unto
himself if Brandeis says yes.
Letter from WHT to Horace D. Taft (June 12, 1928), microformed on TAFT PAPERS, supra note
9, Reel 302.
WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW
become "a lawbreaker, and that federal courts should use the
doctrine of clean hands to protect themselves from this danger.
5 49
The court ought to exclude such evidence "in order to maintain
respect for law; in order to promote confidence in the administration
of justice; in order to preserve the judicial process from contamina-
tion."'55 He concluded with an eloquent peroration that precisely
evoked the widespread popular anxiety about official lawlessness
and that deftly turned on Taft the Chief Justice's often stated
conviction that prohibition should be enforced to maintain the rule
of law:
Decency, security and liberty alike demand that government
officials shall be subjected to the same rules of conduct that are
commands to the citizen. In a government of laws, existence of
the government will be imperilled if it fails to observe the law
scrupulously. Our Government is the potent, the omnipresent
teacher. For good or for ill, it teaches the whole people by its
example. Crime is contagious. If the Government becomes a
lawbreaker, it breeds contempt for law; it invites every man to
become a law unto himself; it invites anarchy. To declare that in
the administration of the criminal law the end justifies the
means-to declare that the Government may commit crimes in
order to secure the conviction of a private criminal-would bring
terrible retribution. Against that pernicious doctrine this Court
should resolutely set its face.551
548. Olmstead, 277 U.S. at 483 (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
549. Id. at 483-84.
550. Id. at 484.
551. Id. at 485. Stone concurred in the opinions of Holmes and Brandeis, but wrote
separately to argue that the grant of certiorari could not restrain the Court from considering
the question of the admissibility of the evidence, which was fairly presented by the record on
appeal. Id. at 488 (Stone, J., dissenting). In his last days as Attorney General, after his
nomination to the Court had been confirmed by the Senate, Stone had written to Frankfurter
that he had reorganized the Bureau of Investigation of the Justice Department to impress
upon agents of the Bureau
that the real problem of law enforcement is in trying to obtain the cooperation
and sympathy of the public and that they cannot hope to get such cooperation
until they themselves merit the respect of the public. The Agents of the Bureau
of Investigation have been impressed with the fact ... that they must not be
guilty of violations of law in gathering evidence upon violations of law, for the
respect to which they are entitled as law enforcement officers can only be
obtained by their strictly observing the rights of citizens and the law of the land.
Letter from HFS to Felix Frankfurter (Feb. 9, 1925) (Stone Papers). Stone was
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If Taft was concerned that defiance of prohibition would lead to
"anarchy,"5 2 Brandeis would expose the real roots of legal legiti-
macy. If Taft worried about the growth of a "contemptuous attitude
toward law," ' 3 Brandeis would elaborate the foundations of "a
government of law." If Taft insisted that "intelligent and well-to-do
people" exemplify respect and obedience to law,554 Brandeis would
explain whose "example" really mattered. For Brandeis, and per-
haps also for Holmes, these questions did not involve the forms of
deference appropriately required by the administrative state; they
turned instead on the necessity of maintaining the rule of law that
legitimated the administrative state itself.
Taft was rhetorically defenseless in the face of this remarkable
assault. He could in his opinion only argue that the Court "must
apply in the case at bar" the common law rule in effect in the State
of Washington in 1889, the year when Washington was admitted to
the Union.55 This common law rule, Taft asserted, was that "the
firmly of the opinion that officials of the Department of Justice can more
effectively perform their duties by acting the part of gentlemen than by resorting
to tactics of a different character. The work of gathering evidence and of
conducting litigation should be done in a gentlemanly way. Agents of the Bureau
of Investigation in the past may have been inclined to place emphasis on the end
rather than on the means.
Id.; see Letter from HFS to Roger Baldwin (Jan. 20, 1925) (American Civil Liberties Union
Archives: The Roger Baldwin Years: 1917-1950, Vols. 271-272) ("I am coming around to the
view that law administration would be imensely [sic] improved in the United States not only
by strict obedience to law by all law enforcement officers, but by insistence that the United
States and its law enforcement officials should play the roll [sic] of gentlemen in the difficult
task of law administration.").
552. See supra note 323 and accompanying text.
553. See supra text accompanying note 326.
554. See supra notes 325-26 and accompanying text.
555. Olmstead, 277 U.S. at 468. Taft's appeal to the common law was in truth
fundamentally ambiguous, because the nature of the law that determined the admission of
evidence in federal criminal prosecutions was at the time utterly unclear. In 1851 the Court
had held that evidentiary rules in federal criminal prosecutions were to be determined by the
law in effect in the state of prosecution in 1789. United States v. Reid, 53 U.S. (12 How.) 361,
362-63 (1851). In 1892, in Logan v. United States, 144 U.S. 263, 303 (1892), the Court applied
the logic of Reid to rule that federal courts should in criminal trials apply the law of evidence
in effect in the state of prosecution as of the date of the state's admission to the Union. This
approach produced increasingly intolerable results as the law of evidence evolved. By 1918,
therefore, the Court in Rosen v. United States, 245 U.S. 467 (1918), was prepared to invoke
"the light of general authority and of sound reason" explicitly to discard "the dead-hand of the
common-law rule of 1789." Rosen fashioned its own rule of evidence that reflected "the
conviction of our time." Id. at 470-71; see Greer v. United States, 245 U.S. 559, 561 (1918).
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admissibility of evidence is not affected by the illegality of the
means by which it was obtained."55 Although Taft did not seek
Two years later, however, the Court without explanation returned to the regime of Reid. See
Jin Fuey Moy v. United States, 254 U.S. 189, 195 (1920). The upshot was that at the time of
Olmstead the law of evidence for federal criminal trials was in a state of utter "perplexity."
W. Barton Leach, State Law of Evidence in the Federal Courts, 43 HARV. L. REv. 554, 565
(1930).
In Olmstead, Taft chose to ignore Rosen and to follow Logan, holding that the Olmstead
trial should be governed by the evidentiary law of Washington in effect in 1889, the year of
Washington's admission to the Union:
While a Territory, the English common law prevailed in Washington and thus
continued after her admission in 1889. The rules of evidence in criminal cases
in courts of the United States sitting there, consequently are those of the
common law. United States u. Reid, 12 How. 361, 363, 366; Logan v. United
States, 144 U.S. 263, 301; Rosen u. United States, 245 U.S. 467... Robinson v.
United States 292 Fed. 683, 685.
The common law rule is that the admissibility of evidence is not affected by
the illegality of the means by which it was obtained.
Olmstead, 277 U.S. at 466-67; see Leach, supra, at 564-65. In 1944, Rule 26 of the Federal
Rules of Criminal Procedure definitively overruled this approach, on the ground that
since all Federal crimes are statutory and all criminal prosecutions in the
Federal courts are based on acts of Congress, uniform rules of evidence appear
desirable if not essential in criminal cases, as otherwise the same facts under
differing rules of evidence may lead to a conviction in one district and to an
acquittal in another.
FED. R. CRIM. P. 26, Notes to the Rules of Criminal Procedure for the District Courts of the
United States, reprinted in 7 DRAFrING HISTORY OF THE FEDERAL RULES OF CRIMINAL
PROCEDURE 225,260 (Madeleine J. Wilken & Nicholas Triffin eds., 1991) (citations omitted).
The approach of Rule 26 was based on the Court's decisions in Funk v. United States, 290 U.S.
371, 379 (1933), and Wolfe v. United States, 291 U.S. 7, 12 (1934), which had held that rules
of evidence in criminal cases should be determined "by common law principles as interpreted
and applied by the federal courts in the light of reason and experience." Id.
Taft's use of Logan allowed him to ignore the inconvenient fact that Washington law at the
time of the Olmstead trial was to the effect that "it is beneath the dignity of the state and
contrary to public policy for the state to use for its own profit evidence that has been obtained
in violation of the law." State v. Buckley, 258 P. 1030, 1031 (Wash. 1927); see State v. Gibbons,
203 P. 390, 396 (Wash. 1922). It also allowed Taft to avoid the problem of determining what
the actual common law rule might have been in 1928, which would have required Taft to
confront the trend of common law decisions upholding the exclusionary rule. See supra note
394. Oddly, neither Holmes nor Brandeis challenged Taft's choice of law in their dissent.
556. Olmstead, 277 U.S. at 467. In his private correspondence Taft elaborated the point:
Holmes says the misdemeanor of the State of Washington is a crime but he does
not realize or consider that the admissibility of evidence in the Federal Courts
is determined not by a statute but by the common law. More than this-a large
majority of the states' Supreme Courts refuse to follow the Weeks' case decided
by our Court as to the admissibility of evidence secured by violation of the 4th
amendment. Chief Judge Cardozo speaking for the Court of Appeals of New York
writes an opinion showing that 31 State Supreme Courts are against it and only
fourteen for it. They have had in New York a case decided by their Appellate
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explicitly or elaborately to justify this rule, he did intimate its
underlying utilitarian calculation in favor of law enforcement:
A standard which would forbid the reception of evidence if
obtained by other than nice ethical conduct by government
officials would make society suffer and give criminals greater
immunity than has been known heretofore. In the absence of
controlling legislation by Congress, those who realize the
difficulties in bringing offenders to justice may well deem it wise
that the exclusion of evidence should be confined to cases where
rights under the Constitution would be violated by admitting
it.
55 7
The upshot was that in the name of upholding the sanctity of the
legal order, Taft and the Court had been maneuvered into ratifying
official lawbreaking."6 8 And in the name of suppressing those who
division following the same principle in which the evidence of the police man
who listened in by wiretapping was held to be admissible although the law of
New York forbids wire tapping as a misdemeanor.
Letter from WHT to Horace D. Taft (June 12, 1928), microformed on TAFT PAPERS, supra note
9, Reel 302. This explanation, however, is in tension with the choice of law rule actually
adopted by Taft in the Olmstead opinion itself, which required Taft to apply the common law
rule in effect in 1889, see supra note 555, and the explanation also suggests that Taft was
himself simply unaware of changes in the common law that had occurred by 1928. See supra
note 394.
557. Olmstead, 277 U.S. at 468. Holmes would later take exception to this formulation of
the question:
The C. J. who wrote the prevailing opinion, perhaps as a rhetorical device to
obscure the difficulty, perhaps merely because he did not note the difference,
which perhaps I should have emphasized more, spoke of the objection to the
evidence as based on its being obtained by "unethical" means (horrid phrase),
although he adds & by a misdemeanor under the laws of Washington. I said that
the State of Washington had made it a crime and that the Government could not
put itself in the position of offering to pay for a crime in order to get evidence of
another crime. Brandeis wrote much more elaborately, but I didn't agree with
all that he said. I should not have printed what I wrote, however, if he has not
asked me to.
Letter from OWH to Frederick Pollock (June 20, 1928), in 2 HOLMES-POLLOcK
CORRESPONDENCE, supra note 294, at 222. Apparently Taft's utilitarian calculus has proved
convincing to later generations, because in the absence of an explicit statutory exclusionary
rule the acquisition of evidence through the violation of criminal law (as distinct from through
the violation of the Fourteenth Amendment) has not been thought to warrant exclusion. See,
e.g., United States v. Thompson, 936 F.2d 1249 (11th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 1075
(1992). I am grateful to Daniel Solove for this reference.
558. The position clearly made Taft uncomfortable and defensive:
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would defy the law of prohibition, they had been forced to. condone
a practice that was forbidden to FBI officers as "unethical" and that
was at the federal level associated almost entirely with prohibition
enforcement. 59 Taft could complain that it was "bizarre" to interpret
Olmstead as reflecting "an interest in convicting bootleggers," because
Of course one does not like to be held up as one who favors the worst morals but
we have to put up with such attacks in our efforts to follow the old time common
law recognized by all authorities English and American that if evidence is
pertinent it is admissible however obtained. Cardozo argues that this view is the
proper one in defense of society. We have hard enough time to convict without
presenting immunity to ... criminals. I shall continue to be worried by attacks
from all the academic lawyers who write college law journals but I suppose it is
not a basis for impeachment. We pointed out that Congress can change the rule
if it sees fit. It will be of interest to see whether Congress will do it. Here it may
be that the prohibitionists in Congress will oppose such legislation not because
of their sensitiveness as to the scope of the 4th Amendment but just because
they are in favor of convicting boot leggers. Indeed many of the opposing views
are and will be due to that issue solely.
Letter from WHT to Horace D. Taft (June 12, 1928), microformed on TAFr PAPERS, supra note
9, Reel 302. Taft was particularly exercised at the "outcry" in the "New York papers," whose
"feeling about bootleggers and prohibition is so strong" that they didn't "seem to realize that
this decision is exactly in accord with the law of their state defended as it is more broadly
even in an attack on the Weeks case by another Jew Cardozo and by the Appellate Division
case cited in the last page of the opinion." Letter from WHT to WVD (June 13, 1928) (Van
Devanter Papers).
559. See Frown on Wire-Tapping, N.Y. TIMES, June 7, 1928, at 29 ("Attorney General
Sargent has instructed agents of the Department of Justice not to resort to this measure for
running down criminals and Commissioner Doran has discouraged its use by prohibition
agents.... 'Although wire-tapping is legal, it is not ethical,' the Department of Justice holds.").
560. Taft would persistently resist the effort to categorize Olmstead as a prohibition
opinion. He wrote to his brother:
It has an element of humor for me that the public seems to be affected by the
fact that it is against the bootleggers and assumes that it was that which carried
the day. Of course that had nothing to do with the conclusion. The telephone
might just as well have been used to carry on a conspiracy to rob, to murder, to
commit treason.
Letter from WHT to Horace D. Taft (June 12, 1928), microformed on TAFT PAPERS, supra note
9, Reel 302. He wrote to Van Devanter that
I suppose you have seen the criticisms of my opinion and our decision in the wire
tapping case. We'll have to stand it of course, without answer or demur.... It
can't be gotten out of the heads of the public that it is a decision on the
Prohibition law. I doubt if the indignation of critics would be so great if it were
a conspiracy to murder that was carried on that way.
Letter from WHT to WVD (June 12, 1928) (Van Devanter Papers). Van Devanter replied:
I have seen many of the public comments on the wire-tapping decision and
have observed, as you have, that some of the comments treat the decision as
though it was peculiar to prohibition cases. Had the decision related to evidence
in a case involving a scheme to defraud the United States or to corrupt some of
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its officers the press and public would have given it undivided approval. The real
nature of the question and of the decision will gradually come to be appreciated
and understood. As with any important constitutional decision it must be judged
by its working through a period of time and not by its accidental application in
a similar case. No doubt other cases will be arising in which the principle will
have application to other kinds of crime and in other surroundings. When this
happens the vision of those who are talking about it now will expand to a larger
range and views will be readjusted accordingly. I am quite content to leave the
outcome to experience. A man named Lowman or something like that who was
once Lieutenant Governor of New York and is now an Assistant Secretary of the
Treasury or in some other position of prominence in the prohibition
administration, gave out an interview-am told it is authentic-to the effect that
in the enforcement of the prohibition law "the practice of wire-tapping will be
followed wherever deemed expedient." This is an unfortunate statement made
at an inappropriate time. For other reasons I have come to think that Lowman
is quite unfit for his job. More than half the agitation about prohibition is due
to the actions and declarations of incompetents in places of authority. A wise
man in such a place would talk little, would work hard and endeavor to exercise
a wide supervision and devote himself to securing results which will speak for
themselves.
Letter from WVD to WHT (June 15, 1928) (Van Devanter Papers). "Time and experience will
demonstrate that the decision is right," Van Devanter wrote Taft:
Part of the opposition comes from men who look on the decision as merely
relating to the detection of liquor transactions. Another part look on it as likely
to interfere with socialistic and communistic efforts. The publication called "The
Nation" has come to be distinctly socialistic and in its last issue it published an
ugly criticism of the decision on its first page.... From beginning to end it lends
itself to tearing down, not building up. Every communist in the country and
every sympathizer with communism naturally will be against the decision, and
so will those who call themselves reformers but in truth are infected with
communism. We do not have to go far to see that this is so.
Letter from WVD to WHT (June 16, 1928) (Van Devanter Papers).
Taft replied:
I hope with you that consideration of the question will justify our conclusion in
the minds of fair men who understand the exact issue. I anticipate that there
will be an immediate effort by legislation to negative the effect of the decision
but I am hoping that a discussion will clarify the real issue. I have no objection
to a provision that no evidence secured by wire tapping or intercepting messages
over telephone systems shall be admissible in courts of the United States in the
trial of criminal cases provided that the act shall not apply in any indictment for
treason, murder, anarchy, robbery, conspiracy against the United States where
there is evidence tending to show that the telephone is being used to promote
such treason, murder, anarchy, robbery or conspiracy. I am not troubled about
the liquor law. That can take care of itself but in the crimes above mentioned
and others society would be at the mercy of the most dangerous criminals if they
could use the telephone to carry on such crimes and be immune from using the
telephone to discover or offset its use for such criminal purpose. Otherwise such
immunity would be making the telephone a Frankenstein.
Letter from WHT to WVD (June 22, 1928) (Van Devanter Papers). Van Devanter promptly
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"the men who voted with the majority and carried the case included
men who have in a good many instances taken a view of the law
which would be regarded as anti-prohibition, like Sutherland,
Butler and McReynolds, and the other side includes Holmes and
Brandeis, who have been voting to sustain the 18th Amendment
vigorously in many cases." '61 But the Court was nevertheless in an
impossible position, and it made Taft bitter.
562
It was all but inevitable that Olmstead would be read as an
opinion carrying "still further the process of creating a govern-
mental bureaucracy equipped with almost unlimited powers of
espionage for the purpose of attempting to enforce Prohibition. 563
The Court was said to be "bewitched by Prohibition,"5" and
wrote back to Taft:
I seriously doubt the propriety of making any concessions respecting the need
for legislation restraining the use of evidence of the kind considered in the wire-
tapping cases. To my mind there is no need for such legislation; nor is there any
sound basis for making a legislative distinction in this regard between different
classes of crime. The agitation which followed the decision will gradually
exhaust itself and the decision will come to be accepted as sound in principle and
needed in practice.
Letter from WVD to WHT (June 25, 1928), microformed on TAFr PAPERS, supra note 9, Reel
302.
561. Letter from WHT to M.S. Sherman (July 11, 1928), microformed on TAFr PAPERS,
supra note 9, Reel 303.
562. Taft complained to his brother that the Olmstead dissenters
abused us as encouragers of criminals in receiving the evidence of the
wiretapping as proper. Brandeis was especially severe in his strictures on our
lack of dignity and morality and I have no doubt he will find a good many
followers. It is rather trying to have to be held up as immoral by one who is full
of tricks all the time. But he can become full of eloquent denunciation without
great effort.... His claques in the law school contingent will sound his praises
and point the finger of scorn at us, but if they think we are going to be
frightened in our effort to stand by the law and give the public a chance to
punish criminals, they are mistaken, even though we are condemned for lack of
high ideals.... Stone has become entirely subservient to Holmes and Brandeis--I
am very much disappointed in him. I urged Coolidge to appoint him but he
hungers for the applause of the law school professors and the admirers of
Holmes. If Holmes' dissents in constitutional cases had been followed, we should
have had no constitution.... Holmes has very little knowledge of governmental
principles.
Letter from WHT to Horace D. Taft (June 8, 1928), microformed on TAFt PAPERS, supra note
9, Reel 302.
563. Editorial, The Court on Wire-Tapping, WORLD, June 6, 1928, at 12.
564. Wire-Tapping Held Legal, LITERARY DIG., June 16, 1928, at 10 (quoting the New York
Evening Post).
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Olmstead was blasted as "the Dred Scott decision of prohibition." '565
Most damaging, however, was the perception, hammered home by
Olmstead, that prohibition could be imposed on a recalcitrant
population only by such "detestable" practices as the "dirty busi-
ness" of wiretapping.566 The impression left by Olmstead was that
"the heaviest load which prohibition has to carry is the shocking
lawlessness that has been employed to enforce it." '567
Ix
In essence, the Court in Olmstead opted for law enforcement over
the rule of law. The decision was received as confirming the view
that the positive law of prohibition would be sustained by all means
necessary. Attempting to explain the demise of prohibition, the
historian David Kyvig has observed that "[diuring the 1920s the
Supreme Court did more than either Congress or the president to
define the manner in which national prohibition would be
enforced." '568 Kyvig argues that decisions like Olmstead, Lanza,
Carroll, and Lambert created "[t]he image of a government prepared
to engage in more aggressive and intrusive policing practices than
ever before in order to enforce" prohibition.56 9 These cases confirmed
the "disenchanted" perception "that government, unable to cope
with lawbreakers by using traditional police methods, was assuming
new powers in order to accomplish its task. 57 °
Taft's efforts to lead the Court relentlessly to sustain prohibition
thus had the paradoxical effect of accentuating the disparity
between the positive law of prohibition and traditional values. This
565. A New Dred Scott Decision, 149 OUTLOOK 293, 293 (1928). Even the Anti-Saloon
League refused unequivocally to support the decision. See Dr. Nicholson Backs Dry Wire-
Tapping, N.Y. TIMES, June 24, 1928, at N3 ("The Anti-Saloon League 'deplores' the recent
Supreme Court decision legalizing 'wire-tapping' in Prohibition cases, if the ruling is to apply
to the Prohibition law only, according to Dr. S. E. Nicholson, National Secretary and State
Superintendent of the dry organization.... It is feared by the dry forces that prohibition will
fall into 'disrepute' and suffer 'irreparable harm' if the American public concludes that
"universal snooping" is favored for enforcing the Eighteenth Amendment.").
566. With the Editor: Judge-Made Law, BARRON'S WEEKLY, June 11, 1928, at 11.
567. Editorial, 126 NATION 679, 679 (1928). For Van Devanter's attack on this article, see
supra note 560.
568. KYVIG, supra note 130, at 32.
569. Id. at 35.
570. Id.
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disparity was most acute in the context of law enforcement, in which
Americans increasingly concluded that the "experience of the last
decade has shown that if we keep nationwide prohibition we shall
continue to have with it summary haltings of automobiles at night,
regulation of non-intoxicants, wire tapping, invasions of the home,
and indiscriminate fatal shootings. These are the price we pay for
prohibition. 5 71 And, increasingly, Americans concluded, as did
Zechariah Chafee, that "the price is too high." '572
The Taft Court exposed and sharpened the administrative teeth
necessary to sustain the noble experiment, and in that way
contributed to the growing national sense that prohibition was
simply not worth the costs of its enforcement. Taft had been right
in the years before 1918. A sumptuary law that was out of touch
with the conscience of the community, and that was obeyed only as
a result of an escalating spiral of repressive enforcement, was
simply not sustainable. The Constitution could retain authority only
if it was regarded as legitimate, and legitimacy did not lie merely in
the procedures of Article V. The failure of prohibition demonstrated
that the positive law of the Constitution must also be answerable to
the people and to their beliefs.
In 1933, five years after Olmstead, Americans ratified the
Twenty-first Amendment, which repealed the Eighteenth. 3 In that
way they acted to reconnect the positive law of the Constitution to
their actual convictions.
571. Chafee, supra note 294, at 949.
572. Id.
573. U.S. CONST. amend. XXI, § 1.
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APPENDIX
Figure A: Percentage of Cases in Which a Justice Joins or Authors an Opinion for the Court
o S £ u 2 o 2,
IM ) 0 -
- 0
m Percentage of decisions in which a Justice joins or authors an opinion for the court In prohibiton.related cases, 1921-1928 Tenms
Percentage of decisions In which a Justice joins or authors an opinion for the Court In all cases, 1921-1928 Teoms
2006] 173
WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 48:1
Figure B: Percentage Likelihood that a Justice Will Join or Author an Opinion for the Court in
Prohibition Cases as Distinct from All Cases
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Table 1
National Prohibition Laws Before 1920
Name Date Enacted Regulation Substance
Regulated
Webb-Kenyon March 1, 1913 Prohibited importation of "Intoxicating
Act 574  liquor into a state for liquor"
purposes unlawful in that
state
Reed March 3, 1917 Prohibited importation of "Intoxicating
Amendment576  liquor into a state under liquors"
whose laws manufacture
or sale of intoxicating
beverages was illegal
Military May 18, 1917 Prohibited sale of liquor to "Any intoxicat-
Prohibition5 76  soldiers in uniform ing liquor"
Lever Act 577  August 10, 1917 Prohibited use of food "Food materi-
materials in production of als" for produc-
distilled spirits for tion of "distilled
beverage purposes spirits"
Presidential December 8, Prohibited production of 'Malt liquor
Proclamation 1917 malt liquor except ale or except ale and
(pursuant to porter porter" contain-
Lever Act)5 75  ing more than
2.75% alcohol
by weight
574. Webb-Kenyon Act, ch. 90, 37 Stat. 699 (1913) (codified at 27 U.S.C. § 122).
575. Reed Amendment, ch. 162, § 5, 39 Stat. 1058, 1069 (1917). The Reed Amendment
represented a significant step in the nationalization of alcohol regulation, as it prohibited the
importation of liquor into any state that proscribed its sale or manufacture, even if state law
did not itself prohibit importation:
Whoever shall order, purchase, or cause intoxicating liquors to be transported
in interstate commerce, except for scientific, sacramental, medicinal, and
mechanical purposes, into any State or Territory the laws of which State or
Territory prohibit the manufacture or sale therein of intoxicating liquors for
beverage purposes shall be ... fined not more than $1,000 or imprisoned not more
than six months, or both; and for any subsequent offense shall be imprisoned not
more than one year.
Id.
576. Military Prohibition Act, ch. 15, § 12, 40 Stat. 76, 82-83 (1917).
577. Lever Act, ch. 53, § 15, 40 Stat. 276, 282 (1917).
578. Proclamation of Dec. 8, 1917, 40 Stat. 1728, 1728-29.
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Presidential September 16, Prohibited production of "Malt liquors,
Proclamation 1918 all malt liquors for including near
(pursuant to beverage purposes beer, for bever-
Lever Act) 79  age purposes,"
whether con-
taining alcohol
or not
War-Time November 21, Prohibited sale of distilled "Distilled
Prohibition 1918 spirits and sale or manu- spirits" and
Actm' facture of wine and beer "beer wine, or
for beverage purposes other intoxicat-
ing malt of
vinous liquor"
National October 28, 1919 Prohibited manufacture, Beverages >
Prohibition sale, transportation, or 0.5% alcohol 582
(Volstead) possession of liquor
Act 5
81
579. Proclamation of Sept. 16, 1918, 40 Stat. 1848, 1848-49
580. War Time Prohibition Act, ch. 212, § 1, 40 Stat. 1045, 1046-47 (1918).
581. National Prohibition Act, ch. 85, 41 Stat. 305, 305 (1919).
582. That is, all beverages containing more than 0.5% alcohol.
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Table 2
States with Statewide Prohibition Regimes in 191883
State Activities Substances Notable
Prohibited5" Prohibited Exceptions for
Personal, Noncom-
mercial Use'
Alabama Manufacture, Beverages > 0.5% Allowed social serv-
sale, importa- alcohol ing of liquor in
tion, possession private homes and
of more than personal importation
limited quanti- of two quarts dis-
ties tilled spirits or two
gallons of wine or
five gallons of beer
every fifteen days
Arizona Manufacture, "Intoxicating
sale, importa- liquors of any kind"
tion, possession
of liquor one
has had
imported
Arkansas Manufacture, "Any alcoholic,
sale, importa- vinous, malt,
tion spirituous or
fermented liquors"
583. This table is constructed from the compilation of laws in FEDERAL AND STATE LAWS
RELATING TO INTOXICATING LIQUOR (Wayne B. Wheeler ed., 2d ed. 1918).
584. To facilitate comparison, this table has endeavored to fashion standardized categories
of activities from the many different terms used in different state laws. For example, while
many statutes prohibit both "sale" and "storage for sale," for purposes of this table, both
prohibitions are subsumed under "sale."
585. This column excludes narrow categories of permissible activities so widespread as to
be of minimal comparative significance, for example, use of liquor for medicinal purposes and
use of wine for sacramental purposes.
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Colorado Manufacture, "Any intoxicating Allowed importation
sale liquors" by permit of limited
quantities for home
use
Georgia Manufacture, Beverages > 0.5% Allowed social
sale alcohol service of liquor in
private homes
Indiana Manufacture, Beverages > 0.5% Allowed personal
sale alcohol manufacture of wine
or cider for personal
use and social
service of liquor in
private homes
Iowa Manufacture, "All intoxicating Did not prohibit
sale liquor whatever" personal importation
for personal use
Kansas Manufacture, "Any intoxicating
sale, possession liquors"
Maine Manufacture Any intoxicating Did not prohibit
for sale, sale liquor as beverage personal importation
for personal use
Michigan Manufacture, Any beverage with Did not prohibit
sale intoxicating personal importation
qualities for personal use
Mississippi Manufacture, Any intoxicating Allowed manufac-
sale, importa- liquor ture of homemade
tion, possession wine for household
use
Montana Manufacture, Beverages > 2% Did not prohibit
sale, importa- alcohol personal importation
tion for personal use
Nebraska Manufacture, Beverages > 0.5%
sale, importa- alcohol
tion, purchase , _II
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New Manufacture, Beverages > 1% Allowed social
Hampshire sale by other alcohol service of liquor in
than state and private homes; did
local agents not prohibit personal
(and then only importation for
for medical, personal use
sacramental,
mechanical,
or scientific
purposes)
New Mexico Manufacture Any liquor
for sale, sale, containing alcohol
importation for
sale
North Manufacture, All liquors produc- Allowed wine and
Carolina sale, importa- ing intoxication cider to be manufac-
tion tured and sold at
place of manufac-
ture; allowed
personal importation
of one quart of liquor
for personal use
every fifteen days
North Manufacture, Any spirituous, Did not prohibit
Dakota sale, importa- malt, vinous, fer- personal importation
tion mented, or other for personal use
intoxicating liquor
Oklahoma Manufacture, Beverages > 0.5%
sale, importa- alcohol
tion, and pos-
session of more
than limited
quantities
Oregon Manufacture, Beverages > 0.5%
sale, importa- alcohol
tion, and
possession
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South Manufacture, All liquors produc-
Carolina sale, importa- ing intoxication
tion, possession
South Manufacture, Any beverage with
Dakota sale, importa- alcohol
tion
Tennessee Manufacture
for sale, sale,
importation
Texas Manufacture, All liquors produc- Did not prohibit
sale, importa- ing intoxication personal importation
tion for personal use
Utah Manufacture, Beverages > 0.5%
sale, importa- alcohol
tion, possession
Virginia Manufacture, Beverages > 0.5% Allowed personal
sale, importa- alcohol manufacture of wine
tion or cider for personal
use; allowed
personal importation
of one quart of
distilled spirits or
three gallons of beer
or one gallon of wine
every thirty days by
any nonminor,
nonstudent male
Washington Manufacture, Any liquor contain- Allowed social
sale, importa- ing alcohol service of liquor in
tion, distribu- private homes
tion, and
possession of
more than lim-
ited quantities
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Manufacture,
sale
Beverages > 0.5%
alcohol
Allowed personal
manufacture of wine
and cider for
personal use;
allowed personal
importation for
personal use of one
quart of liquor every
thirty days
20061
West
Virginia
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Table 3
States Without Statewide Prohibition Regimes in 1918586
State Type of Activities that May Be
Regulation Regulated"7
California Local option Sale and public distribution only (so-
cial service in one's own home pro-
tected)
Connecticut County license Sale only
Delaware District option Sale and importation only (personal
importation in limited amount
permitted)
Florida County option Manufacture, sale, importation (home
manufacture of wine for home
consumption and personal importa-
tion in limited amounts permitted)
Idaho District option Manufacture, sale, importation, pos-
session (manufacture and transporta-
tion for sale outside prohibition dis-
trict permitted)
Illinois Local option Sale only
Kentucky Local option Sale (personal importation for per-
sonal use explicitly protected)
Louisiana Local option Sale (personal importation for per-
sonal use explicitly protected)
Maryland County option Sale (importation limited in several
counties)
Massachu- Local license Sale only
setts
Minnesota County option Sale only
Missouri License system Sale only
586. This table is constructed from the compilation of laws in FEDERAL AND STATE LAWS
RELATING TO INTOXICATING LIQUOR (Wayne B. Wheeler ed., 2d ed. 1918).
587. Like Table 2 supra, this table has endeavored to fashion standardized categories of
activities from the many different terms used in different state laws.
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Nevada Statewide pro- No broad categories of regulation
hibition of sales
to a "minor or
imbecile" or
known habitual
drunkard
New York Local option Manufacture, sale, importation, pos-
session (manufacture and transporta-
tion for sale outside prohibition dis-
trict permitted)
Ohio Local option Sale only
Pennsylvania License system Sale only
Rhode Island Local license Manufacture or sale (manufacture for
sale outside prohibition locality per-
mitted)
Vermont Local license Sale only
Wisconsin Local option Sale only
Wyoming County license Sale only
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